



A-level
PHILOSOPHY
7172/2

Paper 2 The metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind

Mark scheme

June 2019

Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A

The Metaphysics of God

0 1 What is the difference between moral and natural evil?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Moral evil refers to the harm or suffering (intentionally) caused by the actions of free agents/human beings.
- Natural evil refers to harm or suffering not (intentionally) caused by the actions of human beings but is rather the result of natural/physical events and processes.

Responses for 3 marks

- Responses accessing full marks will have the following features three features:

1) Evil: They will unpack ‘evil’ (and we allow a generous range of ways of expressing these negatives for humanity/sentient beings): there will be reference to ‘suffering/harm/pain’ etc. Students do not need to state this for both forms of evil, but it must be somewhere in their answer.

2) Responsibility: When explaining ‘moral evil’, responses must indicate that humans are responsible for the suffering they cause: eg they are ‘freely’ harming others, ‘choosing’ to cause suffering, or ‘intentionally’ inflicting pain. In this context, simply saying ‘actions by humans’ is not sufficient. Students might also say that moral evil in human action is ‘blame worthy’, and that would be fine. Students can also make reference to these key indicators of responsibility in their examples, but examples alone do not suffice.

3) Natural: When discussing ‘natural evil’ responses must indicate what does cause natural evil (eg ‘natural processes’), and not simply that they are not caused by free human beings (this might be in the form of an example which shows they understand the difference: eg ‘things in nature like tsunamis’).

Responses for 2 marks

- Responses at this level will typically lack one of the aforementioned features of 3 mark responses: eg they do not offer a general explanation (just exemplifications) of ‘evil’.

Responses for 1 mark

- Responses at this level will typically lack two of the aforementioned features, and may simply offer examples of moral evil (eg crimes such as ‘murder’) and natural evil (eg. natural disasters such as ‘hurricanes’): they would have to exemplify both to receive any credit.

Note:

- Given the context, it would be acceptable for students to define evil in classical (theological) terms as *privatio boni* (the absence of good).
- Students who (rightly) claim that the two concepts pose a challenge to the existence of God are not answering the question, since they both feature in the problem of evil: this is therefore a similarity not a difference. Any attempt to argue that the two forms of evil differ because of their different relationship to God is likely to be conjectural (and controversial); as such, it is likely to be redundant in a question designed to test knowledge and understanding.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 2 Explain the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about religious language.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- This question concerns different philosophical positions on the character of religious language, especially when used to make claims or express beliefs. In short, do claims/beliefs aim at truth in much the same way as non-religious claims/beliefs about the world?
- A cognitivist account of religious language would typically argue that religious claims aim to describe how the world/reality is: they express beliefs that such-and-such is the case (i.e. they are ‘truth apt’). For example, the sentence “God exists” expresses the belief that God exists, which is true or false depending on whether it describes or mis-describes reality.
- A non-cognitivist account of religious language would typically argue that religious claims do not aim to describe the world through assertions which may be true or false (so religious beliefs are not ‘truth apt’). Rather, they express non-belief-like attitudes towards the world, such as emotions, desires, faith, or guiding principles (students may mention Hare’s ‘bliks’). For example, the sentence “God exists” expresses a commitment to a certain way of life/of interpreting the world.

NB:

- Students who progress to Level 3 (and beyond) will recognise the centrality of ‘truth’ when drawing the distinction, although they do not have to use the phrase ‘truth apt’. Students progressing beyond Level 3 must at least mention religion.
- Students progressing to full marks (Level 5) will also be able to bring out some ‘positive’ feature of the non-cognitivist position: e.g. that religious statements express ‘attitudes’, ‘values’ etc.
- This question does not directly concern the meaningfulness/meaninglessness of religious language. Students may take examples of cognitivists/non-cognitivists who take a stand on this question, but that should not form any part of the definition of these positions.

Note:

- Some students are associating ‘cognitivism’ with the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ in their answers. Do not penalise this unless they are including it as part of the definition of the position.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 3 Outline the paradox of the stone.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

NB: The question here asks for an outline of the paradox, and the Mark Scheme should be interpreted as such. For example, so long as students are using the term ‘omnipotence’ correctly, they do not have further unpack this concept; nor do students do not have to explain what ‘paradox’ means.

