AQA

AS
Philosophy

7171 - Paper 1 – Epistemology and Moral Philosophy

Mark scheme

7171

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Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 2 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.
When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 15 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A - Epistemology

1 What is a necessary truth?

[2 marks]

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Accept any of the following:

- A proposition that is true in all (logically) possible worlds.
- A proposition that could not (possibly) have been false.
- A truth that could not be otherwise.

Notes:

- If they only say that it is a proposition whose contrary is a necessary falsehood, this can only get 1 mark.
- If they give a definition of analytic truth without linking it to the notion of necessity, then this cannot get any marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

2 Explain what knowledge is, according to reliabilism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The relevant line in the specification is: "replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (ie reliabilism)". (However, some [namely, reliabilists about justification] see this as more an analysis of what is meant by justification. For them, justification is best understood in terms of reliability of process. It is fine for students to discuss reliabilism in this sense [or even to explain both senses] as the question does not specify.)

- Students are likely to explain the general view in the following way (or similar)
    - *S* knows that *p* iff (if and only if)
        (1) *p* is true;
        (2) *S* believes that *p*;
        (3) *S*'s belief that *p* was produced by a reliable cognitive process.

- This may be explained as being the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and these terms might be explained. Knowledge is true belief produced by a reliable method.
- The reliability of a cognitive process will most likely be explained in terms of its tendency to cause true beliefs. Examples of reliable cognitive processes given by philosophers have included: memory, perception, testimony, introspection.

- Some students may mention implications, eg:
    - This is often seen as an "externalist" view whereby information about the process itself and its reliability need not be accessible to the agent in order for the agent to have knowledge.
    - This may mean that nonhuman animals might be capable of knowledge (presuming that they are capable of having beliefs).

- Some students may give examples of specific reliabilist accounts, e.g. Goldman's causal account, Nozick's truth-tracking account, etc.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

3 Briefly explain innatism and explain one of Locke's arguments against this view.
[9 marks]

AO = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Briefly explain innatism...

- Innatism is a rationalist view that affirms the existence of innate knowledge and/or innate concepts and so denies that, at (and/or before) birth, the mind is a tabula rasa (a blank slate). (It therefore challenges empiricism which denies the existence of innate knowledge/concepts and claims that the mind is a tabula rasa at birth.)
- Students might say "at (and/or before) the moment that they are first conscious" rather than "at (and/or before) birth", but either is fine (the latter being how this view is normally expressed).
- Students may give examples of proposed innate concepts (eg God, infinity, causation) and/or innate knowledge (eg geometrical, mathematical, logical or ethical truths). They might explain that at least some of this innate knowledge can be argued to be synthetic a priori knowledge (a possibility that empiricists deny).
- They have not been asked to explain why people take the position but some may, and this should not be counted as redundancy (though of course too much time spent on this first (and lesser) part of the question may prevent them having time to do a good job of the second part).
- Students may also distinguish the view that the innate is fully formed from the view of the innate as potential.

…and then explain one of Locke's arguments against this position.

- In general, as an empiricist, Locke argues against the existence of innate concepts and knowledge (ie against innatism) and so claims that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa (a blank slate).
- Students may discuss any of the following arguments which oppose innatism (though this is not exhaustive):

