



A-Level

Philosophy

PHLS2 Ethics and Philosophy of Mind
Final Mark scheme

2175
June 2017

Version/Stage: v1.0

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A – Ethics

1 What is the difference between ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism?

[3 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content for three marks

Ethical naturalists claim that ethical properties (or facts) are natural/physical properties (or facts)...	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that ethical properties (or facts) are non-natural/non-physical properties (or facts).
Ethical naturalists claim that what makes (first-order) ethical propositions true is some natural/physical state of affairs...	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that what makes (first-order) ethical propositions true is some non-natural/non-physical state of affairs.
Ethical naturalists claim that moral terms/concepts like 'good' pick out (or refer to) natural/physical properties...	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that moral terms/concepts like 'good' pick out (or refer to) non-natural/non-physical properties.
Ethical naturalists claim that moral properties/facts depend (or supervene) on natural/physical properties...	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that moral properties do not depend on natural/physical properties (though they may correlate with them)

- There can be both reductive and non-reductive versions of ethical naturalism. Students may presume that 'ethical naturalism' means 'reductive ethical naturalism', so:

Ethical naturalists claim that ethical properties/facts are reducible to (non-ethical) natural/physical properties/facts ...	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that ethical properties are not reducible to (non-ethical) natural properties/facts.
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Indicative content for two marks

Ethical naturalists claim that ethical properties/facts are identical to (or reducible to) natural/physical properties (or facts)....	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that ethical properties/facts are unique.
Ethical naturalists claim that moral truths are	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that

discovered by investigating (or reflecting) on the natural/physical world and identifying moral properties (or facts)...	moral truths are discovered by intuition [or some other example drawn ethical-non naturalist epistemology].
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Indicative content for 1 mark

Ethical naturalists claim that ethical properties/facts are identical to natural properties/facts....	whereas ethical non-naturalists deny this / claim this is false.
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Ethical naturalists claim that moral truths are natural...	whereas ethical non-naturalists claim that moral truths are supernatural/divine.
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NB:

- Examples of the two theories and their advocates are not asked for or required, but if they are given accurately then that is perfectly acceptable.
- Students may begin by mentioning something that the two positions share (e.g. they are both 'realist' positions). Assuming that what they write is accurate, this is not in and of itself a reason to penalise students and it can be classified as 'little redundancy' (Level 3). But if students are writing as much or more about the similarities as they are about differences then this is grounds for characterising this as 'some redundancy' (Level 2), and lacking the precision we would look for in a Level 3 response.
- Students are not expected to produce the additional material supplied in parentheses in the indicative content.

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

2 Explain what error theory claims about the status of ethical language.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Error theory is
 - (1) a cognitivist theory:
 - ethical language is cognitively meaningful
 - ethical language makes claims about mind-independent reality
 - ethical language claims that there are mind-independent moral facts/properties
 - such ethical judgements/claims are truth-apt
 - (2) but also an anti-realist theory about morality:
 - these moral judgements/claims are false
 - there are no such mind-independent moral facts/properties
 - when we make such ethical judgements we are in error / mistaken.
- If students neglect to explain point (1) - so they may say that error theory is the claim that moral statements are false - this is not as serious an omission as neglecting to explain point (2). This is because moral statements can only be false if they are truth-apt.
- However, if they omit to explain point (2), this is more serious, as this would not distinguish error theory from moral realism.

NB: It is possible for a student to explain points (1) and (2) clearly without mention of the underlined terminology.

- To clarify (2) above: The moral judgements that error theorists claim are false are those moral judgements whose truth would presuppose the existence of moral properties (ie the judgements 'murder is wrong' and 'murder is right' are both false). However, some judgements about morality (namely, those that do not presuppose the existence of moral properties) are of course still true - eg the anti-realist claim 'There are no moral properties' is true according to error theorists.
- It is possible to respond by explaining how error theory contrasts with alternative positions (e.g. moral realism).
- Some students may attribute this view to Mackie and some may also explain one or more of his argument/s in support of this view (the argument from relativity and the metaphysical and/or epistemological arguments from queerness).
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Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

3 Explain the issue of circularity involved in Aristotle’s definition of ‘virtuous acts’.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is correct and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may begin by placing the issue within the context of Aristotle’s (agent centred) virtue theory of ethics (although this is not necessary).
- Aristotle defines a ‘virtuous act’ as an act which would be done by a ‘virtuous person’ in a particular situation.
- Aristotle also defines a ‘virtuous person’ as a person who is disposed to do virtuous acts.
- Now assuming that we do not already know what a virtuous act is, or what constitutes a virtuous person, the issue is that we are not left any clearer following the definitions he provides.
- This is because the definition of a ‘virtuous act’, as ‘an act which would be done by a virtuous person in a particular situation’, contains the term being defined, because for Aristotle ‘virtuous person’ means ‘a person who is disposed to do virtuous acts in a particular situation’ (and vice versa).