- The paradox is intended to show that an omnipotent being is impossible/the concept is incoherent. The implication that God (as classically conceived) does not exist may or may not be drawn. It would be sufficient to show that it discredits the notion an omnipotent being.
- Students may well introduce the paradox in the form of a question: ‘Can God, as an omnipotent being, create a stone so heavy that God cannot move it?’ Here is a step by step outline of the argument that could follow in response to that question:

P1: Either God can create a stone too heavy for God to move/lift or God cannot do this
 P2: If God can do this, then God is not omnipotent (since God would then be unable to move/lift the stone)
 P3: If God cannot do this, then God is not omnipotent (since God cannot create such a stone)
 [P4: There is nothing logically impossible about either of these tasks]
 C: Therefore, God is not omnipotent (either way).

Note:

- Many theists have defined omnipotence as the ability to do anything that is logically possible (or to bring about all logically possible states of affairs). This is why P4 may be added, but it need not be for students to be awarded full marks
- If students use another example instead of a stone, or explain the paradox generally without any specific example, as long as the argument is clear, this can be credited (though it is unlikely).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 4 Outline Descartes' ontological argument and explain Kant's objection to it.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Descartes' ontological argument:

- Students may characterise this as an a priori and deductive argument, and explain what that means (though this is not a requirement).
- The (crucial) starting point is the idea of God that Descartes (or anyone else) has.
- Some students may say that for Descartes this idea of God is present innately in the mind, which is fine, so long as they do not seek a causal explanation for this (thereby confusing his 'ontological argument' with his 'trademark argument').
- Students may also say that Descartes' concept of God is among the 'clear and distinct ideas' that he is conscious of as a thinking being, and that is also credit worthy.

A step-by-step outline of the argument:

- P1: He (or we) have an idea of God as a supremely perfect being
- P2: A supremely perfect being (God) has all perfections
- P3: Existence is a perfection
- C1: Therefore, a supremely perfect being (God) exists

- Students might also refer to the distinction between 'existence and essence', pointing out that for Descartes the 'existence' of God can no more be separated from the 'essence' of God than the 'idea

of a mountain' can be separated 'from that of a valley', or the 'idea of 'triangles' from the idea of 'three right angles adding up to 180 °.

NB: In the unlikely event that students only treat the first half of this question and just outline Descartes' ontological argument, the most that can be awarded is 5 marks: assuming their outline is 'clear', 'correct', and there are appropriate 'logical links.

Kant's Objection to Descartes' Ontological Argument

Kant's (most famous) objection centres on the claim that 'existence is not a (real/substantive) predicate', and it is likely that students will base their response on this.

- Some students may point out that Kant's objection is a development of Hume's objection that nothing can be shown to exist by a priori reasoning. Kant argues that Descartes' argument misunderstands what existence is, or what it is to say that something exists.
- Kant questions the third premise in Descartes' argument: 'Existence is a perfection'. To make such a claim is to treat 'exists' like other predicates (or 'perfections') such as 'wise', 'powerful' or 'blue'. However, 'exists' does not work in this way. Saying something 'exists' does not give you more information about that thing, as saying it is 'wise' or 'blue' does. Students may give Kant's example of 100 thalers (gold coins), or another equivalent example, to illustrate this point.
- Rather than adding to a concept's description, 'existence' 'substantiates' a concept, ie it says that there is a thing in the physical world that corresponds to the concept. Therefore, any claim of the form 'X exists' will require experience to determine whether it is true.
- In using 'existence' as a predicate, Descartes is trying to argue that 'God exists' is an analytic proposition. A 'normal' analytic proposition, such as 'a brother is a male sibling' unpacks the concept 'brother', adding to the description of 'brother'. As 'existence' does not add to the description of a concept, it follows that any statement of the form 'X exists' cannot be an analytic statement. Rather, it must always be a synthetic statement.
- Some students may refer to another point that Kant makes against Descartes' ontological argument: that even if existence were a predicate - and 'God exists' was an analytic truth - this would tell us nothing about the actual existence of God.

