A-LEVEL

Philosophy

PHLS1 / Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion
Mark scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Section A – Epistemology

1   What is a priori knowledge?

[2 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
2 AO1	2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
	1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- A priori knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that can be acquired independently of experience (ie without needing any experience).

  or

- A priori knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that is justifiable independently of experience (ie justified without needing any experience).

  or

  - A prior knowledge is knowledge acquired / justifiable through reason *alone.* Students must include *alone* to get full marks

2   Outline the 'argument from illusion' against direct realism.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- An illusion is a distortion of the senses, when what you perceive is different from how an existing object actually is.
- Direct realism claims that we perceive mind-independent objects directly.
- Illusions challenge the direct realist claim that we perceive mind-independent objects directly, because they show that things are not always as they seem.
- Students do not have to specify the version of direct realism they are applying the argument to (although some of the best answers may do this). If students only appear to be critiquing naive realism, they should not be penalised for this.

A step-by-step version of the argument (though there are other reasonable ways of phrasing this argument):

- P1: During illusions, it appears to you that something is F.
- [P2: If it appears to you that something is F, then you must immediately perceive something which is F (the 'phenomenal principle').]
- C1: Therefore, you immediately perceive something that is F.
- P3: There is no suitable mind-independent object that is F.
- C2: Therefore, during illusions, the thing which you immediately perceive (which is F) is not a mind-independent object.
- C3: Therefore, during illusions, the thing which you immediately perceive (which is F) is a mind-dependent object.

Students may continue the argument in the following way, although this is not required for full credit:

- P4: Illusions can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical experiences.
- [P5: Subjectively indistinguishable experiences must involve immediate perception of exactly the same kind of object.]

- C4: Therefore, the thing which you immediately perceive is a mind-dependent object even in veridical cases.
- C5: Therefore, DR (the claim that we perceive mind-independent objects directly) is false.

Notes:

- No example necessary, but the argument might be put in terms of sticks-in-water or visual illusions, like the Müller-Lyer.
- Please note that many philosophers describe perceptual variation as a form of illusion (eg Ayer discusses different perspectives on a coin in his discussion of illusions), so accept examples of perceptual variation as well.
- Square-bracketed parts are not at all necessary but are elements of detail.
- Students may claim that this argument supports the existence of sense data (Russell).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

3 Explain Berkeley's attack on the primary/secondary property distinction.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 AO1	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Background: the distinction made by Locke (and others) between primary properties/qualities that are mind-independent (shape, size, motion, etc) and secondary properties/qualities that are, at least in some sense, mind-dependent (colour, taste, smell, etc).
- Berkeley wishes to establish that all properties/qualities are mind-dependent, so attacks the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
- To do this, Berkeley argues that:
  - **Argument 1**
    - o P1: Secondary qualities are subject to interpersonal and intrapersonal perceptual variation (eg objects can appear to have different colours, tastes, etc) and are therefore mind-dependent.
    - o P2: Primary qualities are also subject to interpersonal and intrapersonal perceptual variation (objects can appear to have different sizes, shapes, speeds, etc).
    - o C: Therefore primary qualities are also mind-dependent.
    - o Students may discuss colours of clouds, Locke's example of two hands in water feeling different heats - which Berkeley himself discusses - and/or examples of how

size can appear different to differently-sized perceivers, but there are many other possible examples.

- **Argument 2**
  - o P1: The mind cannot form an idea of an object with primary qualities but without any secondary qualities.
  - o P2: If an idea of X is impossible ("contradictory"), X is impossible.
  - o C1: Therefore, objects with primary qualities but without any secondary qualities are impossible.
  - o C2: Therefore, both primary and secondary qualities are essential properties of objects.
  - o Students may discuss Berkeley's claim that "you [can't] even separate the ideas of extendedness and motion from the ideas of all the so-called secondary qualities".

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

4   Explain Locke's arguments against innatism.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 AO1	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- In general, as an empiricist, Locke argues against the existence of innate concepts and knowledge (ie against innatism) and claims that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa (a blank slate). Students may discuss any of the following arguments which oppose innatism (though this is not exhaustive):

  - Lack of universal agreement
    - P1: If a concept or item of knowledge was innate, then it would be universal (every person's mind would contain it from birth).
    - P2: There are no such universal concepts or truths.
    - C: Therefore, there are no concepts or items of knowledge that are innate.
      - In support of P2, Locke discusses 'children and idiots' (by the latter, he means those with severe learning disabilities) who lack supposedly innate knowledge such as 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'.
      - He also discusses the different concepts of God that exist in different cultures, along with the absence of any concept of God in some.

