A2

Philosophy

PHLS2

Report on the Examination

2715

June 2017

Version: 1.0

Further copies of this Report are available from aqa.org.uk

Introduction

What follows is a question by question commentary on some discernible trends in the performance of students in the 2017 series. In the course of this commentary, reference is made to anonymised responses, the Question Paper, the Assessment Objectives and the Mark Scheme level descriptors. In compiling this report, the observations of the lead examiner have been supplemented by evidence provided by senior examiners and their team members.

Assessment Objectives:

AO1: Demonstrate understanding of the core concepts and methods of philosophy

AO2: Analyse and evaluate philosophical argument to form reasoned judgements

Note : On the lower tariff items (the 3 mark and 5 mark questions), students tended to perform better on the Philosophy of Mind section. On the higher tariff items (the 12 and 25 mark questions) students tended to produce the best work on the Ethics section.

Section A: Ethics

Question 01: What is the difference between ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism? (3 marks)

This question assessed students' ability to explain the difference between two meta-ethical positions on the current specification (testing AO1 only). With a mean mark of 1.81, students were better able to meet the demands of this question than the corresponding item last year, and the full 3 marks was the most frequently awarded score.

The best responses tended to answer along the following lines: 'Ethical naturalism is a cognitive moral theory which holds that moral properties are identical with (or reducible to) natural properties. Ethical naturalism is also a cognitive moral theory, but it argues that moral properties are non-natural.' Examples of both positions (which were unnecessary) were often provided: invariably 'utilitarianism' was offered as an example of a 'naturalist' position, and 'intuitionism' as a non-naturalist position.

Imprecisions crept in when students conflated metaphysical and epistemological considerations, which often went alongside taking 'intuitionism' as exhaustive of or interchangeable with 'non-naturalism'. So, for instance, students would start by writing about the 'ethical naturalist's identification of moral properties with natural properties', but when it came to non-naturalism, they would present 'intuitions' as if they were 'non-natural moral properties' themselves rather than the cognitive capacity to apprehend the relevant (non-natural) moral properties. The imprecision resulted in students failing to achieve more than 2 marks.

Answers that scored 1 mark were typically characterised by lengthy (and redundant) accounts of what the two positions have in common before going on to identify one distinctive feature of ethical naturalism, but without saying anything (or anything accurate and credit worthy) on ethical non-naturalism. Students who attempted the question but failed to score any marks

usually did not say anything about the differences at all, or else they answered incorrectly by presenting 'ethical naturalism' as 'a realist and objective theory' (which is true), and ethical non-naturalism as an 'anti-realist and subjective theory' (which is false).

Question 02: Explain what error theory claims about the status of ethical language. (5 marks)

This question also addressed AO1 only, but it required a more developed demonstration of understanding, this time applied to the 'status of ethical language' in one of the meta-ethical positions on the current specification: error theory. Students found it harder to score marks on this item than any of the other Ethics questions this year, and with a mean mark of 1.6 students did not perform as well as on the corresponding item last year, but this is not the whole story. The mean mark on this question was brought down by more students not attempting the item this year or simply not understanding the theory at all. At the top end of performance 12.3% of students were awarded maximum marks, more than twice as many as on the corresponding item last year. The question discriminated well, with students who achieved high marks on this question generally being successful on the paper overall.

Students who answered this question successfully identified two key elements of 'error theory' as a meta-ethical position: 1) it is a cognitivist theory, and 2) it is an anti-realist theory. The extent to which students developed these in relation to the specific question about 'the status of ethical language' determined just how far they progressed. Some students went into considerable detail (more than was strictly necessary) to show why 'Mackie thought that all moral claims about a mind-independent reality were false', drawing on 'arguments from queerness' and 'arguments from relativity.' Sometimes students started with these arguments but never fully or precisely drew out their philosophical implications with respect to the cognitivist/non-cognitivist debate or the realist/anti-realist debate.

One of the more common reasons why students did not get to at least three marks was because whilst they recognised the anti-realism of Mackie's position, they tended to associate this with non-cognitivism, and there was lots material on the 'meaninglessness of ethical language', given its supposed subjectivity.

Question 03: Explain the issue of circularity involved in Aristotle's definition of 'virtuous acts'. (5 marks)

Once again, this item concerned a facet of Aristotle's ethics (testing AO1). With a mean mark of 2.71, students did not perform as well as last year's cohort on the corresponding item, and this was true at every level of performance.

