A-LEVEL
Philosophy

PHLS1 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion

Mark scheme

2175

June 2018

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Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A - Epistemology

1 What is direct realism?

[2 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
2 AO1	2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
	1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Direct realism is a theory of perception that makes two key claims: (a) an external world (of mind-independent material/physical objects and their properties) exists and (b) we perceive that world without any intermediaries (e.g. sense data). Students who write the aforementioned (or some suitable variation on it) will get full marks, but we can expect a variety of approaches:
  - a) Candidates may legitimately address the 'realist' part of the theory with reference to a 'mind independent world (or objects)'; an 'external world (or objects)'; or a 'material/physical world (or objects)'.
  - b) Candidates may legitimately address the 'direct' part of the theory positively (e.g. 'we perceive a mind independent world immediately'); or they may frame it negatively (e.g. 'we perceive a mind independent world without mediation'). But we are looking for candidates to do more than reproduce the term 'direct' (or the adverbial form: 'directly').

Indicative content for two marks

- Direct realism is a theory which claims that 'the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties' [AQA specification]
- The view that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent (material/physical) objects [NB: candidates do not need to add 'and their properties' to receive full marks]
- The (common-sense) theory of perception which claims that we have immediate perceptual access to the external (material/physical) world
- A theory which claims that there is no meditation (e.g. sense data) between the mind independent (material/physical) world and our perceptions of it

Indicative Content for one mark

- A theory which claims that we directly perceive the physical/material world [NB: adding the term 'material' or 'physical' distinguishes 'direct realism' from Berkeley's idealism)
- The view that we directly perceive objects without mediation

Notes:

- Students may define the theory through a comparison with an alternative theory and still gain **full marks** so long as: a) all the material is correct, and b), most of the response is concentrated on 'direct realism' and not the contrasting theory.
- Material in parentheses need not be included
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

2 Explain the distinction between impressions and ideas.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 A01	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- In general terms 'impressions' broadly equate to the full range of our sensory experience: e.g. the experience of being hungry, the experience of seeing the colour red, the experience of sunlight.
- In general terms 'Ideas' (or 'thoughts') equate to 'concepts': they are the mental phenomena with which we think: e.g. the idea/concept of HUNGER, the idea/concept of RED, or the idea/concept of BRIGHTNESS.
- Although students could answer in general terms and associate it with the empirical philosophical tradition in general, many will focus on Hume's version of the distinction. They may contextualise it by explaining that for Hume 'ideas' and 'impressions' are the only two types of 'perception' and that perceptions are whatever we are immediately aware of. They may then draw on the following points:

    (1) The Copy Principle: ideas are either (a) simple ideas that are copies of simple impressions or (b) complex ideas that are copies of complex impressions or that are composed of simpler ideas that ultimately can be traced back to impressions.
    (2) Ideas are always inferior to impressions in terms of 'forcefulness' and 'vivacity': 'The most lively thought [idea] is still inferior to the dullest sensation [impression]' (Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sect. 2).
    (3) Impressions precede ideas into the mind and so are the causes of ideas in the mind.

NB: Students do not have to discuss all three points (or in that order) to access full marks, but the best students are likely to discuss more than one of these interconnected points, and they will show the logical relationship between them.

Notes:

- A description of the distinction between 'simple and complex ideas' is not necessary here, but it should not be considered redundant if a student links it to the distinction between 'ideas and impressions' in a way that advances their explanation.
- Locke and Hume make a further distinction *within* 'impressions': between 'sensory impressions' (which concern our perceptions of the world) and 'reflective impressions', which concern our emotional experiences. Students do *not* have to make this distinction, but it should *not* be taken as 'redundant' if they do and should be credited if it helps to advance their explanation.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

3 Explain how the addition of a 'no false lemmas' condition responds to Gettier-style problems.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 A01	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Gettier-style problems are a type of problem for the justified true belief (JTB) theory of (propositional) knowledge (or the 'tripartite theory'). They involve cases of justified true belief that do not amount to knowledge (i.e. cases that challenge the sufficiency of JTB) because the belief is true by luck/coincidence.
- A specific example of a Gettier-style problem is likely to be given. This might be one of Gettier's own examples (e.g. Smith and Jones at the job interview) or another example of their choosing. It is important that any example used involves a justified true belief that involves an appropriate element of luck/coincidence and involves a falsehood in the process of justification.
- The 'no false lemmas' condition responds to 'Gettier-style problems' by adding an additional (fourth) condition to the JTB theory. S knows that p iff:

