A-LEVEL
Philosophy

PHLS2 – Ethics and Philosophy of Mind
Mark scheme

2175

June 2018

Version/Stage: 1.0 Final

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A - Ethics

1   What is a hypothetical imperative?

[3 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students need to explain **both aspects** below in order to get **full marks** (though we do not expect them to separate it out as we have done---it may be explained all together---and their wording of the points might be different):

Hypothetical imperative:
1. imperative: this is a statement commanding a course of action; it is a statement about what one ought to do; it is a command
2. hypothetical: a statement which applies to agents on the condition that they have (in Kant's wording, that they "will") specific ends/goals. It asserts "the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed" (Kant, *Groundwork*)---i.e. 'Do X if you will that Y'. Whether such an imperative applies will depend upon an agent's ends/goals.

Indicative content for three marks

- A hypothetical imperative is a command you should follow assuming that it will help you achieve your desired aim (or fulfil your will).
- A hypothetical imperative is an order that only applies if you have particular goals: e.g. 'exercise if you want to get fit'.
- Unlike a categorical imperative, which is a statement about want you (absolutely) ought to do without qualification (e.g. 'don't lie'), a hypothetical imperative is a conditional statement about what you ought to do given your inclinations or interests (e.g. 'tell the truth in job interviews if you do not want to be thought dishonest by a potential employer').

Indicative content for two marks

- A hypothetical imperative is a conditional statement such as: 'You should do A if you want B'.

NB: In this example the 'command' dimension may be implicit in the example but it is not fully / precisely drawn out.

Indicative content for one mark

- A hypothetical imperative is a command.

NB:
- Students who only explain 'imperative' correctly should be awarded **Level 1 (one mark**).
- Students who explain the 'hypothetical' dimension clearly and correctly but treat the 'imperative' dimension imprecisely (or incorrectly) in either their explanation or their example (if they use an example) should also be awarded **Level 1 (one mark)**.
- Some students may explain that for Kant a 'hypothetical imperative' is to be distinguished from a 'categorical imperative'. This should not be regarded as "redundancy", but if they adopt this approach and err in their explanation of a 'categorical imperative' (e.g. they are imprecise) then this will count against their answer. The material on 'categorical imperatives' should be brief: if it is more expansive than the material on 'hypothetical imperatives' then that is "redundancy".
- Examples are neither asked for nor required. But if an example helps to illustrate an explanation it should not be regarded as redundant and may in fact contribute to a "full" explanation.

Notes

- Kant does make a distinction between different types of hypothetical imperative. This is certainly *not* expected from students. It is provided below in the unlikely event that examiners encounter this kind of material in responses:
  - "Problematic" hypothetical imperatives: hypothetical imperatives where the end that is in fact willed is one that we might not have willed---almost all non-moral imperatives are "problematic" in Kant's sense of the term.
  - "Assertoric" hypothetical imperatives: hypothetical imperatives where the end that is willed is one that we must as a matter of natural necessity will-–-as far as Kant is concerned, the only non-moral end that we must will in this way is our own happiness, and so imperatives that apply because we will our own happiness will be "assertoric".

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

2 **Explain how a rule utilitarian would make a moral decision.**

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Context:

- Students may begin by defining utilitarianism in general: e.g. a normative theory of ethics which is concerned with the maximisation of utility (happiness or pleasure).
- Students may (also) go straight into explaining rule utilitarianism: an act is morally right if and only if (we can reasonably expect / predict that) we are acting in accordance with a rule which produces at least as much utility as any other rule.
- Students may well take Mill as an example of a 'rule utilitarian'. This is of course disputed by many Mill specialists, but students should not be penalised for advancing this interpretation.

Making a Moral Decision:

- A rule utilitarian would make a moral decision by the following procedure, though it need not be set out in this way:
  - (Ahead of the act) determine the utility-maximising rules
  - Identify which rule is relevant to the act under consideration-–-which rule the act would fall under
  - Act according to that rule

- Students do not need to provide examples to access the full range of marks. But some students will illustrate their answer, and that could be a way of developing a "full" explanation.
- For instance, students who focus on Mill may draw on his defence of rights (e.g. freedom of speech) or discuss the importance he places on "secondary principles".
- Other examples might centre on rules concerning societal and legal norms: e.g. telling the truth, not stealing, obeying the speed limit etc).

