



A-LEVEL

Philosophy

PHLS2 Unit 2 Ethics and Philosophy of Mind
Mark scheme

2175
June 2016

Version 1.0: Final Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk.

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A – Ethics

1	What is moral realism?	[3 marks]
----------	------------------------	------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

NB: For full marks students must make reference to the idea that moral facts are mind-independent.

Examples of answers that should get 3 marks:

- The view that ‘ethical language makes claims about mind-independent reality that are true’ (AQA Specification).
- The view that moral judgements can be true (or false), and they are made true (or false) by something in the real world outside our (human) attitudes/opinions.
- The view that ethical language makes claims about mind-independent reality and that at least some of these moral claims are true.
- The view that there are mind-independent moral facts/properties.
- The theory that claims that moral judgements are made true or false by objective moral properties that are mind independent (in some sense).
- The view that moral judgements are truth-apt (cognitivism) and are in some cases true in virtue of mind-independent moral facts/properties.
- The view that moral claims can be true or false and that there are true moral claims in virtue of mind-independent moral facts/properties.
- The view that moral facts exist in virtue of mind-independent facts which may not be moral in and of themselves.

Examples of answers that should get 2 marks:

- The theory that there are objective moral facts / truths.
- The theory that moral facts / properties exist (narrowly understood in terms of the physical / natural world).

- The theory that moral facts / properties exist (narrowly understood in terms of a transcendent world, possibly with references to God).

Examples of answers that should get 1 mark:

- Moral realism is a (cognitive) theory of ethical language.
- Moral realism argues that there are moral facts / truths.

NB: Examples are not asked for or required, but clear and relevant ones should not be counted as redundancy.

2	Explain how an act utilitarian would make a moral decision.	[5 marks]
----------	---	------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

NB: Students who only discuss utilitarianism in general (e.g. focusing on the centrality of consequences / the maximisation of utility etc) but have clear reference to ‘act utilitarianism’ in their answer have sufficient explanatory substance to be awarded 3 marks. Students who go beyond this (4 or 5 marks) will bring out the ‘case by case’ dimension more or less clearly and precisely.

- Students may go straight into discussing act utilitarianism, incorporating certain facets of utilitarianism in general; or they may explain utilitarianism in general first before then homing in on act utilitarianism (either approach is fine).
- Students may explain this by using an example of an actual moral decision and this is, of course, fine.

Utilitarianism in general

- Utilitarians (as consequentialists) decide whether actions are morally right or wrong based on their effects.
- The best decision would be the decision that maximises utility. Utility can be understood in different ways: well-being, happiness, pleasure (or hedonism), preference-satisfaction etc.
- A utilitarian would seek to maximise utility for all affected and his/her own individual happiness would only count insofar as it affected the net total (impartiality: “every man to count for one, nobody for more than one” (Bentham)).

Act utilitarianism

- An act utilitarian would apply this general utility-maximisation principle directly to each action on a case-by-case basis. This view may profitably be compared with rule utilitarianism, which applies the maximisation principle to the rules used to guide action such that individual actions are right or wrong based on whether or not they conform to the chosen rules.

- S/he would consider only the consequences of the action, and not the action itself. One consequence of this is that the same action might be considered right on some occasions but wrong on others.
- The right action in any situation will be the one that leads to more utility than the other available actions.
- Students might use certain versions of utilitarianism to explain this.
- The hedonic calculus (Bentham) where the pleasures and pains caused by various options are compared with respect to their intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent.
- Mill's distinction between the higher and lower pleasures caused by an action.

NB: Examples are not asked for or required, but if they are used and they enhance the explanation, especially in terms of 'fullness' and 'clarity', then they should be credited within the level descriptors.

3	Outline Aristotle’s function argument.	[5 marks]
----------	--	------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is correct and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students might contextualise the argument as Aristotle’s attempt to set out what eudaimonia (ie living well) might be for humans.
- Students may first explain his view of function in general (with reference to the function of knives for example) or may go straight to applying it to humans.