    1. p is true
    2. S believes that p
    3. S is justified in believing p
    4. S did not infer p from anything false

- A lemma is a (subsidiary) premise or claim which influences the development of an argument. The idea is that in 'Gettier-style problems' the justification involves an inference from a premise/claim (a 'lemma') that is false, and this is the reason underlying our intuitive resistance to the notion that such cases could count as knowledge.
- Some of the best students will apply the 'no false lemmas condition' directly to a specific example of a 'Gettier-style problem'.
- The very best students will recognise that the addition of the 'no false lemmas condition' serves to defend the substance of the JTB account of (propositional) knowledge, rather than simply concluding that it 'solves the 'Gettier-style problem' (though students who do this can still access the top band of marks (7-9) if the rest of their answer meets the requirement of the generic mark scheme).

NB:

- Some students will give detailed accounts the of the JTB theory and a 'Gettier-style problem'. This should of course be credited, but if they do not attempt to show how the 'no false lemmas condition' responds to 'Gettier-style problems' then they should not be awarded more than **four marks** (the bottom of the middle scoring band, 4-6): there will just not be sufficient integration with the central issue.
- But if students lay firm foundations with an excellent account of the JTB theory and 'a Gettier-style problem', they may not need to write very much on the 'false lemmas condition' to carry the answer to the top of the mark scale: it will all come down to the clarity, precision and integration in their execution of this part of the assessment.
- If students only define 'false lemmas', however well explained and illustrated, they cannot get beyond **three marks** (the top of the lowest scoring band, 1-3): relevant points but lacking integration with the other aspect of the question.

Note:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

4 Explain what 'innate knowledge' is and how Plato argues for it.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 AO1	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Innate knowledge is knowledge that is in some way present in the mind 'from birth' (or is present in a mind during the whole time that the mind has existed).
- Plato argues for the existence of innate knowledge in his dialogue *Meno*, and it is part of his theory of learning (or acquiring knowledge) as a form of recollection.
- Students may contextualise Plato's argument by referring to 'Meno's Paradox' – 'man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for it he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire' (*Meno*). Plato's argument for innate knowledge rejects the claim that 'man cannot enquire about that which he knows'.
- Plato's response to this paradox is to conclude that learning (gaining knowledge) is a form of remembering, and he demonstrates this through his account of Socrates asking an uneducated slave boy a series of questions about a theorem in geometry. On the basis of this demonstration Plato derives the following argument:

  P1: At the beginning of the discussion the slave boy does not know the answer to the question.
  P2: At the end of the discussion the slave boy knows the answer to the question.
  P3: The slave boy does not come to know the answer through experience (Socrates only asks questions and does not teach him the answer).

C: Therefore, he must have been born with the knowledge of the answer and have recovered/recollected it during the discussion.

- Students do not have to structure the argument as above, but it must be clear how the premises relate to the conclusion(s) and that there is a process of elimination involved in the argument (sometimes this will be implicit, and if the rest of the argument is of sufficient quality, then it can still access the top band of marks: 7-9).
- Students do not need to give the precise details of the geometrical proof undertaken by the slave boy (which centres on increasing the area of a square). And an answer which *only* presents the geometrical proof will not be credit worthy beyond **one mark** unless it is clear from that presentation that the student has shown some understanding of Plato's argument for innate knowledge.
- In other dialogues, such as the *Phaedo*, Plato connects 'abstract essences' (or the forms) with his commitment to innate knowledge: knowledge is a form of recollection because pre-existent (and immortal) souls have some contact with the eternal essences. If students frame their arguments in these terms it should be credited.

NB: Some students will definite 'innate knowledge' in terms which sounds very much like notions in early-modern continental rationalism rather than in terms used by Plato himself. This is fine, so long as they manage to tie it in with Plato's argument.