NB:

- Students who access the top band of marks will not confuse Descartes' ontological argument with some another version. It is important that students are deploying Kant's objection against a clear and correct version of the argument: this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a top band response.
- Although the weight of the marks are on Kant's objection, students should not be penalised for writing more than they need to on Descartes's argument (e.g. those students who explain it in detail rather than just outline it).

Note:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 5 How successful is the design argument for the existence of God?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Conclusions may include:

SUCCESSFUL: some version of the design argument proves the existence of God (either conclusively or to a high degree of probability)

PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL: some version of the design argument proves the existence of a designer (either conclusively or to a high degree of probability), but not necessarily the God of classical theism / the Abrahamic traditions.

UNSUCCESSFUL: no version of the design argument proves the existence of God nor a designer of any kind.

- Students are free to determine the scope of their response. They may focus on one or several versions of the argument.
- Students may explain general features of arguments from design at the outset:
 - they are teleological: concerned with the ‘ends’, ‘goals’, or ‘purposes of phenomena in nature;
 - they are a posteriori, arguing from observable features of the universe to the existence of a being (God) who designed the universe;
 - they are generally inductive: striving to deliver probable conclusions in favour of God/a designer’s existence.
- Design arguments are sometimes divided up into those that focus on instances of spatial regularity and those that focus on temporal regularity, although they can also be used in combination.
- Students are likely to select from the following arguments and responses.

The design argument from analogy (as presented by Hume)

- P1: In the organisation of parts for a purpose nature resembles the products of human design
- P2: Similar effects have similar causes
- P3: The cause of the products of human design is an intelligent mind that intended the design
- P4: A designer must be distinct from what is designed
- C1: Therefore, the cause of nature is an intelligent mind that (a) intended the design and (b) is distinct from what is designed
- C2: Therefore an intelligent designer (God) exists.

- Students may also make the point that the works of nature are so much more complex than the works of humanity that the designer of nature must be much greater and therefore possess some (or all) of the attributes of the God of classical theism.

Paley's design argument: argument from spatial order/purpose

- Students may interpret Paley's argument as a deductive argument, as follows:
 - P1: Anything that has parts organised to serve a purpose is designed
 - P2: Nature contains things which have parts that are organised to serve a purpose
 - C1: Therefore, nature contains things which are designed (from premises 1 and 2)
 - P3: Design can only be explained in terms of a designer
 - P4: A designer must (a) be or have a mind and (b) be distinct from what is designed
 - C2: Therefore, nature was designed by a mind that is distinct from nature. (from 3, 4 and 5)
 - C3: Therefore, such a mind (God) exists
- Alternatively, students may take this as an inductive argument, whereby 'parts organised for a purpose' are most likely explained by intelligent agency. This is likely to be explained in conjunction with the 'watch maker' analogy.
- Some students will also take Paley to be advancing a more straight forward argument from analogy, comparing with world with machines, much like Hume's. This should be credited, but consider whether they are actually saying anything different from any account of Hume they may have given.