Some students placed the issue of 'virtuous acts' within the context of Aristotle's wider ethical system. This was a perfectly good way to approach the question and could earn a response 1 or 2 marks for making relevant points, but they sometimes wrote so much - complete with superfluous illustrations of the principle of the 'golden mean' - that the issue at the heart of this question was rather lost. Other students *described* the circularity clearly enough: e.g. 'for Aristotle virtuous acts are those carried out by virtuous people, while virtuous people are those who carry out virtuous acts.' What was conspicuously missing, however, was any sense of why this was an *issue*.

The better students - those who progressed to at least 3 marks - not only described the circularity but clearly made the point that 'on the basis of the definition Aristotle provides we are none the

wiser as to the nature of virtuous acts.' The highest achieving students did this with even greater precision and development, pointing out that the circularity arose because 'the definition of virtuous acts contains the very term which stands in need of an explanation', and then went on to explain why that was so damaging to a 'normative ethical theory which aims to give guidance on living a moral life.' Some of the very highest achieving students structured their responses around the central role given to moral education and habituation in Aristotle's ethics, and the 'difficulty that arises in knowing exactly who and what to imitate when trying to develop good character and perform good actions, in the light of Aristotle's unilluminating definition.'

Question 04: Explain Kant's view on the telling of lies, using his first and second formulations of the categorical imperative. (12 marks)

This question required a more expansive demonstration of philosophical understanding (AO1), with students required to articulate Kant's view of telling lies (an applied ethical issue on the current specification) using the first two formulations of the categorical imperative. With a mean mark of 6.72, students performed better on this question than on the (compare and contrast) item which occupied the same place on the paper last year, and 17% of students accessed the top band of 10-12 marks (more than twice as many as last year).

The best responses (10-12 marks) tended to set the issues raised by the question within the wider context of Kant's ethics: 'an act based deontological theory, where the only thing that is good without qualification is a good will, and where a moral action is defining by the fulfilment of duty for duty's sake.' These responses then introduced the first formulation of the categorical imperative, sometimes quoted word for word from a reliable English translation. This 'universal formula' was applied to the practice of lying, which was judged to constitute a 'contradiction in conception', creating a 'perfect duty not to lie'. The second formulation of the categorical imperative was then introduced as the 'humanity formulation'. The best illustrations (which were not required but which usually added valued) tended to come with this second formulation, with students demonstrating how lying to someone 'disrespects their autonomy and rationality' by treating them 'merely as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves'. Many of the illustrations tended to centre on borrowing money under false pretences.

Lower down the assessment scale (the 4-6 and 7-9 bands), students often showed relevant understanding of the issues, but this was swamped by redundant material. For example, some students would spend significant time and space distinguishing between the 'hypothetical and categorical imperatives'; this wasn't irrelevant, but it did not address the heart of the question. Students also had a tendency to illustrate their initial explanation of how the categorical imperative works with an example *other than lying*, typically murder or stealing, and the central ethical issue (lying) was dealt with relatively briefly at the end. When discussing the second formulation, some students spent time and space explaining why it was 'legitimate in some instances to use people as a means to an end', when this could have been avoided by a more precise rendering of the humanity formulation, specifying that human beings should treat each other as *mere* means to an end.

Some students mistook the distinction *within* the first formulation of the categorical imperative (the 'contradiction in conception' and the 'contradiction in will') with the first and second formulations of the categorical imperative (the 'universal law' formulation and the 'humanity' formulation). Because some of these students argued (rightly) that lying failed at the 'conception' level, and thereby produced a categorical prohibition against lying, the subsequent explanation of how lying could produce a 'contradiction in will' became superfluous. Students who did not discuss both the 'universal' and 'humanity' formulations could not progress beyond 6 marks because they had not produced sufficient material that was relevant to meet the demands of the question. But students

were not expected to be equally adept at explaining Kant's position on lying using both formulations: students could and did access the top band of marks by producing, for example, a clear and correct application of the first formulation to lying with use of relevant technical philosophical vocabulary, and then by producing a detailed, integrated and well-illustrated application of the second formulation with precise and consistent use of technical philosophical language.