The function argument applied to human beings:

- the function (or ergon) of something is its characteristic form of activity (that sets it apart from other things) .
- being alive or perception cannot be the function because these are shared with other animals
- being guided by reason is distinctive of a human life (a contrast may be drawn between human life on the one hand, and animal or plant life on the other)
- therefore, the function of a human is to be guided by reason
- a human is a good human if s/he performs his/her function well
- therefore, a good human lives a life well guided by reason
- some students may make a link between function, virtue and eudaimonia:
- the function (or ergon) of something is its characteristic form of activity (that sets it apart from other things)
- in order for a human to fulfil his/her function s/he will need certain qualities – such a quality is called a virtue (arête)
- therefore, a good human being ought to live according to the virtues (live virtuously)
- it is in this that eudaimonia (living well) consists: ie rational activity in accordance with virtue.

4	Explain the similarities and differences between what emotivists and prescriptivists say about ethical language.	[12 marks]
----------	--	-------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	<p>A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form.</p> <p>Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.</p>
	7-9	<p>A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely.</p> <p>Integration is present, but may not be sustained.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.</p>
	4-6	<p>A clear answer, in a coherent logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated.</p> <p>Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
	1-3	<p>There are some relevant points made, but no integration.</p> <p>There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.</p>
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Similarities

- Both are consequences of (or responses to) the challenge of logical positivism and the verification principle.
- Both are (in some sense) non-cognitivist about ethical language.

- Ethical statements do not make, or at least do not only make, descriptive claims about reality which are true or false (fact-stating). They express an internal/subjective feeling, attitude, sympathy, commitment.
- But when people are making ethical utterances they are not (or are not merely) expressing states of mind which are beliefs, and both views (arguably) imply a strong connection between moral views and moral actions.
- Both argue that ethical utterances express non-cognitive attitudes so both connect ethical language to its use (nothing about the facts can entail any particular moral judgement).
- Both agree that moral statements are still meaningful (but not because they state facts).
- For at least some proponents of both views the primary purpose of moral language is to influence others in some way (Stevenson for emotivism and Hare for prescriptivism).

Differences

Emotivism	Prescriptivism
Ethical language expresses emotions or attitudes – ‘pro-attitude’ or ‘con-attitudes’.	Ethical language makes recommendations about actions.
<p>Ethical utterances are expressions of emotion:</p> <p>‘X is right’ is the equivalent of cheering and ‘X is wrong’ is the equivalent of booing (the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory). So ‘Stealing is wrong’ means ‘Stealing, boo!’.</p> <p>Ayer claims, ‘You were wrong to steal that money’ does not state/imply anything more than ‘You stole that money’ in terms of its descriptive content since ‘you were wrong’ simply expresses moral disapproval.</p> <p>(Stevenson: in addition they aim to influence the feelings of others.)</p>	<p>Ethical utterances are imperatives prescribing how everyone should behave:</p> <p>Once a standard has been chosen by someone it must be applied universally to all relevantly similar agents/contexts/actions.</p> <p>‘X is right’ means ‘Do X’.</p> <p>So ‘Stealing is wrong’ means ‘Do not steal’.</p>
It is not possible to speak of rational consistency in relation to ethical statements and argument (there is no ‘logic of norms’) so ethical statements cannot therefore play a role as premises in arguments.	It is possible to speak of rational consistency in relation to ethical statements and argument (there is ‘a logic of norms’) so ethical statements can therefore still play a role as premises in arguments.

5	Is Kant's deontological approach to ethics correct?	[25 marks]
----------	---	-------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
25 AO1 – 5 AO2 - 20	21-25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained.</p> <p>A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
	16-20	<p>The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
	11-15	<p>A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content.</p> <p>Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.</p>

6-10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear.</p> <p>Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.</p>
1-5	<p>Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument.</p> <p>There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided.</p> <p>There might be some use of philosophical language.</p>
0	<p>Nothing written worthy of credit.</p>

Note on QWC

The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 25-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptors.

The QWC requirement for the clear and coherent organisation of material, in an appropriate style or styles, is addressed by the requirements for the selection and deployment of material in the form of argument.

The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

Students may well begin by explaining Kant's view (see the bullet pointed arguments below). It is also likely that candidates who agree with Kant will draw on and defend those arguments:

YES: Kant's deontological approach is correct.

- Kant argues that we have duties to do (or not do) certain things which are right (or wrong) in themselves.
- Kant argues that our moral duties are discoverable by reason and that only those who possess adequate rational capacities have such duties.
- Only the good will is good without qualification and to have a good will is to do your duty because it is your duty (other motivations are irrelevant). Students may develop this point with the 'shopkeepers' example.
- Moral duties are categorical and not hypothetical, because they are your duty regardless of what you want and are not a means to a further end.