- o <u>Impossibility of innate truths/concepts that one is not aware of</u> Locke also argues against the claim that these items of knowledge/concepts could be present universally without people (yet) being aware of them. He claims that if a person's mind contained an innate concept or item of knowledge from birth, that person would have to be aware of this from birth. (This argument may be conjoined with the argument above by students.)
- o <u>Alternative explanations</u> Locke argues that any suggested examples of innate concepts and items of knowledge can be adequately explained in some other way: as being based on experience, or as being acquired through reason without being innate, or as not existing at all (for example, he denies that we have a 'positive idea of infinity').
- o <u>Universal agreement does not guarantee innateness</u> He argues (therefore) that even if there were universal agreement on certain concepts or items of knowledge, this would not mean that they were innate (presuming the agreement can be explained in other ways – see point above).
- o <u>Problems distinguishing innate from non-innate</u> Locke argues in general that if 'possession of innate knowledge' means 'capacity to discover it at some point', then this does not adequately distinguish it from other items of knowledge. Specifically, he argues that if certain truths were present in the mind from birth but not universally assented to until the development of reason, then this would not adequately distinguish innate from non-innate knowledge. Examples:
    - ▪ Since it is through reason that all the maxims (axioms) and theorems (derived truths) of mathematics are discovered, it would mean that they are all innate.
    - ▪ Any proposition of the form 'X is not Y' will pass the test; but this will mean that there are 'legions' of innate propositions.
- o <u>No innate concepts so no innate knowledge</u> He argues that there could be no innate knowledge unless there were innate concepts, so any argument against the existence or possibility of innate concepts is ipso facto an argument against innate knowledge. For example, 'yellow is not red' will be universally assented to; but 'there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience' than to claim that the concepts <yellow> and <red> are innate.
- o <u>Transgression of supposedly innate moral principles</u> He argues that the fact that people so confidently and serenely break supposedly innate moral principles is evidence that they are not innate.

Notes:
- There is a lot of possible content here and Locke does give further arguments in addition to those above. Students do not need to consider all of the arguments for credit to be given.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

5   Is knowledge justified true belief?

[15 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
15 7 AO1 8 AO2	13-15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct, and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.
	10-12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and **most of it** is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.
	7-9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.
	4-6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.
	1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Note on QWC
The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 15-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptions.

The QWC requirement for the clear and coherent organisation of material, in an appropriate style or styles, is addressed by the requirements for the selection and deployment of material in the form of argument.

The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

- Conclusions may include:
    - arguing that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB)
    - arguing that knowledge is JTB with minor modifications of what is understood by one or more of the three conditions (for example, by arguing that the justification condition needs to be strengthened, eg infallibilism)
    - arguing that knowledge is not JTB because the conditions need to be added to or replaced
    - arguing that knowledge is not JTB because one or more of the conditions are not necessary
    - arguing that knowledge is not JTB because knowledge is unanalysable and explanatorily fundamental and basic (students may support this claim by arguing that there will always be a Gettier-type counter-example for every analysis of knowledge).
- This question relates to the definition of propositional knowledge (knowing 'that') – which may be distinguished from acquaintance knowledge (knowing 'of') and ability knowledge (knowing 'how').
- The subject of the question is the tripartite view (the 'traditional' view, the Platonic view, JTB theory) that S knows that p if and only if (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p. These conditions are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge.
- Issue: the conditions are not individually necessary.
    - Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge (eg "I know but I don't know how/why I know").
    - Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge (through scepticism about truth).
    - Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge ("she knows that p but doesn't believe that p": eg a series of reliably good answers in a quiz that S would characterise as guesses).

- Issue: the conditions are not jointly sufficient.
    - Cases of lucky true beliefs show that the justification condition should be either strengthened, added to or replaced (ie Gettier-style counter-examples: inferential cases (eg Gettier's Smith/Jones interview or car/location examples) and/or non-inferential cases (eg the 'barn facade' example).

        - Responses to this including:

- strengthen the justification condition so that it implies truth: infallibilism and the requirement for an impossibility of doubt (Descartes)
- add a 'no false lemmas' condition (J+T+B+N)
- replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (reliabilism) – may be linked to externalism
- replace 'justified' with an account of epistemic virtue (V+T+B)
- add a 'truth tracking' condition (Nozick) or a causal condition (Goldman).