  - Lack of universal agreement:
    - P1: If a concept or item of knowledge was innate, then it would be universal (every person's mind would contain it from birth).
    - P2: If so, there would be universal assent/agreement regarding it.
    - P3: There are no such concepts or truths.
    - C: Therefore, there are no concepts or items of knowledge that are innate.
      - In support of P3, Locke discusses 'children and idiots' (by the latter, he means those with severe learning disabilities) who lack supposedly innate knowledge such as 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'.
      - He also discusses the different concepts of God that exist in different cultures, along with the absence of any concept of God in some.
      - Locke also responds to a particular objection to P2 which claims that these items of knowledge/concepts could be present universally but yet still not assented to, if it is possible that they are present in the mind without people (yet) being aware of them. He claims that if a person's mind contained an innate concept or item of knowledge from birth, that person would have to be aware of this from birth. It is, he says, *"near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not"* (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter II).
  - Alternative explanations: Locke argues that any suggested examples of innate concepts and items of knowledge can be adequately explained in some other way: as being based on experience, or as being acquired through reason without being innate, or as not existing at all (for example, he denies that we have a 'positive idea of infinity').
  - Universal agreement does not guarantee innateness: He argues (therefore) that even if there were universal agreement on certain concepts or items of knowledge, this would not mean that they were innate (presuming the agreement can be explained in other ways – see point above).
  - Problems distinguishing innate from non-innate: Locke argues in general that if 'possession of innate knowledge' means 'capacity to discover it at some point', then this does not adequately distinguish it from other items of knowledge. Specifically, he argues that if certain truths were present in the mind from birth but not universally assented to until the development of reason, then this would not adequately distinguish innate from non-innate knowledge. Examples:
    - Since it is through reason that all the maxims (axioms) and theorems (derived truths) of mathematics are discovered, it would mean that they are all innate.
    - Any proposition of the form 'X is not Y' will pass the test; but this will mean that there are 'legions' of innate propositions.
  - No innate concepts so no innate knowledge: He argues that there could be no innate knowledge unless there were innate concepts, so any argument against the existence or possibility of innate concepts is ipso facto an argument against innate knowledge. For example, 'yellow is not red' will be universally assented to; but 'there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience' than to claim that the concepts <yellow> and <red> are innate.

- Transgression of supposedly innate moral principles: He argues that the fact that people so confidently and serenely break supposedly innate moral principles is evidence that they are not innate. (This could be used as further support for the claim that there are no such universal concepts or truths.) Locke does provide the necessary supporting premise - if a moral rule is innate, it is action-initiating - in I.iii.3.

Notes:

- The weight of marks falls on an explanation of Locke's critique, although some credit should be given to answers that deal only with innatism: 3 marks maximum for those that explain innatism alone. This would constitute some relevant points, but no integration.
- There is a lot of possible content here and Locke does give further arguments in addition to those above.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

4 Explain Descartes' first and second 'waves of doubt'.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Descartes' purpose is to subject himself and his opinions to radical scepticism (the 'method of doubt') with the aim of finding certainty/indubitability/knowledge. These two sceptical arguments are proposed in this context as part of his methodological doubt.

- Students may set it out as a step by step argument (though it may of course be differently explained/structured). Here are two possible formats, but there are others:

The first 'wave of doubt': the argument from illusion/perceptual error

- Here is a simple way in which this could be put as an argument:
  - P1: If my senses can deceive me then they cannot and should not always be trusted as a source of knowledge.
  - P2: My senses do and can deceive me.
  - C: Therefore, my senses cannot be completely trusted.
- Descartes discuss things that are very far away and things that are very small as examples.
- However, Descartes does not see such examples from unusual perceptual conditions as giving us reason to doubt all of our senses all the time. For example, he says he can know that he is sat by the fire wearing a winter dressing-gown and holding a piece of paper.

- Students might note that the very fact that we think of such cases as illusions, as one-off cases of error, shows that they are not endemic.

The second 'wave of doubt': the argument from dreaming

- However, he continues, such events (ie being sat by a fire wearing a winter dressing-gown and holding a piece of paper) are the sorts of events that can be dreamt. Thus, even when perception is at its best and we have managed to rule out the possibility of ordinary misperception, it is still possible that we are deceived.
- The dreaming argument is based on the claim that dreams can be subjectively/qualitatively/phenomenally indistinguishable from waking experiences – ie that for any given experience, there is no way of telling whether it is a dreamed or a veridical experience from the experience itself.
- Here are two examples of how this might be structured as an argument (for guidance only – students may explain this accurately and proficiently in many ways):

    - P1: In order for a perception-based belief about mind-independent reality to count as knowledge (for me to be certain of it) there must be no grounds for doubting it.
    - P2: For all such beliefs, the possibility that I am dreaming gives sufficient grounds for doubting them.
    - C: Therefore, I have no perception-based knowledge about mind-independent reality.