- Categorical imperatives are (most readily) derivable from the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 1785, 4:421). Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test is morally wrong.
- A maxim fails the test of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised, so it would be impossible for everyone to act on it. For example, in the case of lying to get what you want, Kant would argue that your maxim would be ‘I can tell a lie, if it gets me what I want.’ If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say ‘all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when it gets them what they want.’ Lying presupposes people taking you at your word, but, in this world, the practice of giving your word doesn’t exist. So my maxim cannot exist with itself as a universal law.
 - Students may mention the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, distinguished by whether a failure is constituted by a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in the will. This could be developed in more detail (possibly using Kant’s examples) and distinguished in terms of application (e.g. we can’t help all others or develop all talents).
 - The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Formula of Humanity): “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (*Groundwork*, 4:429). For example, to lie to someone is to treat them merely as a means to your own ends, rather than as an end. It is to undermine their power of making a rational choice themselves.

Conclusions may be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions and content discussed may be drawn from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive).

NO: Kant’s deontological approach is not correct and some other account is more persuasive.

- Kant ignores ‘the intuition that consequences of actions determine their moral value (independent of considerations of universalisability)’ [AQA Specification]. Consequences/happiness/utility are a morally relevant consideration (and perhaps the only morally relevant consideration). Utilitarianism may be discussed in this context as the right (and a better) account - for example, if you can never lie, you cannot lie to save lives or protect the innocent (lying to the murderer at the door). Some may also even argue that Kant himself relies on consequentialist/teleological reasoning.
- Kant ignores ‘the possible value of certain motives (eg the desire to do good) and commitments (eg those we have to family and friends)’ [AQA Specification]. Virtue ethics may be discussed in this context as the right (and a better) account (the morally right thing to do is that which is the expression of virtue and virtuous character).

NO: Kant’s deontological approach is not correct because of issues with his categorical imperatives as a way of generating moral rules.

- ‘Problems with application of the principle’ (AQA Specification):
 - Some actions may be universalisable but are not recognisably moral duties.
 - Some actions may not be universalisable but yet do not seem to be immoral.

- It can be argued that all actions are non-universalisable (it is impossible for everyone to do exactly what I am doing now, whatever it is).
- We are not capable of setting aside self-interest in the way that Kant supposes we are (this may be put as the idea that reason (or at least reason alone) cannot motivate action).
- ‘Clashing/competing duties’ (AQA Specification) – for example, ‘not lying’ versus ‘save lives’ or Sartre’s example of a young man torn between his duty to his country and his duty to his mother where “no rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do” (*Existentialism is a Humanism*, 1946).

NO/DEPENDS: Kant’s deontological approach is not (wholly) correct because his theory is lacking or imperfect (even if not wholly incorrect).

- It might be, and probably will be, argued that the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is subject to too many problems to be convincing (see above), but the second formulation retains significant force (e.g. we do feel that it is wrong to imprison the innocent as a means to an end, or wrong to torture...etc).
- Good intentions can lead to bad consequences which need to be taken into account, eg A might try to educate/help B in life and B might turn out to be an intelligent criminal - A ought to have foreseen this and is morally culpable.
- One can do one’s duty and yet bad things can happen (moral luck examples): one should still feel a sense of regret/responsibility (eg you hit someone who runs out in front of your car).
- Kant doesn’t acknowledge the role of the moral dimension of emotions such as guilt, love and/or sympathy.
- Given that only rational agents are intrinsically valuable, Kant is left open to the charge that his view means that (eg) animals have no moral worth and can be used as instruments.
- (Related point): Some may argue that Kant does not allow for the actions of such non-rational agents to be morally assessed.
- Kant’s view means that we have the same duties to those who have done (or would do) wrong as we do to those that act morally (eg we ought to tell the truth to the murderer about the location of his intended victim). This seems at odds with our views about morality.

Notes:

There may of course be other ideas that can be discussed in the content of this question. This is not an exhaustive list of content.

Students who introduce alternative moral theories ought to introduce them as criticisms of elements of Kant’s view (or at least as preferable to Kant in some respect) rather than just as juxtaposed alternatives.