Swinburne's design argument: argument from temporal order/regularity

- Swinburne presents an inductive design argument. This features analogy, but its distinctive focus is the temporal order/regularities of succession within the universe as a whole (ie the regular and universal fundamental laws of nature) in order to demonstrate that the existence of God is likely.
 - P1: The universe as a whole contains temporal order/regularities of succession (ie the regular and universal fundamental laws of nature)
 - P2: There are two possible explanatory hypotheses: (H1) temporal order has a scientific explanation; or (H2) temporal order has a personal explanation (eg explaining the singing of a song over time in terms of the singer's intentions).
 - P3: (H1) fails: science can only explain the existence of regularities of succession in terms of more fundamental regularities of succession. So, we cannot give a scientific explanation of the temporal order displayed in the fundamental laws of science (science cannot itself explain why the fundamental laws of science exist as they do)
 - P4: (H2) can explain (fundamental) scientific regularities of succession. They are similar to regularities of succession produced by human agents (the singing of the song), and so, by analogy, are produced by rational agency
 - P5: The agency in question would have to be of immense power and intelligence, free and disembodied.
 - C1: Therefore, an agent probably exists (God) with immense power and intelligence, who is free and disembodied.
- Students may add that Swinburne sees several main advantages to this approach over arguments from spatial order:
 - temporal order cannot be explained in terms of evolution in the way that spatial order can;
 - there is no temporal disorder to account for (the laws of nature are unchanging) as there is spatial disorder (eg blindness)
 - spatial order presupposes temporal order: evolution requires there to be laws of nature.
- Students may add that God is the simplest hypothesis with reference to:
 - God's uniqueness - it is simpler to suppose one God than many;
 - God's infinitude - it is simpler for God to have unlimited (eg) power: any finite degree of power would require an explanation (why that value?);
 - God's uncreated nature because - there would otherwise be an infinite regress.

Issues that may arise for the arguments above, including:

Hume's objections to the design argument from analogy, including:

- the analogy made is weak – the universe is more like a vegetable than a 'watch or knitting-loom';
- regress argument: if order in the universe is explained by order in the ideas of a mind that order itself needs explaining, and so a regress of "universes of ideas" threatens the supposed simplicity of invoking God as an explanation;
- there is a 'great disproportion' between a part of the universe and the whole universe that undermines the inference that something similar to human intelligence caused the universe;
- even if we could infer from part to whole, there is no good reason to choose design by an intelligent mind as the explanation of the whole universe;
- if the analogy is followed faithfully, it would result in many non-theistic conclusions; for example:
 - as the universe is finite we cannot infer an infinite cause;
 - the existence of spatial disorder (see below) would support an inference to a cause that was not omnipotent and omniscient but one that makes mistakes;
 - designers are not always creators (e.g. architects), and they work with pre-existing materials: the God of classic theism is associated with the doctrine of *creation ex nihilo*, and the design argument does not demonstrate that;
 - just as human objects are created by many individuals, it would be rational to infer that the universe was made by a pantheon of gods;
 - we always find minds connected to bodies, but God is meant to be incorporeal;
 - human designers often die whilst their creations continue – thus God might not be eternal.

The problem of spatial disorder (as posed by Hume and Paley):

- the universe contains vast areas of space in which there exists 'spatial disorder' – i.e. no organisation of parts/no purpose or organisation that serves a purpose ineffectively. As the design argument is meant to explain the whole universe, it is not clear why spatial order should be prioritised over spatial disorder in the arguments that focus on this type of order.

The design argument fails as it is an argument from a unique case (Hume):

- our inferences from effects to causes are based on repeated observations (Hume – 'constant conjunctions') between two events. However, in the case of the universe, we only have experience of one universe and therefore cannot legitimately make any inference to a purposeful cause (unlike human creations, which we have so much experience of). We can never tell, from a single instance of an event, what the cause is, let alone that it is an intelligent, purposeful agency. To make an inference about the production of universes we would need to have experience of many universes, which we lack.

Whether God is the best or only explanation:

- In order to infer that there is a designer of nature, we have to rule out other possible explanations of the organisation of parts for a purpose, and these other possible explanations may be no less (or more) plausible/probable; for example:
 - if we assume that matter is finite and time infinite then, over enough time all possible combinations of matter would occur by chance;
 - the theory of evolution by natural selection has the benefit of being a simple explanation as it does not 'multiply entities beyond necessity' (Ockham's Razor), working as it does with natural processes alone
 - the existence of the universe (including instances of both spatial and temporal order) is a brute fact that requires no further explanation.

- On the other hand, students may reject these naturalistic explanations and appeal to the fine-tuning argument: the many other ways the universe could have been and which would not have led to intelligent life, so there is something special about ours (Swinburne's card-shuffling machine example may be deployed here).

Note:

- As the focus of this question is primarily AO2, do not penalise students unduly for misattributing arguments: students could still get into the top band even if they get some of the philosophers names wrong.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B

The Metaphysics of Mind

0 6 Define qualia.