The notorious 'murderer at the door scenario', discussed by Kant himself, often featured in responses to this question, and at all levels of performance, but this tended to cloud the issue with students (understandably) tempted to insist that the prohibition on lying in this case simply cannot be correct, but this did not cohere with what they had said about Kant's position elsewhere. Provision was made in the mark scheme for students wanting to argue that Kant could be interpreted in such a way as to justify lying in (extreme) cases, but students rarely (if ever) exploited this effectively.

At the bottom end of the assessment scale (1-3 marks), students typically did not get beyond making some relevant general points on Kant's ethical system, or else they would launch straight into the story of the 'mad axeman at the door', which certainly served to illustrate Kant's opposition to lying, but it did not bring out the philosophical principles underpinning his stance.

Question 05: Is utilitarianism correct? (25 marks)

This was the first of two questions on the paper designed to test AO1 and AO2. The question invited a discussion of one of the moral theories featured in the current specification, and one of the most influential ethical systems in modern times: utilitarianism. With a mean mark of 13.82, students performed better overall on this question than on the corresponding item last year. More students penetrated the top two levels this year (16–20 and 21– 25 bands), with maximum marks awarded to the very best responses.

Some of the students operating at the top end of the assessment scale took on a self-consciously narrower range of positions, but treated those arguments to much more detailed and sustained analysis and evaluation. Students might write, for example, that they are 'setting preference utilitarianism aside for the purposes of this debate', and produced a focussed analysis of hedonistic versions of utilitarianism. It was open to students to take ownership of the topic in this way and define the scope of their discussion. Most students at the upper end argued that utilitarianism is not correct. Some did this very effectively by explaining and critiquing two or three versions. Others took a different approach, for example by identifying early on some core feature of utilitarianism as a general ethical stance which meant that, despite its apparent strengths as a theory, it could not be considered correct overall. The strengths were typically considered to be related to its 'egalitarian and democratic' character. For many of these students, however, the Achilles heel of utilitarianism is the 'consequentialist' nature of the theory; for some it is the alleged 'weakness on fundamental human rights'; for others it is the 'lack of attention given to motive and/or character'. For those only engaging hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasure and its limits were front and centre of the discussion, and meta-ethical considerations were sometimes brought to bear on the discussion (the 'naturalistic fallacy', for example).

Once again, the most frequently awarded scores this year were in the 11–15 band, with students offering a clear answer in the form of an argument, sometimes with detailed understanding of the positions they discussed (especially on Bentham and Mill). Because of the significant shift towards AO2 in the A2 exam (compared with the AS), the sustained and detailed quality of evaluation is very important, and this was lacking in responses scoring in this 11-15 range: evaluative points often stated (and sometimes countered) very briefly before moving on to further considerations. In

terms of the content of evaluation, act utilitarianism tended to be evaluated more convincingly than rule utilitarianism. Critical analysis of the former revolved around issues with 'calculation' and the 'counter intuitive' implications of apparently having to morally endorse the decisions of persons and communities who took pleasure from 'self-evident' abominations (examples of sexual violence loomed large here). Some of the more promising evaluation took up the issue of whether the aim of act utilitarianism should be to 'maximise total or average happiness', but this was a line of enquiry seldom pursued. Mill's utilitarianism was usually introduced as an improvement on act utilitarianism, and the higher achieving students showed where exactly the improvements were supposed to be. Too often, however, the idea that Mill solved problems with Bentham's system was left implicit. Mill's distinction between 'higher and lower pleasures' was often explained and illustrated at length, but it was not always well integrated with the discussion of 'quantitative notions of pleasure' raised elsewhere in essays. The utilitarianism that students associated with Mill's moral philosophy was typically criticized for falling victim to 'rule fetishism' where it advocated 'strong rule utilitarianism', whilst 'weak rule utilitarianism' was often quickly dismissed for 'collapsing into act utilitarianism'. These are established objections, of course, but few students entertained the possibility that there might be more to be said for rule utilitarianism before moving on.

One of the most frequently used thought experiments among students criticising hedonistic utilitarianism (sometimes to pave the way for 'preference utilitarianism') was Nozick's 'experience machine' (or 'pleasure machine' as it was typically rendered). All too often, however, the scenario imagined by Nozick was briefly described and presented as a 'knockdown' argument against all hedonist utilitarianism it was as if the mere mention of 'Nozick's claim that most people would not want to be wired up to a pleasure machine' somehow settled the argument. The better responses did tease out a range of alternative values as important moral considerations over and above pleasure; values which tended to centre in one way or another on authenticity: the value of enjoying real experiences, truthful experiences, even if this means the experience of some pain.