Section B – Philosophy of Mind

6	What claim do logical/analytical behaviourists make regarding statements about mental states?	[3 marks]
----------	---	------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

NB:

- Logical/analytical behaviourism is treated here as a single theory making a single claim. Candidates who present their answer as if addressing two different philosophical positions making different claims do not have the necessary precision to achieve full marks.
- This question concerns *statements* about mental states. Candidates who frame their answer in terms of reducing/translating mental *states* are not answering precisely and should not be awarded full marks. Candidates can, however, express the same idea in terms of ‘mental concepts’, or ‘talk’ about mind/mentality/mental states.
- Candidates can explain the relevant claim in terms of a reduction of statements about mental states to *behaviour* and/or *behavioural dispositions*: they do not need to have both to get full marks.

Examples of answers that should get 3 marks:

- That all statements about mental states can be (analytically) reduced (without loss of meaning) into statements about behaviour/behavioural dispositions.
- That all statements about mental states can be translated (without remainder) into statements about actual and possible patterns of behaviour/behavioural dispositions.
- That ascribing mental states to minds is a category mistake, and that all talk about (‘inner’) mental states is actually shorthand for talk about (‘outer’) actual/potential behaviour.

Examples of answers that should get 2 marks:

- That all statements about mental states can be (analytically) reduced (without loss of meaning) to behaviour/ behavioural dispositions.
- That all mental states can be reduced/translated (without remainder) to statements about behaviour/ behavioural dispositions.

Examples of answers that should get 1 mark:

- Logical/analytical behaviourists think that mental states are the same as behaviour/behavioural dispositions.
- Logical/analytical behaviourists propose a materialist/physicalist theory of mind/mental states.
- Logical/analytical behaviourists propose a reductionist theory of mind/mental states.

7	Explain the argument that it would be self-refuting to articulate eliminative materialism as a theory.	[5 marks]
----------	--	------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may well start by explaining what eliminative materialism is, namely, the claim that some or all mental states, as understood by folk-psychology, do not exist, so folk-psychology is false or at least radically misleading: where folk-psychology is a psychological theory constituted by the common views about the mind that ordinary people are inclined to endorse (cf. ‘folk-physics’).
- This argument against eliminative materialism is that it is self-refuting in the sense that it cannot be adequately articulated because this articulation itself would be the articulation of a belief and so would require the truth of the very theory that they claim is false (ie the truth of folk-psychology).
- In order to propose a theory one must believe it (or believe that alternative theories are false) but, according to some eliminativists (e.g. the Churchlands) there are no such things as beliefs. Thus in proposing eliminativism the proponent is contradicting themselves.
- This could be put in terms of other mental states: eg a ‘desire’ to persuade people of the truth of eliminative materialism so that they have the same ‘belief’ about it.
- A step-by-step outline of the argument follows (though, of course, (a) it need not be explained in this order or format, and (b) the fact that the question asks students to ‘explain’ rather than ‘outline’ might mean that the students’ answers are more likely to be written in continuous prose than to be in step-by-step form):
 - P1: According to folk psychology, belief is a (genuine) mental state/there are and can be such things as beliefs.
 - P2: The eliminative materialists (sincerely) assert that folk psychology is false.
 - P3: (Sincere) assertions are the expressions of belief.
 - C1: The eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false.

- C2: The eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine mental state/the eliminative materialist believes there are and can be no such things as beliefs.
 - (C2 involves a contradiction.)
- Students may collapse the argument by making the point entirely in terms of belief.
 - P1: According to folk psychology, belief is a (genuine) mental state/there are and can be such things as beliefs.
 - P2: The eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false.
 - C1: The eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine mental state/the eliminative materialist believes there are and can be no such things as beliefs.
 - (C1 involves a contradiction.)
- Some students might put this more generally in terms of semantic properties, eg meaning, truth, rather than beliefs (this would be fine but by no means expected).