Note:

- Students may legitimately distinguish between 'innate knowledge' and 'innate concepts' in order to give some context to the question/response, but if they do they should recognise where Plato is arguing for 'innate knowledge' and where he is talking about 'innate concepts' and the ability to apply them.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

5 How convincing is Berkeley's idealism?

[15 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
15 7 AO1 8 AO2	13-15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct, and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.
	10-12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.
	7-9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.
	4-6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.
	1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Note on QWC
The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 15-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptors.

The QWC requirement for the clear and coherent organisation of material, in an appropriate style or styles, is addressed by the requirements for the selection and deployment of material in the form of argument.

The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

- **Positions a student might adopt:**
    - Berkeley's idealism is convincing
    - Berkeley's idealism is not convincing
    - Berkeley's idealism is convincing in some respects but not others (the best responses are likely to indicate where they think the balance of evidence/argument points overall)

Berkeley's idealism:
- Students do not have to give a detailed explanation of Berkeley's idealism at the outset of their answer in order to access the full range of marks, but their understanding should be clear in the arguments and counter arguments they present.
- Berkeley's idealism may be presented as rejecting the 'realist' dimension in 'direct realism' and 'indirect realism'—--it denies the existence of a mind-independent (external) world.
- Berkeley's idealism is certainly anti-materialist, but it does not have to be presented as 'anti realist': it may well be presented as a metaphysical position which tries to give an account of the *nature* of the *real* world---a world constituted by perceivers ('minds' or 'spirits') and the objects of perception ('ideas').
- Idealism may be approached as a 'direct' theory of perception---the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (and their properties).

Berkeley's idealism is convincing because:
- Indirect realist theories lead to scepticism about our perceptual knowledge whereas idealism secures an objective (mental/spiritual) reality which we can know about directly.
- The primary/secondary distinction in some versions of indirect realism collapses in a way that shows that all qualities are mind-dependent: (a) perceptual variation arguments prove the mind-dependence of primary qualities no less than secondary; (b) it is impossible to conceive of something with primary qualities but not secondary qualities (the 'inextricability argument').
- It is not possible to conceive of a mind-independent material substance/substratum in which (mind-independent) properties inhere: understood as a 'support" for properties, it must be extended, in which case its extension must inhere in a second substance/substratum, which leads to an untenable regress…
- It is impossible to conceive of a mind-independent sensible object (the 'master argument')
- Ideas can only resemble other ideas, so our ideas cannot inform us of a mind-independent external world of material objects (and their properties).

Berkeley's idealism is not convincing because:
- Berkeley fails to distinguish between two senses of 'idea'---the thing we are aware of and the actual act of apprehension---with the latter being obviously mental but the former not (Russell). This might be put in terms of the 'master argument' failing through confusing the act of conceiving with the content of what is conceived.

- Idealism struggles to deal with the distinction between veridical and non-veridical perceptions (i.e. illusions and hallucinations).
- Idealism leads to solipsism.
- There are problems with the role played by God in Berkeley's idealism:
    - Problems with (an eternal and immutable) God having ideas of pain
    - The problem of evil
    - The problem of whether human beings and God can be said to be perceiving the same objects
    - Some students will claim that Berkeley appeals to God simply to plug the 'explanatory gap' opened by the problem of how it is that objects seem to endure when they are not perceived by anyone. This criticism can be credited. But some of the best students will realise that Berkeley thought there were very good reasons for believing in God (as an 'infinite mind' or 'spirit') given: a) his refutation (as he saw it) of the existence of 'material substance'; b) his conviction that there must be (causally) active minds (or 'spirts') which explain changes in our perceptions (since 'ideas' themselves are 'passive'); and c), the order and beauty of the sensible world

Berkeley's idealism is convincing in some respects but not others

- Students could draw from the previous arguments to formulate a multi-layered response which recognises the successes and failures of Berkeley's idealism.
- Students might argue that 'Berkeley's idealism' is more convincing than 'direct realism' in insisting on the mind dependent nature of (some) of our perceptions, but that it creates problems which are more convincingly solved by 'indirect realism'.
- Students might argue that 'Berkeley's idealism' dissolves the threat of scepticism raised by 'indirect realism' (e.g. the 'veil of perception'), but it creates other problems that are more convincingly solved by 'realism'.