NB: For students progressing beyond Level 2, we are looking for students to go beyond an outline of the circle: e.g. ‘Virtuous acts are those performed by virtuous people; and virtuous people are those who perform virtuous acts...’ We are looking for students to explain what the *issue* is with the circularity: that it does little (or nothing) to inform us about the nature of virtuous acts (some will then tease out some of the problems which follow from this).

Notes:

- If responses are given in terms of ‘what someone with a virtuous character would do’ (rather than ‘virtuous people’), this is equally acceptable.
- Although the question is about circularity with reference to ‘virtuous acts,’ students may equally well frame the issue as a problem with determining what is meant by ‘virtuous people’, as long as the issue of circularity with respect to ‘virtuous acts’ is clear in their answer.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

4 Explain Kant’s view on the telling of lies, using his first and second formulations of the categorical imperative.

[12 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	<p>A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form.</p> <p>Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.</p>
	7-9	<p>A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely.</p> <p>Integration is present, but may not be sustained.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.</p>
	4-6	<p>A clear answer, in a coherent logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated.</p> <p>Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
	1-3	<p>There are some relevant points made, but no integration.</p> <p>There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.</p>
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- General points:
 - Students may begin by placing the issue of lying within the context of Kant's (act centred) deontological ethics: the motive of duty is the defining character of moral conduct, and we determine our duties through the exercise of reason.
 - Kant’s view may be distinguished from other moral theories: he does not base morality on consequences (unlike utilitarianism) and does not base morality on dispositions/character/nature (unlike virtue ethics).

- Kant argues that we have a categorical/absolute/perfect duty not to lie. If, for example, there is an axe-murderer at the door, given that you can never lie, you cannot even lie in order to save lives or protect the innocent.
 - Only the good will is good without qualification, and to have a good will is to do your duty because it is your duty (other motivations are morally irrelevant). Therefore, one ought to tell the truth out of duty alone rather than for some other reason.
 - Kant argues that our moral duties are discoverable by reason and so that only those who possess adequate rational capacities have a duty not to lie.
- Kant's view on lying in terms of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Formula of Universal Law): "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [or "universal law of nature"]" (*Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*):
 - Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test is morally wrong.
 - A maxim fails the test of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised, so it would be impossible for everyone to act on it. This may be referred to as a 'contradiction in conception'.
 - In the case of lying to get what you want, Kant would argue that your maxim would be 'I can tell a lie, if it gets me what I want.' If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say, 'All rational agents must, by a universal law of nature, lie when it gets them what they want.' Lying presupposes people taking you at your word, but, in this world, the practice of giving your word doesn't exist. So my maxim cannot exist with itself as a universal law.
 - Thus, we have a (perfect) duty not to lie.
 - Kant's view on lying in relation to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Formula of Humanity): "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (*Foundations*):
 - In the case of lying, to lie to someone is to treat them merely as a means to your own ends, rather than as an end.
 - Lying undermines the power and autonomy of others to make rational choices by depriving them of the truth to make an informed decision. "For the one I want to use for my aims through such a [lying] promise cannot possibly be in harmony with my way of conducting myself toward him and contain in himself the end of this action" (*Foundations*).

NB: Students who take the 'contradiction in conception' and 'contradiction in will' dimensions of the Formula of Universal Law as the first and second of Kant's formulas (without attempting the Formula of Humanity) cannot be judged to have answered both parts of the question, and so they cannot progress beyond the 4 -6 Band due to "insufficient material than is relevant". But students treating both the first and second formulas do not have to do so with equal detail and precision in order to access the full range of marks.