NB: A good understanding of eliminative materialism is clearly relevant to this question, but students who only give an account of eliminative materialism (however full, clear and precise) cannot progress beyond 2 marks as the 'substantive content' of the explanation required for an answer to this question concerns *'the argument that it would be self-refuting to articulate eliminative materialism.*

8	Outline the ‘knowledge’/Mary argument.	[5 marks]
----------	--	------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The ‘knowledge’ argument (by Frank Jackson) aims to establish that conscious experience involves non-physical phenomenal properties (qualia): ie it aims to establish property dualism. It is therefore an anti-materialist (or physicalist) and antireductionist argument.
- Qualia are the introspectively accessible subjective/phenomenal features of mental states (the properties of ‘what it is like’ to undergo the mental state in question). For many, qualia would be defined as the intrinsic/non-representational properties of mental states.
- The ‘knowledge’ argument rests on the claim that someone with complete physical knowledge about a conscious being could still lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that being (the ‘qualia’).
- If physicalism is true physical facts provide a complete account of knowledge but in the case of the knowledge/Mary argument, there is something in Mary’s knowledge that remains unaccounted for, so physicalism is false.
- Reference to the story of Mary is not an absolute requirement since the question is primarily about the ‘argument’, but it is likely that some explanation of the story will help with the clarity and fullness of the response.
- Students may outline the argument in step-by-step form (possibly even in the abstract, ie with little or no reference to Mary or to Jackson’s story). Alternatively they might outline the argument using the Mary story (or one of their own stories constructed in the same philosophical spirit - eg about Jeff, an expert on the olfactory system), and this is fine so long as the argument is clear. Finally, of course, they may do both of these things.
- Here is a step-by-step argument outline (though, of course, it need not be explained in this order or format):
 - P1: Mary knows all the physical facts about human colour vision before her release.

- P2: Mary does not know all the facts about human colour vision before her release (she does not know the phenomenal facts).
- (Or: alternative P2: Mary learns a new fact about human colour vision on her release (a phenomenal fact)).
- C3: Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human colour vision.
- (P3: Non-physical facts are facts about non-physical phenomenal properties.)
- (C4: Therefore, there are non-physical properties.)
- Alternatively the argument could be perfectly well put in terms of properties rather than facts from the start.
- There are other ways of expressing this argument, many of which involve significantly less precision. The levels of response should be used to reflect such expressions.
- On a related note, it would be an element of imprecision for students to merely say things such as, 'Mary knows everything before her release' or 'Mary learns what red is' or 'Mary didn't know what red is' without any further qualification of what this means exactly.
- Although the argument was put forward as an argument for property dualism, some students could (justifiably) claim that, if successful, the argument (also) proves substance dualism since one cannot be a property dualist without being a substance dualist (perhaps because non-physical properties must be (or at least are likely to be) properties of non-physical things/substances).
- For reference, here is the story of the neurophysiologist Mary (this is the original passage):

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on.... What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false (Frank Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Quali', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 1982, vol. 32, vol., no. 127, pp. 127 – 136: 128)

NB: A good understanding of the story of Mary is clearly relevant to this question, but students who only explain that story without drawing out the philosophical point (however full, clear and precise) cannot progress beyond 2 marks as the 'substantive content' of any answer to this question concerns the *argument* which underlies the story and the philosophical purpose it serves.

9	Explain the similarities and differences between functionalism and mind-brain type identity theory.	[12 marks]
----------	---	-------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	<p>A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.</p>
	7-9	<p>A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely. Integration is present, but may not be sustained.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.</p>
	4-6	<p>A clear answer, in a coherent logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
	1-3	<p>There are some relevant points made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.</p>
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

NB: Students may discuss functionalism generally or specific versions of it.

Similarities

- Students are most likely to say that identity theory and functionalism are materialist / physicalist theories of mind, and this would be fine. A more precise approach still would be to say that both theories are compatible with the truth of physicalism (many functionalists happen to be physicalists, but they need not be).
- So, both are typically proposed as materialist / physicalist positions, and both are ontologically conservative.

- It is possible to say that both type identity theory and functionalism are reductive theories in some sense: type identity theorists reduce mental states/properties to neural states/properties and (some) functionalists reduce mental properties/states to functional properties/states.
- Both identify theorists and some (realizer) functionalists claim that for humans the mind is to be identified with the human brain and that mental states are neural states.
- Both claim that mental states cannot be explained or analysed (merely) in terms of behaviour (contra logical/analytic behaviourism).
- Both claim that the mind exists and that mental vocabulary is meaningful (contra eliminative materialists).
- Both are accused of giving an inadequate explanation of phenomenal properties (qualia): eg Mary may know all neural/functional facts about someone but not know what it is like for them to see red; neural/functional duplicates without consciousness (neural/functional zombies) are conceivable.
- Both identity theorists and non-analytic functionalists recognise that their explanation of the nature of mental states will not be an analytic reduction and so will not issue in statements that are synonymous with statements containing mental state vocabulary (contra logical/analytic behaviourism).
- All identity theorists and most functionalists would agree that mental states supervene on physical states in the sense that there can be no mental difference without a physical difference.