NB: Do not penalise students heavily for misattributing arguments (when it does not confuse the point they are trying to make): the repeated misattribution of arguments may be a reason for not giving a student full marks, but it should not be a reason to deny them a top band mark (if the rest of their answer warrants it). We are testing students' understanding of philosophical arguments (AO1) and their ability to evaluate them (AO2).

Notes

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Philosophy of Religion

6 What does it mean to say that religious statements are 'verifiable eschatologically'?

[2 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
2 AO1	2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
	1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may attribute the concept of 'eschatological verification' to Hick and frame its significance in terms of defending the 'meaningfulness' of religious statements (although referencing 'meaningfulness' is not, on its own, sufficient for credit).
- Students may also take 'eschatological verification' to be concerned with demonstrating the truth of religious statements.
- Eschatology may be taken to refer to 'the afterlife', 'heaven', 'the end of time', the 'last (or final) days (or things)', and other equivalent terms and phrases.
- When it come to the 'verifiable' dimension of the concept: when awarding full marks we are looking for students to do more than reproduce the word 'verifiable' (or the verb form: 'verify'). They could do this by referring to the 'truth' of a religious statement, or by some indication of the 'empirical / experiential' character of the process whereby we might come to know the truth of religious statements.

Indicative content for two marks

- It means that religious statements (like 'God exists') are meaningful because their truth will be revealed in the afterlife (if there is one).
- It means that although religious statements (e.g. 'God loves us') cannot be shown to be true in this life, it will be possible to verify them in the afterlife (if there is an afterlife).
- It means that we can prove religious statements (e.g. 'Jesus sits at the right hand of the Father') by a direct experience at the end of time or in the afterlife (if there is one).

Indicative content for one mark

- It means that religious statements can be verified in the afterlife
- Religious statement can be shown to be true or false in the afterlife
- Correct definitions of 'verification' and/or 'eschatology' which do not connect the two can also be awarded **1 mark**.

NB: This philosophical concept concerns *verification not falsification*: students who claim that statements can also be show to be 'false' eschatologically will lose a mark.

Notes:

- Material in parenthesis does not need to be included.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

7 Outline Aquinas' Second Way (his causal argument).

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may set the scene by saying that the 'second way is a cosmological argument for the existence of God'.
- Students may also note that it makes use of 'a posteriori' reasoning (based on sense experience) and that it is 'deductive' (if the premises are true the conclusion must be true).
- Students may say that the argument concerns 'efficient causality' and that the causal sequence Aquinas is concerned with is a 'vertical/hierarchical/per se sequence'. This is not necessary to gain full marks, but students must not imply that the argument concerns a different form of causality.
- Students may note that the argument is of the *reductio ad absurdum* form.
- Students may also go straight into an outline of the argument. They do not have to structure the argument as below, but it must be clear how the premises relate to the conclusion(s): the logical links must be clear. An example of an outline for full marks is as follows:

  P1: We know (through experience) that the world contains (efficient) causes.
  P2: Nothing can be the (efficient) cause of itself (if it could it would have to exist before itself, which is impossible)
  P3: If the series of (efficient) causes was infinite there would not be a first (efficient) cause
  P4: If there was no first (efficient) cause there would be no subsequent (efficient) causes (contradicting P1)
  C1: Therefore there is a first (efficient) cause, and this is (what we call) God.

NB:

- The wording of the question in parentheses clearly indicates which of Aquinas's arguments this concerns. If students give an account of another cosmological argument, then no matter how good it is they cannot get beyond **Level 1**: for recognising that it is a cosmological / causal argument for the existence of God, which is clearly a relevant point of understanding. If a student blurs rather than totally confuses their cosmological arguments, then depending on the extent of the imprecision they could get to **Level 3**: if the 'substantive content' is present.
- Candidates should *not* be penalised if they speak only of a 'first cause' rather than God.