Notes:

- It is most unlikely that students will try to interpret either formula in such a way that lying is (sometimes) found to be permissible, but there is justification in some of Kant's lesser known writings for exploring such an interpretation. One method is to argue that, in extreme cases, it is possible that the maxim one acts on in the telling of a lie could be universalised without contradiction (in the case of the 'murderer at the door', this usually involves the assumption that the murderer is ignorant of the fact that the person they are questioning knows his/her evil intentions, and so they are also engaged in an act of deception which the 'victim' has the right to resist).
- Kant does not consider it virtuous to acquiesce to being used as an instrument to some malicious goal, indicating that it may be legitimate to protect one's self against someone who is using you as a means to their (wicked) ends by telling a lie. Here are some relevant passages from Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*:
 - "[I]f we were to be at all times punctiliously truthful we might often become victims of the wickedness of others who were ready to abuse our truthfulness. If all men were well-intentioned it would not only be a duty not to lie, but no one would do so because there would be no point in it. But as men are malicious, it cannot be denied that to be punctiliously truthful is often dangerous..."
 - "A man who knows that I have money asks me: 'Have you any money on you?' If I fail to reply, he will conclude that I have; if I reply in the affirmative he will take it from me; if I reply in the negative, I tell a lie. What am I to do? If force is used to extort a confession from me, if my confession is improperly used against me, and if I cannot save myself by maintaining silence, then my lie is a weapon of defence...The forcing of a statement from me under conditions which convince me that improper use would be made of it is the only case in which I can be justified in telling a white lie."

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

5 Is utilitarianism correct?

[25 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
<p>25 AO1 – 5 AO2 - 20</p>	21-25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained.</p> <p>A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
	16-20	<p>The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
	11-15	<p>A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content.</p> <p>Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.</p>
	6-10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence.</p>

		<p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear.</p> <p>Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.</p>
	1-5	<p>Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument.</p> <p>There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided.</p> <p>There might be some use of philosophical language.</p>
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Credit can be given for responses which consider (a) utilitarianism in general, (b) focus on one particular version of utilitarianism, or (c) consider two or more versions in the course of the essay.
- General points:
 - Utilitarians (as consequentialists) decide whether actions are morally right or wrong based on their effects.
 - The best decision is the decision that maximises utility (creates the greatest net utility)
NB: utility can be understood in different ways (see below).
 - A utilitarian would consider the effects on happiness of all those affected; no-one would be ignored during the calculating process, and no one accorded special favour: “every man to count for one, nobody for more than one” (Bentham).
- Utilitarians differ in their answers to various questions, forming a complex matrix of possible positions):
 - Which consequences matter? / What is meant by ‘utility’?
 - the quantity of pleasurable sensations (Bentham’s hedonic calculus)
 - the quality of pleasure (Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures)
 - the satisfaction of preferences (preference utilitarianism – Hare and Singer)
 - various ‘ideals’/values (ideal utilitarianism - Moore)
 - The consequences of what?:
 - particular acts (according to act utilitarianism)
 - rules (according rule utilitarianism)
 - The consequences for whom?:
 - Do animals count?
 - Do all human beings count, and if not, what are the morally relevant criteria?
- Possible lines of argument:

NO: Utilitarianism is not correct: arguments / points against in the form of ‘external’ criticism / debates, including the claims of rival ethical theories and their advocates.

- Problems with calculation:
 - Difficulties with predicting/knowing the relevant consequences.
 - Difficulties with measuring utility (e.g. for Mill, is any amount of ‘higher’ pleasure of more value than an infinite amount of ‘lower’ pleasure?).
 - Utilitarianism has the strange result that we cannot know whether we have done the right thing until after we have done it (and we may never know); a