Differences

Functionalism	Identity theory
Mental states should be explained functionally (as with, eg, the definition of bridge as a structure built over a road, river or railway).	Mental states should be explained in terms of identity (as with, eg, the definition of water = H ₂ O).
Mental states are functionally defined so there is the possibility of non-humans having mental states (and so of non-human systems being minds).	Mental states are identical to human brain states so only humans can have mental states (only human brains can be minds).
So mental states are multiply realisable. This difference could be expressed in terms of 'liberalism' on the part of functionalism.	Mental states are not multiply realisable. This difference could be expressed in terms of 'chauvinism' on the part of identity theorists.
Mental states are defined in terms of their relations to other mental states and inputs/outputs (stimuli/behaviour).	Mental states are not defined in terms of their relations to other mental states and inputs/outputs (stimuli/behaviour).

10	Are dualists right to say that minds and/or their properties are non-physical?	[25 marks]
-----------	--	-------------------

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
25 AO1-5 AO2-20	21-25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained.</p> <p>A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
	16-20	<p>The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
	11-15	<p>A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content.</p> <p>Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.</p>
	6-10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions</p>

		might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear. Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.
	1-5	Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument. There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided. There might be some use of philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Note on QWC

The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 25-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptors.

The QWC requirement for the clear and coherent organisation of material, in an appropriate style or styles, is addressed by the requirements for the selection and deployment of material in the form of argument.

The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

NB: Although dualist claims about minds and their properties are at the heart of this question, it is possible that students will want to advance alternative accounts of minds and their properties, drawing from a broad range of theories. These alternative approaches are perfectly acceptable so long as they show understanding of dualism and critical engagement with dualist arguments.

Students may well begin by explaining what dualism is. There are various versions that could be discussed.

- Property dualism: at least some mental properties are non-physical (likely to refer to either intentional or phenomenal properties or both).
- Substance dualism: there are two kinds of substance, mental and physical: minds are therefore independent non-physical substance/s.
- In the context of discussions of causation, students may also look at different (substance or property) dualist accounts of the interaction between the mind and physical reality: epiphenomenalism dualism, parallelist dualism, occasionalist dualism, overdeterminist dualism.
- There may be discussions of panpsychist property dualism (ie panpsychism understood as a kind of property dualism): the view that consciousness is a fundamental, universal and non-physical property of physical reality.

- There may be some discussion of predicate dualism as the only plausible form of dualism: the view that mental predicates are essential for a full description of the world, and that they are not reducible to physical predicates.

The view expressed within the question constitutes a denial of physicalism/materialism (at least in some sense):

- Physicalism: the ontological/metaphysical claim that everything is physical (or at least that everything supervenes on the physical: there can be no change in any property without a change in physical properties) – so minds are not ontologically distinct from the physical.
- Physicalism and materialism may be used here interchangeably (and that would be fine), although a change in usage does correlate with historical changes in philosophical conceptions about the nature of material / physical reality. Some students may exploit those changes.
- Materialism may be understood as the ontological/metaphysical claim that everything is constituted of inert matter; and so minds are constituted out of matter (this was an early modern view). Physicalism (or later materialism) does not limit material reality in this way: to extended substance, or matter in motion. Current physics, for example, admits energy and fields of force as physical.

Conclusions may be drawn from the following:

It Depends: Some but not all parts/properties of the mind are non-physical (eg pain as physical and located, but imaginings as non-physical).

YES and NO: Mental properties are non-physical, but they are non-physical properties of physical minds which are part of physical substance.

- **YES:** Minds and their properties are non-physical (ie non-physical substance or at least non-physical mental properties exist).
- **NO:** Minds and their properties are part of the physical world and so are not non-physical.
- **NO:** Minds and their properties are not non-physical, but neither are they part of the physical world – in fact they do not (and perhaps could not) exist physically or non-physically (appealing to eliminative materialist arguments).
- **YES and NO:** Dualists are right to say that minds and their properties are non-physical, but wrong to say that mind-independent objects/properties exist in addition (eg an idealist or monist panpsychist approach that claims that the so-called ‘non-mental’ is ultimately reducible to the mental/non-physical).
- **YES:** Some students may aim to support dualism by giving reasons for rejecting several physicalist alternatives making dualism more likely, or leaving dualism as the only viable option. This approach will only work well if the reasons for rejecting these physicalist approaches are identified clearly as being reasons that themselves support dualism.