NB:

- Students progressing to **Level 3 (3 marks)**---the "substantive content of the explanation is present"---will go *beyond* making points about utilitarianism in general and rule utilitarianism in particular. They will apply this theoretical understanding to *making a moral decision*.

- Some students might compare this approach to act 'utilitarianism', where on each occasion (case by case) the consequences of each act are considered in order to make a decision. Students should not be penalised for this if it helps to advance their explanation, so long as the material on 'act utilitarianism' does not overshadow the material on 'rule utilitarianism'.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

3   **Explain the issue of clashing/competing duties facing Kantian deontological ethics.**

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is correct and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Context:
- Students may begin by defining deontological ethics: e.g. as a normative theory of ethics based on duty.
- Kant argues that we have categorical duties to do (or not do) certain things which are right (or wrong) in themselves, and these duties are discoverable by reason.
- Students may (but need not) make an explicit the distinction between 'perfect duties' (e.g. to 'not make lying promises' and to 'not commit suicide') and 'imperfect duties' (e.g. 'to help others' and 'to develop one's talents'): they are distinguished by whether a failure is constituted by a contradiction in conception ('perfect') or a contradiction in the will ('imperfect').

Clashing/competing duties:
- Clashing/competing duties involve a situation where:
    1. The agent is morally required to act (or refrain from acting) according to two (or more) maxims.
    2. The agent is able to act (or refrain from acting) according to each maxim by itself.
    3. But the agent is unable to act according to both (or all) the maxims.
    4. So the agent cannot avoid doing something morally wrong.
- It is the last of these (i.e. that the agent *cannot avoid doing something morally wrong*) which is the reason why this is seen as being such an important issue.
- It is likely (but not necessary) that students will explanans the issue by giving an example of such scenarios, for example:
    o 'not lying' versus 'saving lives' (students may use Kant's own case of the murderer at the door)
    o Sartre's example of a young man torn between his duty to his country and his duty to his mother (i.e. between treating one or the other as a means to an end) where "no rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do" (Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*).

- Students may give examples where
  - a perfect duty clashes with a perfect duty
  - a perfect duty clashes with an imperfect duty
  - an imperfect duty clashes with another imperfect duty

NB:

- Students progressing **beyond Level 3** should do **more** than **outline the issue**: they should be making it clear *why exactly it is an issue*: because the moral agent cannot help doing something wrong in such a scenario.
- Students may meet the requirements of the previous point using different wording: e.g. 'in such an instance of conflict the moral agent will fail to act in accordance with (at least) one duty / obligation'.
- Students can access the full range of marks without making full use of the technical philosophical vocabulary used above (e.g. 'maxim', 'perfect duty'). But their understanding of the issues must be clear.
- Students may mention that Kant himself claims that "a conflict of duties is inconceivable" (Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*). So long as that is all they say, do not penalise for redundancy. If they try to explain *why* it is inconceivable then that should be counted as redundant material.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

4   **Outline moral realism <u>and</u> explain how Mackie's argument from queerness opposes this view.**

[12 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.
	7-9	A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely. Integration is present, but may not be sustained. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	A clear answer, in a coherent logical form. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Context

- Students may contextualize their response by noting that this is an 'inductive argument': it is an argument for the implausibility (or improbability) of moral realism rather than its impossibility.
- Some students will frame the argument in stronger terms: e.g. as showing that moral realism 'could *not possibly* be true'. This is incorrect, but if it is an *occasiona*l rhetorical overstatement

rather than a *persistent misunderstanding*, it should not stop a student accessing the **top band of marks (10-12)**.
- For Mackie this argument opposes moral realism and supports moral anti-realism. Students may place these philosophical aims within the context of Mackie's 'error theory' (but this is not necessary).
- The responses are likely to be tackled in two parts by students:

"Outline moral realism…":

Students might outline it in one of the following ways:
- The view that moral judgements can be true (or false) and they are made true (or false) by something in the real world outside our (human) attitudes/opinions (e.g. 'by objective moral properties').
- The view that ethical language makes claims about mind-independent moral reality and at least some of these claims are true.
- The view that there are mind-independent moral facts/properties/values.
- The view that moral judgements are truth-apt (cognitivism) and are in some cases true in virtue of mind-independent moral facts/properties/values.
- The view that moral facts exist in virtue of mind-independent facts which may not be moral in and of themselves (but are reducible to those mind-independent facts).