Preference utilitarianism was almost invariably the third and final position discussed by students, typically with reference to Singer. Because preference utilitarianism tended to feature late in students' essays, however, it was dealt with all too quickly, suffering from a lack of detail in explication and repetitive evaluation (arguments against act utilitarianism revolving around 'depraved pleasures' were often just rehashed here in the form of 'depraved preferences'). Nevertheless, there were some good examples of students using preference utilitarianism to 'resolve' issues in act and rule utilitarianism, with this version emerging in those essay as 'the strongest form of utilitarianism to date', whether or not it was judged 'correct' overall.

Although it was open to students to advance the claims of alternative moral theories in critical conversation with *utilitarianism*, this was rarely successful. Students discussing other moral philosophies tended to juxtapose Kant's deontological ethics or Aristotle's virtues ethics with utilitarianism, but they did not use features of those alternative normative positions to critique features of utilitarianism, nor did they seek to critically compare utilitarianism (favourably) with those others systems. Indeed, lengthy discussion of other moral theories was often indicative of students who did not know enough about the central theory to produce an extended discussion. Having said that, fewer students struggled to get out of the bottom scoring band this year than last (1-5 marks), and this was typically achieved through some basic / generic understanding of utilitarianism and the use of some 'evaluative' language, rather than the making of reasoned judgements.

Section B: Philosophy of Mind

Question B6: What is a philosophical zombie? (3 marks)

This question (testing AO1 only) assessed the ability of students to explain a concept used in thought experiments in the Philosophy of Mind: the 'philosophical zombie'. With a mean mark of 2.28, students performed better on this question than on the corresponding item last year, and over 50% of responses were awarded the full 3 marks.

Most students accessed full marks by explaining that a 'philosophical zombie is a hypothetical being that is an exact physical replica of a normal human being but without conscious experience'. Some students answered the question by identifying 'phenomenal experience' or 'qualia' as the missing element; some answered in modal terms (with reference to 'possible worlds'). Quite a number of students linked the concept to arguments for property dualism, which was not necessary, but it certainly did not count against students in terms of redundancy.

Students most frequently failed to achieve marks by omitting to clarify that philosophical zombies are *physically* 'identical to human beings'. Other students claimed that philosophical zombies are 'physically identical to normal human beings but lack minds/mental states'. The former represents a lack of precise detail; the latter obviously does not target the precise features of the mental states that are most relevant here.

Fewer students failed to score any marks on this question compared to the corresponding item last year. Typically they just did not know anything about the concept and so produced responses without philosophical merit, or else they left the question blank.

Question B7: Explain how eliminative materialism differs from mind-brain type identity theory. (5 marks)

This question required students to explain how two materialist theories on the specification differ. Overall, students responded very well to the challenge, with the mean mark rising this year to 3.14 and 13.5% of students awarded maximum marks: the highest for a 5 mark question this series.

Students at the upper end of the assessment scale (4-5 marks) took various approaches. Some began by giving a brief explanation of each theory, leaving the differences implicit in the first instance, and then drawing them out in a concluding paragraph. Others approached the question thematically: for example, by explaining where they differ on the 'ontology' of minds and mental states, or on the 'status of the language' we use to talk about minds and mental states. The substantive difference we were looking for students to identify was that one theory (mind-brain type identity theory) is reductionist and the other (eliminative materialism) is eliminativist. How clear the students were on that fundamental difference determined whether they progressed to 3 marks and beyond. The fuller responses, accessing the full range of marks, tended to exploit the different perspectives on 'folk psychology' rather than just answering in terms of the 'existence of mental properties'.

Students lower down the assessment scale (2 marks) tended to describe the two theories and left the differences implicit, or lower down still (1 mark) they would confuse characteristics of the two positions, with 'eliminative materialism' characterised as 'reductionist'. Sometimes the *identity* aspect of 'mind-brain type identity theory' was lost in students' responses, where the language of 'correlation' was used, leaving open the possibility that mental states and brain states were ontologically distinct in this type of materialism.

Question 8: Explain how the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states might cause an issue for logical/analytic behaviourism. (5 marks)

This question had a mean mark of 2.76. Students found this item harder to score marks on than the previous question of the same tariff, and harder than the corresponding item last year. The question required students to show their philosophical understanding (AO1) of a particular issue facing one of the materialist positions covered in the current specification: logical/analytical behaviourism.