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- There are lots of definition of qualia, and students may (but need not) qualify their answer by saying “The standard definition is....”
- Based on the AQA Specification, students are likely to focus on the phenomenal/intrinsic/non-representational character of ‘mental states, but candidates could locate qualia more narrowly as a feature of ‘sense data’. This is unlikely but it would be acceptable given the origins of the concept (eg. Lewis).

Responses for 3 marks

- Intrinsic (and non-intentional) phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible (AQA Specification).
- The non-intentional (and/or non-representational) experiential character/quality of conscious states (or sense data).
- Intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties of mental/conscious states (Dennett).

Responses for 2 marks

- The ‘what it is like’ of (subjective) conscious experience.
- The qualitative character of conscious experience.
- Non-physical and ineffable properties of mental/conscious states.

Responses for 1 mark

- Properties of some or all mental states.
- A defining feature of the mental (along with intentionality)
- Subjective (conscious) experience.

NB: Students who access Level 3 will say something affirmative about the nature of qualia and its characteristics (eg 'intrinsic' or 'phenomenal') and something about what it lacks / in what respects it differs from other mental states (eg 'non-intentional', 'non-representational'). The 'introspectively accessible' dimension (AQA) can be assumed to be present in responses which just refer to 'conscious experience/mental states'.

- Do not award any more than Level 1 for responses which merely exemplify qualia: e.g. 'it refers to things like the experience of seeing red roses or the taste of pineapple'.

Note:

- The material in parentheses is no essential to include.
- The indicative content is not exhaustive. Other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 7 Outline how the ‘knowledge/Mary argument’ can be applied to functional facts. **[5 marks]**

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

NB: The question here asks for an outline and the Mark Scheme should be interpreted as such.

- The knowledge argument by Jackson aims to establish that conscious experience involves qualia. It is an anti-reductionist argument, originally advanced in favour of (property) dualism. The argument attacked mind-brain identity theories but can be applied to functionalism, which seeks to reduce mental facts to functional facts (facts which may or may not be physical).
- The ‘functionalised’ knowledge argument is that someone – Mary - with complete knowledge of all the “functional facts” of a conscious being (ie the facts exhaustively specifying all the functional roles) could still lack knowledge of how it feels to have the experience (the ‘qualia’) and thereby lack knowledge of a (kind of) mental fact. This goes to show that mental facts cannot be reduced to functional facts.

Here is a step-by-step outline (though, of course, it need not be presented in this order or format):

- P1: If functionalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the functional facts about colour perception would be to have complete knowledge of all the mental facts involved in colour perception
- P2: Mary knows all the functional facts involved in colour perception
- P3: When Mary sees colour (eg a red rose), she learns a new fact (the fact of what it is like for both herself and other people to see red)
- P4: If Mary learns a new fact, not all mental facts can be functional facts (since Mary already knew all of these)
- C1: Therefore, not all mental fact’s are functional facts
- C2: Therefore, functionalism is false.

There are other ways of expressing the argument, and the levels of response should be used to reflect the precision of that expression.

NB: Students who capture the central logical implications of the knowledge/Mary argument (that there is some fact that Mary knows via first person experience that she did not know via third person study of human perception) but do not mention ‘functional facts’ or allude to features of ‘functionalism’ (eg ‘in-puts

and outputs') cannot get beyond Level 3 (substantive content). Students who explicitly treat functionalism as a physicalist theory (without qualification) cannot progress beyond Level 4 because of a lack of precision.

Note:

- Reference to the original story of Mary is not an absolute requirement since the question is primarily about the argument, but it is likely that some explanation of the story will help with the clarity and fullness of the response. Students may outline the argument in step-by-step form or they might outline the argument through an account of the story (or some variation) in continuous prose, and this is fine as long as the argument is clear.
- It would be an element of imprecision for students to merely state 'Mary knows everything about colour perception' instead of 'Mary knows all the functional facts/properties'.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 8 Explain Ryle’s claim that substance dualism makes a ‘category mistake’.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Substance dualism is the Cartesian position that the mind and the body (brain) are two separate ‘substances’ or ‘things’ (as opposed to properties): *res cogitans* and *res extensa*.
- To make a category mistake is to assign a concept to a logical category to which it doesn’t belong (eg it would be a category mistake to assign ‘numbers’ to the category of ‘things which have weight’). A ‘category mistake’ is therefore a ‘logical’ or a ‘semantic’ mistake.
- Ryle claims that substance dualism (a) assigns ‘mind’ (and mental states’) to “the categories of ‘thing,’ ‘stuff,’ ‘attribute,’ ‘state,’ ‘process,’ ‘change,’ ‘cause,’ and ‘effect.’” and (b) conceives of them as non-physical and ‘ghostly.’
- Ryle illustrates the category mistake of thinking about ‘the mind’ as a separate non-physical ‘thing’ by applying a number of analogies, which all have the following features: once one has a complete description of the component parts of some designated phenomena and how they work together (eg the ‘colleges’, ‘lecture theatres’, and ‘libraries’ of a university) it is a mistake to look for something ‘over and above’ those constitutive features. Some students will discuss the mistake of looking for ‘team spirit’ as something that exists in addition to the relationships between players as they undertake the characteristic activities of their sport.
- Ryle argues that to talk about ‘the mind’ and ‘mental states’ is to talk about publicly observable overt behaviour or behavioural dispositions which can be expressed in hypothetical and empirically verifiable if-then sentences: these behaviours/dispositions just are ‘the mind’.
- NB: Students who simply make points about the character of dualism and/or behaviourism, or define a category mistake in general, cannot get beyond Level 2. For example, students may say that the mind is not a ‘thing’ but that to have a mind (or to be minded) is to be disposed to behave in indefinitely many complex ways, but again they need to explain the mistake. Students who get to Level 3 and beyond will explain (with different degrees of precision and development) why this is a problem for substance dualism.

Note:

- Students may say that Ryle calls the mind the ‘ghost in the machine’ but this alone is only worth limited credit (1 mark) as students will need to explain how this view is a result of a category mistake.
- It is unlikely, but students who are very familiar with Ryle’s arguments may explain that the dualism’s category mistake derives from, on the one hand, being trapped within the grammar of mechanics, and

on the other hand, a desire to understand our mind and mental states non-mechanistically: Ryle calls this a ‘para-mechanical hypothesis’

- Also unlikely, but some students may make reference to Wittgenstein’s private language argument (and his ‘beetle in the box’) when explaining the category mistake.
- Students need not, but may, note that the category-mistake generates a number of pseudo-philosophical problems: the problem of other minds and the problem of mental causality.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 9 Explain the philosophical zombies argument and the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible.

[12 marks]

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

The philosophical zombie argument:

- The philosophical zombie argument is an argument against physicalism and in favour of property dualism: the view that although there is only one substance (the physical) mental properties are not identical to physical properties. Students may frame it as ‘an anti-reductionist’ argument in opposition to physicalism in general or some particular reductionist approach (including some form of functionalism).
- A philosophical zombie is an exact physical duplicate of a human being which nevertheless lacks any phenomenal properties or qualia: it is ‘dead inside.’
- If phenomenal mental states were identical to certain physical properties/functions, it would not be metaphysically possible for something with those physical properties/functions without phenomenal mental states. One way that philosophers have tested the metaphysical possibility of certain claims in thought experiments is to consider their conceivability, working under the assumption that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility.
- Philosophical zombies are conceivable, and so philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore at least some features of mental states (the phenomenal) are not identical to physical properties/functions and physicalism is false: those features are therefore (non-physical) phenomenal properties.