Notes
- As the focus of this question is primarily AO2, do not penalise students for misattributing arguments.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Philosophy of Religion

6   What does it mean to claim that God is everlasting?

[2 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
2 AO1	2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
	1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- God exists throughout (and so within all) time.
- God exists through time without beginning or end.

7   Outline the paradox of the stone.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- It is intended to show that an omnipotent being is impossible.
- It is a singular incoherence: a problem with God having this attribute singly.
- Detailed argument:
    - P1: Either God can make a stone too heavy for God to move/lift or God cannot do this.
    - P2: If God can do this, then God is not omnipotent (since God would then be unable to move/lift the stone).
    - P3: If God cannot do this, then God is not omnipotent (since God cannot do it).
    - [P4: There is nothing logically impossible about either of these tasks.]
    - C: Therefore, God is not omnipotent (either way).

Notes:

- Normally understood as being aimed at those who define omnipotence as the ability to complete all logically possible tasks (or to bring about all logically possible states of affairs). This is why P4 may be added.
- If students use another example instead of a stone, or explain the paradox generally without any specific example (perhaps in terms of whether God can create a task that God is unable to perform), as long as the argument is clear, this can be credited.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

8   Explain how the Free Will Defence responds to the problem of evil.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 AO1	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The context (the problem of evil): could refer to either or both of the following:
    - the logical problem of evil (free will explains why the existence of God is compatible with evil) - God's omnipotence, omniscience and supreme goodness and the existence of evil are inconsistent.
    - the evidential problem (free will explains why the existence of God is compatible with the extent/distribution/amount of evil).

- The Free Will Defence addresses these problems by arguing that the 'gift' of free will is worth the consequent unavoidable risk of moral evil that may result from it.
- Moral evil is therefore our fault, rather than God's.
- The general argument is as follows but (a) many parts of this may be expanded upon in various ways and (b) there are many other reasonable ways of phrasing this argument:
    - P1: A world containing significantly free creatures is better than a world without such creatures (and better than no world at all).

- o C1: Therefore, if God creates a world, then it must be a world with significantly free creatures.
- o P2: If a world contains significantly free creatures, then moral evil is possible in that world.
- o C2: Therefore, if God creates a world, then it must be a world in which moral evil is possible.
- o [C3: Therefore, the existence of moral evil is compatible with the existence of God (or, for the evidential version, the extent/distribution/amount of moral evil is now explicable).]

Notes:

- Students may include reference to Plantinga's concept of 'transworld depravity' though this is not required for credit to be given.
- Students may discuss the evil caused by the free choices made by supernatural beings (angels/ the Devil). They may relate this to physical/natural evil (arguing that even so-called 'physical/natural evil' is in fact moral evil).
- Do not penalise students who omit omniscience in their articulation of the problem of evil.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

9 Outline the verification principle and explain Hick's claim that religious statements are verifiable eschatologically.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 AO1	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The verification principle, either the weak or the strong form (as distinguished by Ayer); a proposition is only meaningful if **either**:
    - (1) analytic: conceptual, tautological, logical.
    - **or**
    - (2a) its probable truth could be empirically verified potentially/in principle (the weak version) or (2b) its truth could be conclusively empirically verified actually/in practice (strong version).
- Applying this to religious language, some have argued that religious claims such as 'God loves me' and 'God answers my prayers' would not be meaningful given that they do not meet either of the conditions above.
- Hick accepts the verification principle, but claims that there are possible experiences that we could have which would verify such claims after death (eschatologically) by removing any serious doubts we might have had about the matter – ie we could have an experience of God.
- He agrees that such claims cannot be falsified, but they can be verified.

- This relies on his claim that a person (the same person) can be resurrected after death and so continue to have further experiences in heaven.
- Students may explain this in terms of his parable (analogy) of the Celestial City: two men travelling on a road; one believes that it leads to a Celestial City and the other does not; this affects how they interpret the good and bad events that occur; but one of them will be proved right at the end of the road.

Notes:
- To access full marks, students should demonstrate an understanding of both the verification principle and eschatological verification.
- Students may treat the verification principle in greater detail than Hick's eschatological verificationism. Although the weight falls on the latter ('explain' rather than 'outline'), if both are understood clearly and precisely, students can still progress to full marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

10   Does the cosmological argument prove that God exists?

[15 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
15 7 AO1 8 AO2	13-15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.
	10-12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and **most of it** is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.
	7-9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.
	4-6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.
	1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Note on QWC

The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 15-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptions.