Note:

- Material in parentheses does not have to be included.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

8 Outline and explain the Euthyphro dilemma.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 AO1	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may begin by outlining in general terms what a dilemma is-–a situation/idea involving two options, neither of which is satisfactory (usually for different reasons).
- The 'Euthyphro dilemma' challenges common theistic assumptions about the relationship between God and morality.
- The 'Euthyphro dilemma' is an issue facing the concept of God within classical theism, in particular the notion of supreme goodness and (in some presentations) omnipotence.
- The Euthyphro dilemma originates with Plato in his dialogue *Euthyphro* (although the focus there is on 'piety' rather than' goodness', and the dilemma occurs within a 'polytheistic' rather than 'monotheistic' context). It has been discussed by Leibniz (among many others) as an issue for God within Christian theology and classical theism more generally.
- Students may initially outline the dilemma in the form of a question: e.g. Does God will what is morally good because it is morally good, or is it morally good because God wills it? Each option appears unsatisfactory for classical theism:

Option One: God wills what is morally good because it is morally good.

- This implies that morality is independent of God/what God wills and therefore severs the *essential* relationship between God and moral goodness.

- This also implies that God could not change what constitutes moral goodness and thus challenges the notion that God is omnipotent---–that God can do anything.
- This also challenges any scriptural accounts which suggest that moral laws are created by God (through an act of will).

Option Two: What is morally good is morally good because God wills it.

- If moral goodness is whatever God wills, then 'God is good' does not say anything morally substantive about God's will or goodness---it is a tautology, empty of content.
- If moral goodness is whatever God wills then morality is arbitrary: there is no *reason* why God wills as God does (if there was, then morality would be a standard 'beyond' God and the divine will).
- The arbitrary and tautological nature of the relationship between God and morality has disturbing and counterintuitive consequences: on this view 'killing children', for example, would have to be considered 'morally good' simply by virtue of God willing it.
- If moral goodness is whatever God wills, then praising (or worshipping) God cannot be an acknowledgement of moral achievement or greatness on God's part.

- Because both 'horns' of the dilemma are unsatisfactory it follows that God's relationship to moral goodness is inherently problematic.
- Students do not need to cover all the above points to access the top band of marks (7-9), but they must explain at least *one point on each* 'horn' in sufficient detail.

NB:

- Although this question is worded in terms requesting an 'outline' and an 'explanation', students do not have to produce their answer in two parts (outlining *and then* explaining the dilemma): precise and integrated explanations are able to access the full range of marks.
- Responses that focus on 'piety' and 'gods' (rather than 'goodness' and 'God') are acceptable because they are loyal to the primary source. So long as they cover both horns of the dilemma in an integrated way, each in appropriate detail and the logic is clear, then they can access the full range of marks.

Note:

This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

9 Outline and explain Paley's argument from design.

[9 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
9 AO1	7-9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may begin by explaining general features of arguments from design:
  - They argue from observable features of the universe to the existence of a God who designed the universe (an a posteriori argument).
  - They can be divided up into those that focus on instances of purpose in the universe and those that focus on instances of regularity in the universe (spatial and / or temporal). Students are most likely to focus on Paley's version of the first type, but they may run the two together, which is fine.
- Students may interpret Paley's argument either as a 'deductive argument', an 'inductive argument' based on analogy, or an (abductive) 'inference to the best explanation' (though the latter could simply be taken as another kind of inductive argument) :

  - As a deductive argument:

    P1: Anything that has parts organised to serve a purpose is designed.
    P2: Nature contains things which have parts that are organised to serve a purpose.
    C1: Therefore, nature contains things which are designed (from Premises 1 and 2).
    P3: Design can only be explained in terms of a designer.
    P4: A designer must: (a) be or have a mind; and (b) be distinct from what is designed.

C2: Therefore, nature was designed by a mind that is distinct from nature (from Premises 3 and 4).
C3: Therefore, such a mind ('God') exists.

- As an inductive argument based on analogy:

  P1: In the organisation of parts for a purpose ('the fitting of means to ends'), nature resembles the products of human design.
  P2: Similar effects have similar causes.
  P3: The cause of the products of human design is an intelligent mind that intended the design.
  P4: A designer must be distinct from what is designed.
  C1: Therefore, the cause of nature is an intelligent mind that (a) intended the design of the word, and (b) is distinct from what is designed.
  C2: Therefore, an intelligent designer (God) exists.