Students could set out the argument in the following way step by step way:

P1: If phenomenal properties (consciousness/qualia) were identical (or reducible) to physical properties of the human body, then it would be (metaphysically) impossible for those physical properties to exist without phenomenal properties also existing

P2: A philosophical zombie (which lacks phenomenal properties) is conceivable

P3: What is conceivable is (metaphysically) possible

P4: A philosophical zombie is (metaphysically) possible

P5: If a philosophical zombie is possible then phenomenal properties (consciousness/qualia) are possibly distinct from physical properties

C: If phenomenal properties are possibly distinct from physical properties, then phenomenal properties cannot be identical (or reducible) to physical properties

Note:

- The philosophical zombie argument is a conceivability argument, and students might explain that a conceivability argument is one in which actuality/reality is inferred from possibility which is entailed by conceivability: conceivability → possibility → actuality. As such, students do not need to refer to the 'logical' or the 'metaphysical' in order use 'appropriate philosophical language' (though most probably will): conceivability, possibility, and actuality are sufficiently clear terms to capture the logical progression of the argument.
- A situation is conceivable if its description does not entail a contradiction and this in turn means it is possible according to the argument.
- Students may explain possibility in terms of 'possible worlds,' eg to say that 'X is possible' is to say that 'there is a possible world in which X is the case.'
- Students may explain why 'possibility' entails 'actuality' by referring to Kripke. According to Kripke, all identities are necessary, so if X is identical to Y then there is no possible world in which X and Y are distinct. Therefore, if there is a possible world in which X and Y are distinct then X and Y are distinct in all possible worlds, including the real/actual one.

The response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible:

- Whether or not a state of affairs is conceivable is determined by a priori reflection on the concepts involved, but whether or not a state of affairs is metaphysically possible depends on the natures of the things involved.
- The natures of things are (sometimes) discovered a posteriori (eg water is H₂O), and a posteriori discoveries can (sometimes) show that what is conceivable is metaphysically impossible (eg water is not H₂O).
- If a prior reasoning cannot guarantee metaphysical actuality, then a gap between conceivability and possibility opens up.
- Therefore, the conceivability of philosophical zombies would does not entail that philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible; and despite that conceivability, it may still be the case that mental properties (such as qualia) are identical (or reducible) to physical properties.

NB: Given the lack of consensus within the professional literature concerning the use of the term 'logical' in this philosophical context, we should tolerate variations in the students' responses. Some philosophers use 'logical' interchangeably with 'conceivable' (where logic defines the limits of our conceptions); others use 'logical' interchangeably with 'metaphysical' (where logic is more closely identified with how the world is/must be). So long as students are clear and consistent in their usage, they should be penalised for choosing one form over another.

Note:

- Students may choose to illustrate the point with a variety of examples: it is conceivable that water isn't H₂O, but since water is actually H₂O, it is impossible for water not to be H₂O; the masked man fallacy; Clark Kent/Superman etc.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

1 0 Is eliminative materialism convincing?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>

1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Students could take a variety of positions:

YES: Eliminative materialism is convincing.

NO: Eliminative materialism is not convincing.

TO SOME EXTENT: A less definitive response is also possible: eg only intentional mental states such as ‘beliefs’ should be eliminated whereas the phenomenology of more basic mental states cannot be eliminated (or vice versa).

- Students might explain eliminative materialism as the position that some or all common-sense (“folk-psychological”) mental states/properties do not exist and/or our common-sense understanding of mind is radically mistaken. This thesis is defended most notably by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland (although students may associate Dennett with a tendency in that direction).

YES: Arguing for eliminative materialism:

- As a preliminary, some students may give reasons for preferring materialist/physicalist conceptions of mind, citing the success of the physical sciences or problems with dualism. The better answers will engage with the details of eliminative materialism when discussing these problems, and not simply assume/assert the success of materialism/physicalism in general.
- Because of the centrality of eliminating common sense concepts about mental states, arguments in favour of eliminative materialism are likely to focus on the strength of objections to this (radical) proposal.
- Folk-psychology is an empirical theory (it postulates ‘mental states’, such as ‘beliefs’ and ‘desire’, to explain and predict behaviour).
- Any good empirical theory must satisfy a number of criteria to avoid elimination:
 - there cannot be too many explanatory failures;
 - there must be growth and promise of future development;
 - the theory must cohere with other empirical (scientific) theories.
- According to the Churchlands, folk-psychology does not fulfil any of those criteria:
 - There are explanatory failures: folk-psychology cannot offer (scientifically) satisfactory explanations of mental illness, creative imagination, pre-linguistic learning, or memory.
 - Growth and promise: folk psychology is ‘stagnant’ and ‘infertile.’ There hasn’t been any growth and development for thousands of years.
 - Coherence: folk psychology doesn’t cohere with other empirical theories such as particle physics, atomic and molecular theory, organic chemistry, evolutionary theory physiology, and neuroscience.