    - P1: In order to know about the nature of the external world (what it is like), I need to be certain that I am not dreaming
    - P2: In order to be certain that I am not dreaming, dreams would have to be subjectively distinguishable from veridical experience.
    - P3: A vivid dream is subjectively indistinguishable from a possible veridical experience.
    - C: Therefore I cannot be certain that I am not now dreaming (it is possible that I am now dreaming and so I cannot know anything about what the external world is like.

- It is important to recognise that this argument applies specifically to perception-based ("sensory") knowledge claims about particular matters of fact.
- There are some beliefs that are not threatened by this sceptical argument: e.g. Descartes claims that the truths of maths and geometry, for example, are known whether we are awake or dreaming, and that mind-independent objects (which include body and extension) must exist since dreams must get their content from somewhere.

Notes:

- Whilst integrating the first and second waves of doubt is important in terms of the development of Descartes' methodological scepticism, students can still gain access to the top band by treating each argument discretely if this is done with clarity and precision, and the connection between the two waves is implicit in their exposition.
- If only one of the first or second waves of doubt is explained, then this can be given a maximum of 5 marks. This includes students who mistake the third wave of doubt (the evil deceiver) for either the first or second wave.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

5 How convincing is indirect realism?

[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13-15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct, and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used consistently and correctly throughout.
10-12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
7-9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always correctly.
4-6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.

	There is some limited use of philosophical language.
1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument. Philosophical terms might be mentioned.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students will likely begin by explaining indirect realism (IR), which can be most clearly split up into the following claims (especially for the purposes of evaluation):

    1. REALISM claim: Mind-independent objects and their properties (objects which exist whether or not they are perceived or conceived of) do exist.
    2. SENSE-DATA claim: We immediately perceive mind-dependent sense-data and their properties rather than these mind-independent objects and their properties
    3. REPRESENTATION claim: Our non-physical sense-data (normally/can) represent these physical mind-independent objects and their properties (at least to some extent) (meaning that we indirectly perceive them). Students may explain this in terms of the primary/secondary quality distinction, although there is no requirement for them to do so.
    4. CAUSATION claim: Our non-physical sense-data are (in the end) caused by these physical mind-dependent objects and their properties (ie by their effects on our physical bodies/brains).

- Conclusions may be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions and content discussed may be drawn from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive):

    - **UNCONVINCING**: the immediate objects of perception are (or are likely to be) mind-independent:
        - Broadly metaphysical/ontological objections to IR:
            - IR faces problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) represent mind-independent objects (there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of representation - this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content and/or Berkeley's "likeness" principle).
            - IR faces problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) are caused by mind-independent objects (there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of causation – this may be linked to questions about mind-body causation and so put as an anti-dualist and pro-materialist argument).
            - Other problems associated with sense-data: location issues (where are they?), and the issue of indeterminacy (the speckled hen problem).
        - Broadly epistemological objections to IR:
            - IR faces issues of scepticism about the existence and nature of the external world (the 'veil of perception').
            - In addition, it appears introspectively (a phenomenological point) that we are aware of mind-independent objects (the "transparency" of experience); statements about external mind-independent objects are irreducible to statements about 'mere' experiences.
                - Indirect realists can respond that good inductive support can be given for the existence of the external world:
                    - Locke's argument from the involuntary nature of our experience

- the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Locke and Catharine Trotter Cockburn (attrib)
- Bertrand Russell's response that the external world is the 'best hypothesis'.

- **CONVINCING:** the immediate objects of perception are never mind-independent (although mind-independent objects (probably/definitely) do exist) (ie arguing for indirect realism).
  - The argument from illusion.
  - The argument from hallucination (the possibility of experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception).
  - The argument from perceptual variation (Russell's table example)
  - The time-lag argument.
  - The argument from science (differences between the ordinary or folk conception of objects and the scientific conception).
    - Students may then discuss responses to these arguments from alternative theories of perception (most likely direct realism) which show how we can avoid the indirect realist conclusion (eg by discussing "relational" properties of objects and/or challenging the phenomenal principle).

- **UNCONVINCING:** IR is false because mind-independent objects and properties do not exist (ie arguing for either idealism or some form of phenomenalism).
  - Berkeley's 'Master' argument (and other arguments he gives) can be interpreted as demonstrating that we cannot have a meaningful or coherent concept of anything mind-independent (and it may therefore follow that such objects are impossible).
  - Berkeley's attack on the Primary/Secondary Quality distinction: his argument that all properties are mind-dependent. (Of course, this only applies to versions of IR that embrace this distinction, eg Locke).