- Students may also make the point that the works of nature are so much more complex than the works of humanity that the designer of nature (God) must be so much greater (in intelligence, knowledge, power, etc).
- Students do not have to structure the argument as above, but it must be clear how the premises relate to the conclusion(s). If a 'narrative' approach is taken (e.g. telling the story of the watch and the stone…) the key concepts and logical structure of the argument and key must be clear/explicit if they are to access the full range of marks.

NB: Students should not be penalised if they refer only to an 'intelligent designer' rather than 'God'.

Notes:

- Material in parentheses does not need to be included
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

10 Can the problem of evil be solved?

[15 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
15 7 AO1 8 AO2	13-15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.
	10-12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.
	7-9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.
	4-6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.
	1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Note on QWC

The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 15-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptors.

The QWC requirement for the clear and coherent organisation of material, in an appropriate style or styles, is addressed by the requirements for the selection and deployment of material in the form of argument.

The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

- **Positions a student might adopt:**
    - **Yes:** the problem of evil (in any form) can be solved
    - **No:** the problem of evil cannot be solved (in any form)
    - **Yes and No**: the problem of evil as it is sometimes formulated can be solved (e.g. the logical version), but not in others (e.g. the evidential version); the problem of evil could be solved if all we had to concern ourselves with was 'moral evil' (due to 'free will', for example), but it cannot be solved in the face of 'natural evil'.
    - **Probably not, but…**in the terms that the problem of evil is typically presented it cannot be solved, but only if we accept certain assumptions about the nature of God (under classical theism) or about the precise meaning of the classical attributes (e.g. 'supreme goodness'). Some theists reject the former and contest the latter.

The problem of evil

- Students may well begin by explaining and illustrating what evil is, perhaps distinguishing between moral evil and natural evil:

    - Moral evil: pain or suffering which results from the intentional actions (and/or negligence) of human beings.
    - Natural/physical evil: pain or suffering which does not result from the intentional actions (and/or negligence) of moral agents but arises in the course of natural processes (e.g. injury and disease, grief, suffering caused by natural disasters etc.).

- The best students will explain (or clearly outline) the problem of evil and may refer to either or both of the following issues in the course of their answer.

    1) The logical problem of evil: an omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely good God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil (e.g. drawing on Mackie). Students may say that this is a 'deductive argument'.
        - Students may refer instead to the 'inconsistent triad (e.g. drawing on Epicurus/Hume), framing the logical problem as a tension between God's 'supreme goodness', 'supreme power' and the 'existence of evil' (NB: students who treat 'omnipotence' as inclusive of 'omniscience' should not be penalised).
    2) The evidential problem: a supremely good God is incompatible with the extent/distribution/amount of evil and renders such a God's existence unlikely/ improbable. Students may say that this is an 'inductive argument'.
        - Students may develop this along the lines of an 'argument from particularly horrendous evils', which could draw on specific examples of extreme suffering.

- Responses to the problem of evil may be framed as 'defences' or 'theodicies'. If students want to make a clear distinction between the two in the service of their argument, then that is high level understanding that should be credited. But students should *no*t be penalised if they use the terms 'defence' or theodicy' generically to refer to any response to the problem of evil which upholds the existence of God or the rationality of believe in God.
- Conclusions may be formed around the following positions, and the content utilised may be drawn from the following bullet-pointed material (among other relevant material):

YES: A supremely good, all-powerful and all-knowing God would create people with free will (as only then will their choices have moral value), even if this leads to (or at least risks) the existence of evil: evil on this view is the fault of human beings who exercise their free agency in harmful ways.

- Students may deploy Plantinga's free will defence: even an omnipotent God cannot create a world without evil *and* confer 'morally significant' freedom on creatures. Some may develop this argument along modal lines and discuss 'transworld depravity'.
- The free will dimension of Augustine's theodicy may be discussed in this context (with or without its biblical dimensions).
- Students may expand on the latter (with or without the biblical dimensions) and apply 'free will' to the problem posed by natural evil: natural evil here might be explained by the free choices made by supernatural beings (e.g. fallen angels/the Devil), so even apparently natural evil has a moral dimension.
- A certain degree of natural evil may be attributed to human freedom (e.g. decisions which damage the environment or hurt non-human creatures).