Students at all levels of performance typically began by defining logical/analytical behaviourism as 'the view that all statements about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to statements about behaviour or behavioural dispositions'. Beyond this, students tended to focus their attention on 'other people's mental states', discerned 'through behaviour', but with little direct attention given to the characteristics of 'self-knowledge'. A typical reason for students not accessing marks was the tendency to blur the 'asymmetry' issue question with 'multiple realizability'. There were frequent discussions of 'super Spartans' and the difficulty of accurately identifying the mental states of others on the basis of their behaviour. Some of the higher achieving students focussed on the fact that that 'we do not observe our own behaviour in the same way that we do 'other peoples'', with the counter intuitive implication being that 'we do not know our own minds as well as those of others.'

Despite some of the weaknesses noted above, more students accessed full marks on this question than on either of the 5 mark items on the Ethics section (12.9%). The most precise responses tended to focus on the 'direct and non-inferential nature of self-knowledge acquired through introspection', over and against the 'indirect and inferred nature of knowledge of other people's mental states acquired through observation; or the 'certainty / infallibility of self-knowledge' over and against the 'speculative and fallible' nature of knowledge of other people's mental states.

At bottom end of the assessment scale (1-2 marks) students did not get beyond a definition of logical/analytical behaviourism, or else they only partially / vaguely touched upon the issue of symmetry.

Question 09: Explain the conceptual causation issue and the empirical causation issue as problems facing interactionist dualism. (12 marks)

This question required an extended demonstration of philosophical understanding (AO1), focussed on two issues with 'interactionist dualism' centring on causation: the 'conceptual issue' and the 'empirical issue'. With a mean mark of 5.62 students performed marginally better than on the corresponding item last year, but many more students accessed the top band: 15.6% of students scored 10-12 marks. One of the factors pulling the mean mark down for this item is that more students did not even attempt to answer the question than any other item on the paper.

At the top end of the assessment scale (10-12 marks) students tended to begin with a brief but precise explanation of interactionist dualism, with reference to either or both 'substance dualism' and 'property dualism', with the 'interactionist' dimension explained (and often illustrated) in terms of a two-way causal process. The conceptual issue was usually associated with Elizabeth of Bohemia and her critique of Descartes, with the problem centred on the 'inconceivability of the mind as an immaterial substance (unextended in space) impacting on the body as a material substance (extended in space) and vice versa'. Sometimes the conceptual issue was laid out in a step-by-step format of premises leading to the conclusion that 'the mind must be material because the mind does cause effects in the body (and vice versa)'. Students approached the 'empirical issue' as one centring on the 'conservation of energy principle' and the related position that the 'universe is a closed system'. Students often supplemented the latter with empirical considerations from neuroscience and 'the lack of evidence for any non-material causal powers of the mind over the brain, in contrast to the wealth of evidence for the causal power of the brain over the mind'.

Lower down the assessment scale (4- 6 and 7-9 bands), students tended to explain one of the issues clearly enough, but they either omitted the other issue or misunderstood it. Perhaps the most frequent error was to subsume the empirical issues under the conceptual, leaving little if anything distinctive to say about the empirical issues. There were some overlaps between the two issues, which we tried to allow for, but the key was for students to recognise that the 'conceptual issue' as is concerned with 'conceivability' and the 'logical relationship between ideas', whereas the 'empirical issue' emerged from 'physical theories or principles' constructed on the basis of 'data drawn from natural sciences'. Many students just did not draw that distinction in their presentation of material, and those who thought it relevant to discuss the role of the 'pineal gland' in Descartes' interactionist dualism showed a particular tendency to blur the conceptual and the empirical issues. Other students devoted unnecessary time and space to explaining arguments for interactionist dualism before addressing the issues that were central to the question. Some responses also devoted too much time to explaining arguments for interactionist dualism before engaging with the central issues

Students who were unable to break out of the bottom scoring band (1-3 marks) often did not get beyond an outline of dualism (in some form or another), often with little or no attention to the interactionist dimension.

Question 10: Is the functionalist theory of mental states correct? (25 Marks)

This question tested both AO1 and AO2, taking as its subject matter one of the most influential theories of mental states to emerge in the twentieth century: functionalism. With a mean mark of 10.91 this was, statistically, the hardest question to score marks on. Students scored lower than on the corresponding item last year, and fewer accessed the top band of marks (21-25), although once again the 11–15 band was the most frequently awarded.