- When arguing for the plausibility of eliminating folk psychological terms, students are likely to offer examples of the elimination of other widely utilised empirical theories, which they draw from the history of science: phlogiston, élan vital, caloric etc.
- Demons and states of demon possession may also be referred to as entities and explanatory theories once posited to explain mental illness which subsequently have been eliminated in favour of neuro-psychological accounts.
- For all these historical examples, it is important that students understand that they are analogies and do not slip into associating outmodes (scientific) ideas with deficiencies within folk-psychology itself.

NO: Arguing against eliminative materialism

- Some students will respond to the theory as prima facie implausible, based on the confidence they/we can have in our intuitive understanding of the mind.
- For students taking this latter line, our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other (sceptical) considerations (eg Descartes' point that we cannot doubt that we have mental states since they are immediately obvious to us and introspectively available).
- Folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis when understanding the mind and human behaviour): eg I am successfully able to predict and explain that my friend will be at the party tonight because I know that he believes that there is a party tonight, and I have good grounds for believing that he desires to go to it.
- The articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting: the act of articulating a theory seems to presuppose that this theory is recommended for belief by those articulating it, and yet according to this theory there are no beliefs. Does the eliminative materialist believe that there are no beliefs? If so, that would seem to be self-refuting. If they do not believe it, then why are they advancing it? Students may argue that the position collapses into incoherence.
- Folk psychology has grown and been transformed in the study of quantitative (and computational) psychology, and studies suggest that the mental states we postulate do map onto the brain so folk-psychology is more coherent with other empirical sciences than eliminative materialism suggests, even if there is much that we still do not understand about the mind.
- Folk psychology also plays a crucial role in some evidence-based treatment of mental illness: eg cognitive behavioural therapy, some of which is concerned with the role of beliefs in maintaining (and overcoming) psychological pain.

TO SOME EXTENT: Arguing that eliminative materialism is partly successful

- Eliminative materialism successfully shows that so called intentional mental states do not exist, but it cannot show that non-intentional mental states do not exist since their phenomenal qualities (qualia) are immediately obvious to us and beyond reasonable doubt.
- It might be conceded that the theory does appear self-refuting, but that is because we are so entrenched in forms of understanding dictated by folk-psychology, and so we find it difficult to imagine not thinking in those terms.
- Students who take the latter line may argue that the critique of folk psychology is a necessary first step in the process of dismantling imprecise ways of conceiving the mind, but it would be naïve to think we can simply 'step out' of this way of thinking about the mind having shown its scientific limitations.
- Whatever the difficulties with eliminative materialism, it is a reasonable expectation that we will move beyond this way of understanding the mind (at least scientifically) in the future, given the changes we have seen in other forms of (scientific) understanding in human history (especially given the advances we are making in neuro-science).

Note:

- It is important that students do not conflate eliminative materialism with mind-brain identity theory: i.e. the eliminative materialist does not claim that mental states are brain states (eg that pain is c-fibres firing) but that the mental states we postulate (eg 'beliefs,' 'desires,' etc) do not exist at all and

therefore do not ‘map on to the world’ (there is nothing in reality which the vocabulary refers to). ‘Elimination’ should not be confused with either ‘identity’ or ‘reduction’.

- According to eliminative materialism not only is there nothing in reality to which our folk-psychological vocabulary refers, but it is unhelpful and misleading to use our folk-psychological vocabulary. This stands in contrast to ‘fictionalism’ [sic] which claims that our folk psychological vocabulary is helpful although it doesn’t successfully refer to mental states (it is a ‘useful fiction’).
- As the focus of this question is primarily AO2, do not penalise students unduly for misattributing arguments: students could still get into the top band even if they get some of the philosophers names wrong.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.