NO: Arguing that the existence of evil shows that God does not and, indeed, could not possibly exist: there is a logical problem of evil, and this deductive argument against the existence of God is decisive.

- Some students will utilise Mackie's attack on the idea that evil is due to human free will: i.e. his argument that a world with human beings that always choose freely to do good is a logically possible world, and so it is the world that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God ought to have created.
- Some will also draw on Mackie's distinction between 'first order and second order goods and evils', arguing that any attempt by the theist to make second order goods (e.g. courage) dependent on first order evils (e.g. pain) just leads to an infinite regress of ever increasing evils providing the occasions for ever increasing goods. The maximisation of evil (even to achieve higher goods) is surely---so this argument goes---incompatible with an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God.

NO: Arguing that the existence of evil, and more specifically its extent and distribution, shows that it is likely / more probable that God does not exist: there is an evidential problem of evil, and this inductive argument against the existence of God is successful.

- Some students may use Rowe's evidential argument, drawing on extreme cases of human and animal suffering to argue that the most rational position to adopt in the face of such evil is to reject belief in the God of classical theism, which is rendered highly improbable by such cases.

YES: Arguing that the 'soul-making' defence can be used to show that a supremely good God would be right to create/permit evil in order for people to grow morally and spiritually and achieve higher-order goods that rely on the presence of evil:

- Students may discuss Hick and perhaps Irenaeus in this context.
- They may discuss Hick specifically in response to the 'evidential problem' that evil is required to keep God sufficiently 'hidden' and to maintain 'epistemic distance' so that faith/belief and virtue is of more value than it would be operating in the overwhelming presence of God (this issue of 'divine hiddenness' cuts both ways, of course: for some, the 'hiddenness' of God from ordinary perceptual knowledge when combined with the existence of evil constitutes powerful evidence *against* the existence of God).

AYTYPICAL RESPONCES: Some students may claim that God does not have one or more of the classical attributes traditionally ascribed to the divine nature:

- Some may argue that God is not omnipotent and/or omniscient and so the problem of evil does not arise for those who have this concept of God – e.g. within process theology or open theism.
- Some may argue that the goodness of God is not be confused with moral goodness: the latter is an attribute of creatures not of their creator (e.g. Aquinas): goodness is co-extensive with being ('reality' or 'existence'), and God is supremely good in so far as God is *Ipsum esse subsistens* (subsistent being itself).
- The best students who take this kind of approach will nevertheless engage with the problem of evil as a real issue for some philosophical (and popular) conceptions of God, even if in the end they reject those conceptions.

YES: Arguing that the existence of evil does not mean that God does not exist since: given God's omnipotence, omniscience, and supreme goodness, this must be the 'best of all possible worlds' (e.g. Leibniz).

- Students may also appeal to Leibniz's claim that it is wrong to assume that human happiness is the sole standard by which the goodness of worlds is to be judged.

YES: Arguing that natural evil is a necessary result of the laws of nature. These laws are for a greater good as they are prerequisites for events to take place in a regular way within the context of a material/physical world that supports our existence.

YES: Arguing that goodness (in some sense) requires evil:

- The possibility of goodness logically requires the possibility of evil.
- The actual existence of goodness requires the actual existence of evil.
- An appreciation of goodness requires experience of evil (that possessing the concept of goodness relies on possessing the concept of evil).

NO/YES: Arguing that the existence of evil is not (rationally) compatible with God's existence but that this should not count against *belief* in God: we should still have faith in the face of such paradoxes, suspend our reason and believe 'by virtue of the absurd' (e.g. Kierkegaard).

NB: Do not penalise too heavily for misattributing arguments (when it does not confuse a point being made in the discussion): repeated misattribution may be a reason for not giving a student full marks, but it should not be a reason to deny them a top band mark. We are testing students' understanding of philosophical arguments (AO1) and their ability to evaluate them (AO2).

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.