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The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

- Conclusions may include:
    - The cosmological argument proves (conclusively) that God exists. (The argument is understood deductively with the conclusion following from the premises.)
    - The cosmological argument fails to prove (conclusively) that God exists. (The argument is understood deductively with the conclusion failing to follow from the premises.)
    - The cosmological argument establishes that God probably exists. (The argument is understood inductively/abductively, with God's existence as the best explanation of the existence of the universe.)
    - The cosmological argument fails to establish that God probably exists. (The argument is understood inductively/abductively, with God's existence as a possible explanation but not the best explanation of the existence of the universe.)
    - The cosmological argument fails to establish either that God exists or that God does not exist.
        - It may be argued that the argument cannot establish the existence of God as any more or less probable than God's non-existence.
        - It may be argued that the premises are too problematic to constitute the start of a cosmological argument for the existence of God.
    - If students consider more than one cosmological argument, then they may, of course, draw different conclusions for different arguments.

- Students may define God as a maximally great being (omnipotent, omniscient, supremely good and eternal or everlasting).
- Students may discuss one or more of the following cosmological arguments:
    - The Kalām causal argument: the universe had a beginning, so requires a cause.
    - Aquinas's 1st and 2nd ways: motion/causation must have a prime mover/first cause (ie God):
        - Some may interpret this as a 'horizontal' chronologically prior mover/cause (where this is a finite temporal series).
        - Some may interpret it as a 'vertical' sustaining contemporaneous cause of (a) motion/causation at any given moment and/or (b) the series as a whole (even if this is an infinite temporal series).

- o Aquinas's 3rd way (or Leibniz/Copleston versions): contingency as requiring explanation in terms of a necessary being (there are different interpretations of how this argument works so we cannot be too prescriptive).
  - o In connection with the latter, or as a standalone cosmological argument, students may appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (in one or more forms). Rowe identifies two versions: 1) There is an explanation for the existence of every being; 2) There is an explanation for every positive fact.
  - o Descartes' cosmological ('Trademark') argument: students may discuss either or both of the following arguments (though for Descartes they are two parts of one overall argument):
    - (1) God as cause of my idea of God: I have an idea of a supremely perfect being (ie God): that is, an infinite being. By the 'causal adequacy principle' (ie that there must be at least as much (total) reality in the cause as in the effect), I cannot be the cause of this idea as I am finite. Only God could be the cause of this idea and so God must exist.
    - (2) God as cause of my existence (with an idea of God in my mind): I exist as a being with an idea of a supremely perfect being. The only possible cause of my existence as such is God. I cannot be the cause of myself as I would then be God and I know I am not. No other being(s) could be the cause because either the question would be raised about them (leading to a regress) or they could not account for the idea of God that I have. Nor can I have no cause, as a cause is needed to sustain anything finite from one moment to the next.
- 'Horizontal' versions may support the finiteness of the universe empirically (by reference to expanding universes, 2nd law of thermodynamics (if the world were infinitely old there would be no available energy), the 'big bang') – there are of course competing theories within physics/cosmology.
- Reference may be made to the impossibility of infinite series (eg Zeno's paradoxes or the claim that infinite time cannot be traversed).
- Issues with these arguments may include some of the following (adapted to the particular argument):
  - o Theists have to believe in the possibility of an infinite series – God knows infinite propositions and this would be an actual infinity in the mind of God – so cannot oppose infinity on logical/paradox grounds without inconsistency.
  - o It is not the case that everything needs a cause/explanation (or at least we cannot know whether it is the case a priori or a posteriori) – Hume.
  - o There is no need for any further explanation once every particular has been explained (ie the argument commits the fallacy of composition – Russell and Hume).
  - o If everything needed a further cause/explanation, this would have to apply to God as well or, vice-versa, if God is unexplained/uncaused, then the universe could be too.
  - o Even if there is a cause/explanation of this universe, we cannot assume that it is God (with all His traditional attributes).
  - o A necessary being is impossible (most relevant to contingency versions of the argument) – Hume.
  - o Causation/beginning does not make sense outside of the physical/spatial/temporal world so a timeless and spaceless God could not be the cause – Kant.
  - o Descartes' argument can be challenged by an attack on the causal adequacy principle, by offering alternative explanations of the idea of God in his mind, or using some of the points above.

        o   According to modern mathematics, actual infinities are not problematic (but there is a question about whether this is applicable to the physical world).

Notes:
- As the focus of this question is primarily AO2, do not penalise students for misattributing arguments.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

AS LEVEL PHILOSOPHY (PHLS1)

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES GRID

Question	AO1	AO2
1	2	
2	5	
3	9	
4	9	
5	7	8
6	2	
7	5	
8	9	
9	9	
10	7	8