- related point: Is it *actual* or *expected* consequences that matter in terms of the rightness of the decision made?
- How much of the future can, or ought, the calculation take into account?
 - Difficulties with making calculations quickly and accurately enough for the right decision to be made in time (and rule utilitarianism as a possible response to this concern).
- Utilitarianism ignores individual liberty/rights:
 - It fails to take seriously the distinctness of persons (Rawls).
 - It treats people only as a means to an end, violating the Kantian principle – so Kant may be used to make this point.
 - Rights and/or liberties are a way of doing this. Rule utilitarianism might be brought in and evaluated as a response to this concern.
 - Utilitarianism ignores the possible value of certain motives (e.g. the desire to do good), and the character of the person doing the action.
 - Virtue ethics may be discussed in this context as the right (and a better) account (the morally right thing to do is that which is the expression of virtue and virtuous character). Utilitarians may of course respond to this by arguing that they are able to morally evaluate motive and character so long as this is itself done on utilitarian grounds).
 - Utilitarianism ignores the possible moral status of particular relationships (family/friendship) we may have with others, and indeed ignores the special duty we may have to ourselves.
 - Singer's example of the drowning child and donations to charity might be discussed in this context (he, as a utilitarian, argues that nationality and distance are not in themselves morally relevant factors).
 - This point may be linked to the following point...
 - Utilitarianism is too demanding on us – it requires us to do 'supererogatory' acts (acts which are normally seen as praiseworthy but not obligatory).
 - Certain versions of utilitarianism take sensations of pleasure too seriously:
 - Aristotelian critiques: pleasure, though important, is not the highest good for humans, since it is what we share with animals.
 - Kantian critiques: we should act out of duty rather than to attain/maximise happiness – it is God who will ensure that the 'highest good' (including happiness) will be achieved for those who do the right thing.
 - Nozick's experience machine: pleasure is not all we care about since we would not plug into a pleasure-machine; we also care about our experiences being 'real' and our desires really being realised / coming true. For some this is a point in favour of preference utilitarianism.
 - Counter-intuitive results: utilitarianism might ask us to do things which we intuitively think are wrong (eg removing the organs of a healthy person to save 5 lives, torturing the innocent child of a terrorist to obtain information about a bomb threatening thousands of people).

YES: Utilitarianism is correct:

- Mill's 'proof' of the principle of utility: the first part of his argument is that happiness is good; the second part of his arguments is that happiness is the only good.
- Common sense: it is evident/obvious that everyone's ultimate concern is to maximise happiness/pleasure and minimise unhappiness/pain – i.e. one can ask "Why do X?" and eventually one will get to "Because it brings happiness", but one can't pursue it by then asking "Why seek happiness?"
- Universality: takes into account all agents / all those capable of feeling pain/pleasure happiness/unhappiness, thus bringing animals into the moral sphere. For Singer, this takes seriously the insights of theories of evolution (most obviously Darwin's) which

have often been taken to undercut the ‘sacred’ status of human beings and their (automatic) ethical priority.

- Practicality/ease: we can work out what to do using a clear ‘decision procedure’.
- Objectivity: the calculation above is objective and would give the same results for anyone who applies it.
- Egalitarianism and impartiality: each agent / relevant being counts as equal in the calculation (in the sense that one starts by treating each person as equal before calculations).
- Focuses on human wellbeing and promotes benevolence towards others: we should each seek to maximise happiness of the greatest number.
- Democratic: the happiness (pleasures/preferences) of people are an important part of a democratic society which takes seriously the will(s) of the people.
- Provides a secular framework for ethics: moral reasoning and judgement can operate independently of (conflicting) religious traditions, relying as it does on rational procedures which anyone can use.

NO: Utilitarianism is not correct: arguments based on metaethics and the assumption that utilitarianism is naturalist (eg hedonistic naturalism):

- Appeal to the is-ought gap (Hume).
- The naturalistic fallacy (Moore): ‘good’ cannot be defined/analysed in terms of any other (natural) property.
- The open-question argument.
- Mill’s ‘proof’ the principle of utility fails.
- Moral disagreement: goodness cannot be happiness since there is not wide enough agreement on this (or what ‘happiness’ amounts to).

IT DEPENDS:

- Students may conclude that whether utilitarianism is correct depends on which version you adopt, and proceed to defend / repudiate certain versions.
- It is also possible (if unlikely) that students will argue for the complementarity of insights from (some) forms of utilitarianism and other moral theories: for example Aristotle’s eudemonic (virtue) ethics.

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

Section B – Philosophy of Mind

6 What is a philosophical zombie?

[3 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content for three marks

- A philosophical zombie (or p-zombie) is something that:
 - (1) is physically identical (or duplicate of) a (normal/conscious) human being (ie has all and only the same physical properties as a normal/conscious human being)
 - but...
 - (2) [*accept any of the following or equivalents*]:
 - ...lacks any consciousness
 - ...lacks qualia
 - ...lacks qualitative states / experiences
 - ...lacks phenomenal properties
 - ...there is nothing it is like to be a philosophical zombie.

Indicative content for two marks

- A philosophical zombie (or p-zombie) is:
 - identical to a human being but lacks consciousness [or equivalents: see point (2) above]
 - physically identical to us but lacks consciousness [or equivalents: see point (2) above]

Indicative content for one mark

- A philosophical zombie (or p-zombie) is:
 - a being that lacks consciousness [or equivalents: see point (2) above]
 - a being that is physically identical to humans but has no mind/mental states.