- **CONVINCING FOR SOME CASES:** the immediate objects of perception are sometimes but not always mind-dependent
  - ie arguing for a (metaphysical) disjunctivism in which illusions and/or hallucinations do have sense-data as immediate objects of perception but veridical perception does not
  - Doing so by attacking the 'common factor principle' in arguments from illusion and hallucination, ie denying that subjectively indistinguishable experiences must involve immediate perception of the same kind of object.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Moral philosophy

6 What is moral anti-realism?

[2 marks]

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Accept either of the following (though there may be other possible ways of phrasing it):

- The view that there are no mind-independent/objective moral properties/facts.
- The view that any/all moral properties/facts that do exist are mind-dependent.
- The view that there are no mind-independent/objective moral truths (see Notes below).

Some students may put it in the following way as a disjunction:

- The view that either (a) there are no moral properties/facts at all or (b) there are moral properties/facts but they are all mind-dependent.

Notes:

- It is important that students recognise that (traditionally) anti-realism is a metaphysical/ontological position. Those that straightforwardly confuse it with cognitivism/non-cognitivism (eg by only talking about assertions of belief and/or expressions of attitude), without linking their answer to mind-independence, cannot be credited.
- Some students may say that mind-independent/objective moral *truths* do not exist, which implies the absence of a truth-maker – ie that there are no objective moral facts/properties to ground moral truths. This should be credited as some contemporary ways of drawing the distinction between realism and anti-realism are couched in linguistic terms, ie in terms of truth.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

7 Explain Aristotle's account of the role of education/habituation in the development of a moral character.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students may cover education and habituation together (as referring to the same process). Alternatively, they may discuss them separately. Both approaches are acceptable.

The core points are:

- A virtue is a stable state/trait of character. Virtues are dispositions to think, feel and react in particular situations.
- We do not have the virtues by nature/we are not virtuous by nature. Rather, we have the capability to become virtuous.
- We can understand how we 'acquire virtues' by drawing an analogy with how we 'acquire practical skills':
    - You don't learn to play the lyre by just acquiring knowledge about lyre playing, but by actually practising the activity (ie by playing the lyre).
    - You don't become virtuous just by acquiring knowledge of how to be good, but by practising being good (ie doing good actions)
- Thus, we become virtuous through habituation and, in particular, through the habits we develop when growing up. Over time, a child develops the appropriate habits and learns to take pleasure in what s/he should take pleasure in and be pained by what should pain him/her - *"It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference".* (*Nicomachean Ethics* Book 2)
- Aristotle says*: 'by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly.'* (*Nicomachean Ethics* Book 2)

Here are some further points that may be made:

- Aristotle is not saying that simply performing (for example) just acts makes you a truly just person. For example, a child might behave justly because s/he has been taught do act justly (so

do actions which are “in accordance with justice”), but, over time, come to act justly because s/he has chosen to do so. S/he recognises the value of just acts. Virtue is chosen knowingly, for its own sake.

- A fully virtuous action is one where the agent knows what they are doing, chooses the act for its own sake and makes their choice from a firm and unchangeable character.
- Students may also discuss the importance of identifying a role model in relation to developing a moral character.
- Students may discuss the importance Aristotle places on the family, the law/state, and public education.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

8 Explain how a utilitarian might approach the issue of eating animals.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Students may discuss (a) utilitarianism in general, (b) focus on one particular version of utilitarianism, or (c) consider two or more versions.

- Students may explain what utilitarianism is in general:
    - Utilitarians (as consequentialists) decide whether actions are morally right or wrong based on their effects.
    - The best decision is the decision that maximises utility (creates the greatest net utility).
    - NB: what utility is understood to be and what maximisation amounts to vary across the many different species of utilitarianism.
    - A utilitarian would consider the effects on happiness of all those affected; no-one would be ignored during the calculating process (impartiality: “every man to count for one, nobody for more than one” (Bentham)).