Most students argued that the functionalist theory of mental states was not correct, and the supposed inability of functionalism to account for 'qualia' seemed to be the most frequently cited reason for its failure as a theory of mind. Machine functionalism and psycho-functionalism (or 'causal role functionalism') were the most frequently discussed variants, and the strengths explained in terms of 'multiple realisability' and avoiding the 'chauvinism of 'mind-bran type identity theory'. All too often, however, the supposed advantages of functionalism over behaviourism or mind-brain type identity theory were asserted rather than explained. Criticisms tended to be drawn from Block's 'Chinese mind', the possibility of 'inverted qualia', the possibility of 'functional zombies', Searle's 'Chinese room' thought experiment, and Jackson's 'knowledge/Mary' argument.

The highest achieving students framed / adapted these criticisms (and their responses) specifically to functionalism, but many did not (see below).

Perhaps the greatest barrier to students scoring highly on this question was their understanding of functionalism itself, which was crucial not just in its own right, but as a way of opening up possible avenues for evaluation and analysis. Many students took functionalism to be synonymous with physicalism and so never brought out the distinctive character of functionalism or objections to it. Some of the best responses (16–20 and 21-25 bands) acknowledged the ontological neutrality of functionalism at the outset, but said that they would be restricting the argument to 'physicalist versions of functionalism'. Again, taking ownership of subjects in this way is good practice and was often the mark of confident and well-focussed philosophical writing. Whether or not students concluded in favour of or against functionalism (and most were against it), these better students rigorously challenged the 'intuitions' (or 'prejudices') that many of us have about the mind and mental states which are even evident in sophisticated philosophical arguments. Dennett was often a reference point when attempting to refute the 'Chinese mind', 'Chinese room', and 'knowledge/Mary' arguments. Accounts of and responses to the possibility of a 'philosophical zombies' and 'inverted qualia' were the least convincing, although, in response to the latter, there were some outstanding attempts to show how our perception of colour, for example, cannot be taken in isolation but is part of a wider network of interrelated functions.

At the lower end of the assessment scale (6 – 10 marks) students tended to juxtapose functionalism with other theories of mind, but without direct critical engagement between the two. The 'excessive liberalism of functionalism' was sometimes taken as an important objection, which is a plausible criticism, but some attempted to charge the functionalist with attributing (conscious) minds not only to 'sophisticated computers' (such as those that can 'pass the Turing test') but to 'can openers' and 'hole punches', which rather caricatured the theory. Lower down still (1-5 marks), there was often little accurate material at all on functionalism, and the argument was framed in terms of a dispute between dualism and materialism.

One notable trend this year, which was evident to a lesser extent on item 05, was the tendency among students to use specific mark scheme language in their essays. There is nothing wrong with this in principle, and if it helps to encourage the use and demonstration of the relevant skills we would welcome it, but there was little evidence that it served any constructive purpose. Students would refer to 'crucial arguments', or announce that were 'distinguishing stronger from weaker arguments', but this was not reflected in their actual writing. What matters is that students *show* the evaluative and analytical skills indicated by level descriptors not that they *tell* examiners that this is what they are doing, especially when the 'weight' they claim to be giving to particular arguments is not apparent in what they actually write.

A more positive development this year, which is also relevant to the mark scheme level descriptors, was students showing the ability to form 'reasoned judgements' on an 'ongoing basis' in relation to the essay question. The practice of articulating provisional conclusions on the basis of the 'material considered thus far', or summarising the essential points to emerge from the analysis and evaluation of a particular issue within a wider discussion, can serve the end of building and sustaining a line of argument in an extended piece of philosophical writing. It can also take some of the pressure off the concluding section of the essay: a space where some students try to draw all relevant strands of an argument together (which is of course welcome), but at a stage in the exam when they can be short on the necessary time to achieve this.

Use of statistics

Statistics used in this report may be taken from incomplete processing data. However, this data still gives a true account on how students have performed for each question.

Mark Ranges and Award of Grades

Grade boundaries and cumulative percentage grades are available on the Results Statistics page of the AQA Website.

Converting Marks into UMS marks

Convert raw marks into Uniform Mark Scale (UMS) marks by using the link below.
UMS conversion calculator