NB: References to 'Mind' or 'mental states' are not to be taken as synonymous with 'consciousness' (or its equivalents). Students are nevertheless able to describe what the philosophical zombie is lacking as

'conscious mental states' ('consciousness' or its equivalents is one of the essential features of answers which are substantively correct.

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

7 Explain how eliminative materialism differs from mind-brain type identity theory.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- (1) Eliminative materialism (EM): the claim that some or all mental states, as understood by folk-psychology, do not exist so folk-psychology is false or at least radically misleading.
 - (2) Mind-brain type identity theory (Type-IT): the claim that mental states can be ontologically (but not analytically) reduced to brain states.
- There are a number of ways in which the difference/s might be explained and it should be noted/recognised that there are subtleties in the ways in which specific proponents of each view have expressed those views.

Mind-brain type identity theory	Eliminative materialism
Type-IT claims that mental states / properties (as understood by folk-psychology) exist...	...whereas EM claims that (at least some) mental states / properties (as understood by folk-psychology) do not exist.
Type-IT is an ontologically reductive theory...	...whereas EM claims that there are no phenomena that need 'reducing'.
Type-IT sees mental language as making claims that are meaningful and true...	...whereas eliminative materialists see it as making (at least some) claims that are, at best, false or, at worst, meaningless.

NB: The table format above works on the assumption that students will often try to explain two or more points of difference. If they do this with sufficient precision then they can score full marks (there is no requirements to 'integrate' their points on these 5 mark questions, though some of the best might do so). But it is also possible for students to take one difference and develop it fully, explaining it with logical precision and (possibly) supplementing it with illustrations (although examples are not a requirement of this question).

- 8 Explain how the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states might cause an issue for logical/analytic behaviourism.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The logical/analytical behaviourist claim: all statements about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (analytically reduced / translated without remainder) into statements about (actual and possible patterns of) behaviour / behavioural dispositions.
- The important implication of this, in relation to this question, is that the way in which I justify knowledge-claims about my own mind would have to be the same as the way in which I justify my knowledge-claims about the minds of others. Ryle almost (but not quite) makes this claim: "The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same" (*Concept of Mind*).
- The issue of asymmetry: Logical/analytical behaviourism seems to imply that I can discover the same kind of things about the minds/mental states of others that I can discover about my own mind/mental states, and that I can do so using the same kind of methods. But this is at odds with the obvious asymmetry that seems (to many) to exist between our self-knowledge and our knowledge of others
- Aspects of this symmetry:

Self-knowledge	(Attempted) knowledge of other minds
Direct and non-inferential; acquired directly through introspection.	Indirect and inferred from behavioural observations from perception.
Certain: it is impossible to doubt claims made about one's own mind.	Uncertain: It is possible to doubt claims made about another's mind.
Infallible: one cannot be wrong about one's knowledge-claims about one's own mind.	Fallible: one can be wrong about one's knowledge-claims about other people's minds.

Incorrigible: no-one could ever be in a position to correct you with regard to your knowledge-claims about your own mental states.	Corrigible: someone could be in a position to correct you with regard to your knowledge-claims about another person’s mental states (most likely the other person him/herself).
Completeness/transparency: there is nothing about one’s own mind that one does not know.	Incompleteness/non-transparency: there may well, and might necessarily be, aspects of another’s mind of which you do not have knowledge.
Possible/actual: most claim that we can have knowledge of at least some of our own mental states.	Impossible: some might argue that, presuming certain definitions of knowledge, knowledge of the minds of others is impossible.

NB: The table format above works on the assumption that students will often try to explain two or more aspects of the asymmetry. If they do this with sufficient precision then they can score full marks (there is no requirement to ‘integrate’ their points on these 5 mark question). But it is also possible for students to take one aspect and develop it fully, explaining it with logical precision and (possibly) supplementing it with illustrations (although examples are not a requirement of this question).

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 9 Explain the conceptual causation issue **and** the empirical causation issue as problems facing interactionist dualism.