Conclusions may be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions and content discussed may be drawn from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive).

YES: Minds and/or their properties are non-physical: ie non-physical substance or at least non-physical mental properties exist (so defending dualist arguments).

- The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes).
- The conceivability argument for substance dualism: the logical possibility of mental substance existing without the physical (Descartes).
- The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism: the logical possibility of a physical duplicate of this world but without consciousness/qualia (Chalmers).
- The ‘knowledge’/Mary argument for property dualism based on qualia (Jackson).

Responses, including:

- The mental is divisible in some sense; not everything thought of as physical is divisible.
- Mind without body is not conceivable; what is conceivable may not be possible; what is logically possible tells us nothing about reality (ie the actual world).
- A ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable; what is conceivable is not possible; what is logically possible tells us nothing about reality (ie the actual world).
- Responses, including: Mary gains no new propositional knowledge (but gains acquaintance knowledge or ability knowledge); all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia; there is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact (often put as the sense/reference reply); qualia (as defined) do not exist and so Mary gains no propositional knowledge.
- The argument from intentionality for property dualism: only mental states have intrinsic (as opposed to derived) intentionality (the irreducibility of intentionality).

NO: Minds and their properties are not non-physical, but neither are they part of the physical world – in fact they do not (and perhaps could not) exist physically or non-physically (eliminative materialist arguments).

- Eliminative materialists may combine dualist arguments that would show that the mind, if it were to exist, could not be identified with anything physical, with materialist arguments that suggest that the mind could not possibly be non-physical – together this would imply that minds are neither physical nor non-physical because they do not exist.

NO (but not necessarily so): Minds and their properties are physically realised in the actual world but should be understood functionally meaning that there may be possible worlds in which they are non-physically realised.

YES (but not necessarily so): Minds and their properties are non-physically realised in the actual world but should be understood functionally meaning that there may be possible worlds in which they are physically realised.

- Mental states are multiply realisable: what characterises mental states (eg pain) is not that they are physical or non-physical in nature but rather their functional/causal role (functionalism).

NO: Minds and their properties are part of the physical world and so are not non-physical (physicalism/materialism). The strength of such a position could be located in the extent to which it successfully avoids problems facing dualism.

- It avoids the problems facing interactionist dualism, including conceptual and empirical causation issues (ie the latter = dualism is inconsistent with the widely accepted view that the physical world is causally closed and that energy is conserved).
- It avoids the problems facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including: (a) the causal redundancy of the mental; (b) the argument from introspection; (c) issues relating to free will and responsibility; (d) epistemological problems (eg how can I know that I am having a red experience if the quale has no causal power?).
- Avoids problems arising from the view that non-physical mental states represent physical reality (there is not enough in common to sustain this relationship of representation - this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content) – NB: intentionality issues cut both ways and some see intentionality of mental states as constituting an argument against physicalism (see earlier).
- It makes mental states empirically discoverable by science and so arguably solves the problem of other minds facing versions of dualism.
- It arguably makes claims about the mind (at least potentially) verifiable and so mental terms/talk meaningful (an argument often made by behaviourist materialists).
- Naturalistic arguments: the purely physical origins, and physical constitution of each individual human being, and the material evolutionary origins of the species suggest there is no explanation of origin of an immaterial mind.
- Evidence for the neural dependence of all mental phenomena (the effects of drugs and brain damage, MRI of the brain) is best explained by supposing that minds are brains (or at least that any mind that existed is likely to be physical).
- Successful reductions in the history of science (eg sound to compression waves of air), give us (inductive) reason to believe that an equivalent reduction is possible for minds.
- Ockham's razor: physicalism is to be preferred over dualism as it requires fewer entities, so long as it explains the phenomena (at least) as well as dualism (see dualist arguments).
- There may also be sceptical responses to dualist arguments which nevertheless acknowledge the (possibility inherent) limitations of materialist accounts: eg we may not have (or ever have) the theoretical/conceptual apparatus needed to understand/carry out a naturalistic reduction of the mind to the brain but this does not show that it is not reducible in such a way (McGinn's epistemological pessimism).