- Students may choose to discuss one or more versions of utilitarianism (made complicated by the fact that utilitarians differ in their answers to various questions, forming a complicated matrix of possible positions):
    - Which consequences matter? / What is meant by ‘utility’?
        - the quantity of pleasurable sensations (Bentham’s hedonic calculus);
        - the quality of pleasure (Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasure);

        - the satisfaction of preferences (preference utilitarianism – Hare and Singer)…
        - various 'ideals'/values (ideal utilitarianism - Moore)
    - The consequences of <u>what</u>?:
        - particular acts (act utilitarianism);
        - rules (rule utilitarianism)…
    - The consequences for <u>whom</u>?:
        - do animals count?;
        - do all human beings count, and if not, what are the criteria?
- For all of these possibilities, students may explain details of these views and it is not possible to give all of those details here.

They may do one or more of the following:

- Explain that (or consider how) one or more such view would/could <u>support</u> the eating of animals
    - eg, the utility caused to humans from eating animals outweighs the disutility (for the animals and for vegetarians/vegans) – perhaps assuming certain things about the way in which the animals are kept and killed
- Explain that (or consider how) one or more such view would/could <u>oppose</u> the eating of animals
    - eg, the disutility (for the animals and for vegetarians/vegans) outweighs the utility caused to humans from eating animals – perhaps, again, assuming certain things about the way in which the animals are kept and killed
- Explain/consider the utilitarian decision-making <u>process</u>, perhaps by considering it in terms of various hypothetical scenarios, eg, "If p, then it would be right to do A". Eg:
    - if certain animals do not feel pain (e.g. insects), then…
    - if non-meat alternatives are rare then…
    - if non-meat alternatives are plenty then…

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

9 Explain how Mackie's argument from relativity challenges moral realism.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used correctly throughout
4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- The argument from relativity (sometimes called the argument from disagreement) sees moral disagreement as constituting evidence against the moral realist hypothesis (and so as supporting the moral anti-realist hypothesis).
- It is, therefore, an inductive/abductive argument – an argument to the best explanation.

- Moral realism is the claim that there are mind-independent moral facts/properties
  - Examples of moral realism include ethical naturalist views (such as naturalist utilitarianism) and ethical non-naturalist views (such as Moore's intuitionism).
- Moral anti-realism - the claim that there are no mind-independent moral facts/properties
  - Examples of moral anti-realist views include error theory (Mackie's own view) which is the claim that moral utterances are typically assertions (ie, the error theorist is a cognitivist) but that they are systematically untrue assertions since there are no moral properties to make them true.

- Students may set out the argument in standard form, and here is an example of how this could be done:
  - P1: It's an empirical fact that there is an enormous amount of intractable variation / opposition in moral views (across history and across geography)

- P2: There seem to be two ways of explaining this (two hypotheses):
  - Option A (the moral anti-realist hypothesis): This variation merely "reflect[s] adherence to and participation in different ways of life" (Mackie) and there are no mind-independent moral facts/properties.
  - Option B (the moral realist hypothesis): This variation occurs because there is a realm of mind-independent moral facts to which some communities/cultures/eras have inferior epistemic access than others.
- P3: Option A is better/simpler/more likely (partly because any attempt to give an account of Option B is not going to be easy/plausible).
- C: Therefore, it is unlikely that there are any mind-independent moral facts / properties and so it is unlikely that moral realism is true.

Notes:

- An account of moral realism that does not explicitly refer to how the argument from relativity challenges this position cannot be awarded more than 3 marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

10 Can Kantian deontological ethics be successfully defended against objections?
[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13-15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used consistently and correctly throughout.
10-12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and **most of it** is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
7-9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always correctly.
4-6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.