[12 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	<p>A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.</p>
	7-9	<p>A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely. Integration is present, but may not be sustained.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.</p>
	4-6	<p>A clear answer, in a coherent logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
	1-3	<p>There are some relevant points made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.</p>
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The question does not mention substance dualism or property dualism, so it would be acceptable to discuss this as a general issue for interactionist dualism or in terms of one or both of these theories in their interactionist form(s).
- Interactionist dualism:
 - (A) Dualism:
 - General: The mind and/or mental states/properties is/are non-physical.

- Property dualism: at least some mental properties exist that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties (reference to either intentional or phenomenal properties or both).
- Substance dualism: minds exist and are not identical to physical bodies or to parts of physical bodies (there are two kinds of substance, mental and physical).

(B) Interactionism:

- The non-physical interacts causally with the physical in both directions.
- Both conceptual and empirical issues aim to argue against the possibility of interaction between the non-physical and the physical in one or both directions.
- The conceptual issue: the following examples would be priori / conceptual arguments in the sense that they rely only on teasing out the logical implications of what is understood by the concept of 'causation'.

P1: Causation without...

- ...contact / 'pushing'...
- ...it taking place in space / having location...
- ...energy transfer...

...is inconceivable

P2: If causation without X is inconceivable then causation without X is (or is likely to be) impossible.

C1: Therefore, causation without X is (/ is likely to be) impossible.

P3: Causation between the physical and the non-physical (in either direction) could not possibly involve X.

C2: Causation between the physical and the non-physical (in either direction) is impossible.

- The empirical issue:

NB: As with the "conceptual" issue, although the question says "issue" (singular), "the empirical issue" can plausibly be interpreted as being the general issue of the incompatibility of interactionist dualism and current empirical science, and therefore include several sub-issues. They will be a posteriori / empirical issues in the sense that they rule out dualist interaction on the basis of (proposed) empirical / scientific facts (and may, for many, be inductive rather than deductive).

- Here is one example (step by step) drawing on the argument from causal closure; other styles of presentation are perfectly acceptable.

P1: The universe is a closed causal system in which the total amount of energy remains constant (conservation of energy principle)

P2: Any non-physical to physical causation would have to involve an addition of energy to the physical world (*and physical to non-physical causation would have to involve a loss of energy from the physical world*)

C: Therefore, non-physical to physical causation is not empirically possible

- Additionally (it might be argued):
 - Science has a long history of explaining seemingly mysterious causation in physical terms (e.g. gravity was one such 'mystery' in the seventeenth century).

- The absence of anomalies within nature that might be an indication of interference from outside the physical world.
- Occam’s razor can be used in this context: entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity

NB: Students who *only* discuss the “conceptual” issue *or* the “empirical” issue have only addressed half the question and so cannot progress beyond the 4-6 Band due to “insufficient material than is relevant”. But students treating both issues do not have to do so with equal detail and precision in order to access the full range of marks.

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

10 Is the functionalist theory of mental states correct?

[25 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
25 AO1-5 AO2-20	21-25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained. A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones. Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.
	16-20	The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained. A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument. Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.
	11-15	A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed.

		<p>A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content.</p> <p>Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.</p>
6-10		<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear.</p> <p>Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.</p>
1-5		<p>Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument.</p> <p>There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided.</p> <p>There might be some use of philosophical language.</p>
0		Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Credit can be given for reference to various versions of functionalism:
 - In the *Specification* for this qualification, functionalism is defined as being the claim that “all mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised.”
 - Machine functionalism: mental states are machine states specified causally in terms of their inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states by a (deterministic or probabilistic) machine table.
 - Psycho-functionalism: mental states are the entities postulated by the best *scientific* explanation of human behaviour and are specified causally in terms of the functional roles they play in producing the behaviour to be explained.
 - Analytic functionalism: all statements about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (analytically reduced / translated without remainder) into functional statements.
- For any of these species of functionalism there will be role and realizer versions:
 - Role functionalists identify the property of pain with a higher-level functional / causal / relational property.
 - Realizer functionalists identify the property of pain with the actual property that realizes the ‘pain’ role.
- Functionalist theories claim that mental concepts should be treated as functional concepts (like clock) rather than as compositional concepts (like diamond).
- Mental states are therefore multiply realisable: multiple functionally identical (functionally isomorphic) set-ups could realise a particular mental state.
- Functionalism is silent about the dualist / physicalist question, but many functionalists are in fact physicalists and claim that only something physical could realize a mental state or, indeed, could play any kind of functional role at all.

- Some possible conclusions:
 - YES: functionalism gives the correct account of mental states.
 - NO: functionalism does not give the correct account of mental states.
 - DEPENDS: One version of functionalism gives the correct account but one or more other versions do not.
 - DEPENDS: functionalism gives the correct account of some mental states but not others.

YES: functionalism gives the correct account of mental states.

- The (alleged) advantage of understanding how differently constitutes beings (especially animals) can be considered minded.
- It may be aligned in general with progress in the natural sciences; more specifically students may argue that functionalist approaches to mind receives support from advances in computing and robotics/AI and/or the possibility of extra-terrestrial life.
- This theory might improve upon the weaknesses of other theories:
 - It recognises the importance of reference to internal states (unlike logical/analytical behaviourism).
 - It allows for multiple analysability (unlike type identity theory).
 - It does this while still giving an explanation of what all mental states of a given type have in common (unlike token identity theory and logical/analytical behaviourism).
 - Though typically adopted by physicalists it is not dependent on the truth of physicalism and is compatible with forms of dualism.

NO: functionalism does not give the correct account of mental states.

- Absent qualia / functional zombies (Block's "Chinese mind"):
 - P1: A functional zombie is functionally identical to something that has qualia / phenomenal properties (e.g. Block's "Chinese mind")
 - P2: A functional zombie is conceivable.
 - P3: If X is conceivable then X is logically possible.
 - C1: Therefore, a functional zombie is logically possible.
 - P4: If a functional zombie is logically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties.
 - C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.
 - There are of course challenges to the conceivability or possibility of this scenario: e.g. Chalmers' response based on gradual replacement of neurons with silicon chips and the impossibility of 'fading' or 'disappearing' qualia, demonstrating that two functional isomorphs would both experience qualia / phenomenal states.
 - It might also be argued that a "Chinese mind" made up of Chinese message-passers is no stranger a scenario than a carbon brain made out of neurons.
- Inverted qualia:
 - P1: It is conceivable that two functionally identical beings/systems could have inverted qualia with respect to each (the 'invert scenario').
 - P2: If X is conceivable then X is logically possible.
 - C1: Therefore, this 'invert scenario' is logically possible.
 - P4: If the 'invert scenario' is logically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties.
 - C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.

- There are challenges to the conceivability or possibility of this scenario: e.g. Chalmers’s response based on the impossibility of ‘dancing’ qualia, demonstrating that two functional isomorphs would always be phenomenally identical.
- Absent intentionality / understanding / semantics (Searle’s “Chinese room”):
 - Technically this is aimed at strong AI versions of functionalism according to which equivalence of input-output relations (ie with no regard for internal states) is sufficient for equivalence in mental states.
 - Scenarios of notes being passed, the rule-book, and the non-Chinese speaking person in the room using the rule-book to output ‘answers’:
 - P1: The non-Chinese speaking person in the room who is functionally identical to a native Chinese speaker.
 - P2: The non-Chinese speaking person in the room does not understand Chinese (although s/he understands syntax, s/he has no grasp of the intentional content (the semantic meaning) of the statements).
 - C1: Therefore, being functionally identical is not sufficient for being mentally identical, so functionalism is false.
 - There are challenges to the conceivability or possibility of the “Chinese room” scenario’: e.g. the whole system does understand Chinese (the ‘systems’ reply).
- The Mary/knowledge argument applied to functionalism (Jackson):
 - Even if all functional isomorphs would be mentally identical with regard to qualia (ie even if the absent and inverted qualia objections can be adequately responded to) it can still be argued that functional properties are not reducible to phenomenal properties:
 - P1: Mary knows all the functional facts about human colour vision before her release.
 - P2: Mary does not know all the facts about human colour vision before her release (she does not know the phenomenal facts).
 - C1: Therefore, there are non-functional facts about human colour vision.
 - P3: Non-functional facts are facts about non-functional phenomenal properties.
 - C2: Therefore, there are non-functional properties.
 - C3: Therefore functionalism is a false (or at least incomplete) account of the mind.

IT DEPENDS: one version of functionalism gives the correct account but one or more of the other versions do not.

- A student might argue, for example, that only realizer (and not role) functionalism can give a full/better explanation of mental causation than rival theories.

IT DEPENDS: functionalism gives the correct account of some mental states but not others.

- A students might argue, for example, than intentional states should be functionally understood but phenomenal states should not or cannot be (see qualia issues above).

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.