	There is some limited use of philosophical language.
1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument. Philosophical terms might be mentioned.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Students may well begin by explaining Kant's view which may include some of the points below:

- Kant argues that we have duties to do (or not do) certain things which are right (or wrong) in themselves.
- Kant argues that our moral duties are discoverable by reason and that only those who possess adequate rational capacities have such duties.
- Only the good will is good without qualification and to have a good will is to do your duty because it is your duty (other motivations are irrelevant). Students may develop this point with the 'shopkeepers' example.
- Moral duties are categorical and not hypothetical, because they are your duty regardless of what you want and are not a means to a further end.
- Categorical imperatives are (most readily) derivable from the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test is morally wrong.
- A maxim fails the test of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised, so it would be impossible for everyone to act on it. For example, in the case of lying to get what you want, Kant would argue that your maxim would be 'I can tell a lie, if it gets me what I want.' If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say 'all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when it gets them what they want.' Lying presupposes people taking you at your word, but, in this world, the practice of giving your word doesn't exist. So my maxim cannot be universalised.
- Students may mention the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, distinguished by whether a failure is constituted by a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in the will.
- The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Formula of Humanity): "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." For example, to lie to someone is to treat them merely as a means to your own ends, rather than as an end. It is to undermine their power of making a rational choice themselves.

The question is asking specifically whether Kantian deontological ethics can be successfully defended against objections, and so it's likely that students will focus on arguments/considerations <u>against</u> the view and consider whether they are successful or not. However, students may approach the question by considering arguments <u>for</u> Kant's view and evaluating whether they can be successfully defended against objections.

Conclusions may be drawn by discussing some of the following objections to Kant's position, considering possible responses, and ultimately deciding whether they give us a good enough reason to reject his account (though remember that this list is not exhaustive).

- Kant's deontological approach is not correct because of issues with his categorical imperatives as a way of generating moral rules.
    - Problems with application of the principle:

- ‘Not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral’ (AQA specification).
- ‘Not all non-universalisable maxims are immoral’ (AQA specification).
- It can be argued that all actions are non-universalisable (it is impossible for everyone to do exactly what I am doing now, whatever it is).
- We are not capable of setting aside self-interest in the way that Kant supposes we are (this may be put as the idea that reason (or at least reason alone) cannot motivate action).

  - ‘Clashing/competing duties’ (AQA specification) – for example, ‘not lying’ versus ‘save lives’ or Sartre’s example of a young man torn between his duty to his country and his duty to his mother where “no rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do” (Existentialism is a Humanism).

- Kant’s deontological approach is not (wholly) correct because his theory is lacking or imperfect (even if not wholly incorrect).

  - Good intentions can lead to bad consequences which need to be taken into account, eg A might try to educate/help B on in life and B might turn out to be an intelligent criminal - A ought to have foreseen this and is morally culpable.

  - One can do one’s duty and yet bad things can happen (moral luck examples): one should still feel a sense of regret/responsibility (eg you hit someone who runs out in front of your car).

  - Kant doesn’t acknowledge the role of the moral dimension of emotions such as guilt, love and/or sympathy and/or fails to take into account the pleasure which an agent takes in performing a morally good action.

  - Given that only rational agents are intrinsically valuable, Kant is left open to the charge that his view means that (eg) animals have no moral worth and can be used as instruments.

  - (Related point): Some may argue that Kant does not allow for the actions of such non-rational agents to be morally assessed.

  - Kant’s view means that we have the same duties to those who have done (or would do) wrong as we do to those that act morally (eg we ought to tell the truth to the murderer about the location of his intended victim). This seems at odds with our views about morality.

- Kant’s deontological approach is not correct and some other account is more persuasive.

  - Kant ignores ‘the view that consequences of actions determine their moral value’ (AQA specification) - independent of considerations of universalisability. Consequences/happiness/utility are a morally relevant consideration (and perhaps the only morally relevant consideration). Utilitarianism may be discussed in this context as the right (and a better) account - for example, if you can never lie, you cannot lie to save lives or protect the innocent (lying to the murderer at the door). Some may also even argue that Kant himself relies on consequentialist/teleological reasoning.
  - Kant ignores the possible value of certain motives (eg the desire to do good) and commitments (eg those we have to family and friends). Virtue ethics may be discussed in this context as the right (and a better) account (the morally right thing to do is that which is the expression of virtue and virtuous character).
  - Foot – ‘morality is a system of hypothetical, rather than categorical, imperatives’ (AQA specification).

- Students who introduce alternative moral theories ought to introduce them as criticisms of elements of Kant's view (or at least as preferable to Kant in some respect) rather than just as juxtaposed alternatives.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.