NB:
- A precise outline of 'moral realism' should not simply include the 'cognitive' component but the 'realist' component: there exists a mind independent moral reality (which makes some moral judgements true).
- Students may explain 'moral realism' in general terms or in relation to 'ethical naturalism' or ethical 'non-naturalism'. Either (or both) is fine. But coherent and integrated explanations will ensure that the outline of 'moral realism' is consistent with their account of 'Mackie's argument from queerness': i.e. they will not define 'moral realism' exclusively in terms of 'ethical naturalism' and then go on to frame Mackie's 'argument for queerness' in terms of an attack on 'ethical non-naturalism'.
- Within the context of Mackie's own "argument from queerness" he does focus especially on 'ethical non-naturalism' (with reference to Plato and Moore), so if students frame their whole response in terms of an 'ethical non-naturalist' version of moral realism than should not count against them. Where it would count against them is if they suggest that this is somehow exhaustive of 'moral realism' as a position.

"…explain how Mackie's argument from queerness opposes this view":

There are two parts to Mackie's argument from queerness (as identified by Markie himself):
1: The metaphysical argument: this challenges the existence of a mind independent (and motivating) moral reality given the 'queer' (odd/unusual/peculiar) metaphysical status of such a proposed reality.
2: The epistemological argument: this challenges the ability of human beings to discern prescriptive moral truths from a mind independent reality given the 'queer' (odd/unusual/peculiar) epistemological status of such proposed truths.

NB: Students accessing the **top band of marks (10-12)** will show some understanding of *both* these arguments. They do not need to do them both to the same standard, however: e.g. a student may give a clear but brief explanation of the 'metaphysical argument', while giving a precise and detailed explanation of the 'epistemological argument'; taken together with a precise 'outline of moral realism' that would be enough to access those higher marks.

The argument from queerness is likely to be explained in two parts and draw from the following points:

The metaphysical argument:
- If mind-independent moral properties (or "values" as Mackie sometimes calls them) existed they would be "objectively prescriptive" in the sense that merely knowing that they exist would have to be intrinsically motivating (in a categorical/universal sense).
  - o Mackie says that these values would have to have an inbuilt "to-be-pursuedness": a motivational quality within a mind independent moral reality.
  - o Mackie offers Plato's Forms as an example of what such properties would have to be like (as the source of moral truth and the motivation for acting in accordance with it).
- But however we may try to imagine these "objective values", according to Mackie "they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe" (Mackie, *Inventing Right and Wrong*).
- As such, the existence of such "objective values" is unlikely/implausible/improbable.

The Epistemological argument
- If mind-independent moral properties existed and were "objectively prescriptive", then the method by which we come to know about them would have to be completely different to anything we are accustomed to using.
  - o According to Mackie, if we were able to detected mind independent and motivational moral properties, "it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else" (Mackie, *Inventing Right and Wrong*).
  - o Mackie offers Moore's 'intuitionism' as an (unpersuasive) example of what such a faculty might amount to.
  - o But however we try to imagine this kind of knowledge, "none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer" (Mackie, *Inventing Right and Wrong*).
- As such, it is unlikely/implausible/improbable that we could ever have knowledge of mind independent moral truths.

NB:
- Students who **only outline moral realism** (however precisely or comprehensively they do it) cannot get beyond the **bottom of the 4-6 band: 4 marks)**. The weight of the marks in this question falls on Mackie's argument and the ability of students to integrate the material overall.
- Students do not have to quote from Mackie, but the quotes given above are given to help examiners recognise the terms in which Mackie actually frames his argument.

Notes:

- Mackie's 'argument from queerness' is not to be confused with his 'argument from relativity'. If students do discuss the latter, then this should only be credited in so far as they manage to integrate it with the 'argument from queerness' using the kind of points listed above.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

5   **How convincing is Aristotelian virtue ethics?**

[25 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
25 AO1 – 5 AO2 - 20	21-25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained. A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones. Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.
	16-20	The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained. A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument. Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.
	11-15	A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed. A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content. Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.
	6-10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence.

		Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear. Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.
	1-5	Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument. There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided. There might be some use of philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Aristotle's ethical view, in general, is based around the development of good moral character: it is agent centred rather than act centred.
- When explaining Aristotle's views students are likely to make reference to one or more of the following:
    - 'The good' for human beings: the meaning of Eudaimonia (living well) as the 'final end' for human beings (and the relationship between Eudaimonia and pleasure)
    - The function argument (with rationality understood as the characteristic activity of human beings) and the relationship between virtue and function
    - Aristotle's account of virtues and vices:
        - virtues as character traits/dispositions and the importance of feelings (virtue may perhaps be distinguished from mere continence)
        - the role of education/habituation in the development of moral character (perhaps including reference to the state and to family/role-models)
        - the skill analogy
        - the doctrine of the mean and its application to particular virtues
        - the relationship between virtues, actions and reasons and the role of practical reasoning/practical wisdom
    - Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions.

- It is possible that students may decide to focus quite specifically and in detail on certain of these features of Aristotle's theory, perhaps because their preferred lines of argument relate specifically to them (e.g. that in emphasising the importance of education/habituation Aristotle leaves too much to chance in the development of good character).
- Some students may mention that Aristotelian virtue ethics can be situated in metaethical discussions as an example of moral realism and ethical naturalism: the truths of ethics are derived from (or reducible/identical to) facts about human nature that are discoverable through observation. They may do this in order to then evaluate this approach by applying arguments for or against moral realism and/or ethical naturalism.

The overarching positions adopted could be among the following:
   YES: it is (very) convincing-–-i.e. the student may support and/or defend an Aristotelian account
   NO: it is not (very) convincing---i.e. the student may argue that it cannot be adequately supported and/or that there are (fatal) issues with the account
- **YES and NO**: it is convincing in some respects but not in others---this may end up still meaning it is rejected, or alternatively it may be accepted but with some qualification
- **YES and NO:** it is convincing but incomplete in some way

Arguments will likely draw from the bullet-pointed lists underneath (though this is not exhaustive):

Support for Aristotelian virtue ethics:
- Eudaimonia (whether understood as 'happiness' or 'living well') is a common (if not universal) aspiration of humankind and therefore an appropriate goal for the moral life
- Anscombe supports an Aristotelian approach by noting that rigid laws/rules (as in Kantian deontological ethics) do not make sense in the absence of a law/rule-giver (e.g. God). Moral philosophers should therefore focus on the well-being / flourishing of a human life with all its dimensions working in harmony (holism).
- In the light of all that we know about the human species (e.g. through evolutionary biology and anthropology) human beings are still best understood in Aristotelian terms: e.g. as 'rational animals' (e.g. Geach). Students may therefore defend Aristotelian virtue ethics through the function argument, based as it is on this reputedly essential characteristic of human nature (i.e. rationality).
- Students may qualify the latter with an acknowledgment that our modern understanding of human biology and psychology make Aristotle's own views on women and slaves indefensible today, but his insights into the nature of 'man' can and should be expanded to be inclusive of all human beings and (possibly) some non-human animals (e.g. MacIntyre).
- Students may argue that the importance of education and habituation in the cultivation of moral virtue is empirically demonstrable (in those we admire as moral exemplars); by contrast, we do not (typically) attribute admirable moral decisions to the application of abstract universal principles or speculative consequential calculations.
- The 'doctrine of the mean'---properly understood to mean registering the appropriate emotion, at the appropriate time, motivating the appropriate action---is applicable to practical moral education with the potential to develop moral character throughout a lifetime.
- Some students may argue that virtue ethics rightly places greater emphasis on how moral agents feel about their morally good action---e.g. commending those who take pleasure in acting for the good of others rather than seeing this as a form of self-interest without moral worth.

Criticism of Aristotelian virtue ethics:
- Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act: the doctrine of the mean is too vague (given that it depends on the person, the circumstance, and seems unmeasurable)
- The issue of clashing/competing virtues (e.g. might kindness clash with courage?)
- The possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and virtuous persons in terms of each other: virtuous acts as acts performed by virtuous people, and virtuous people as those who perform (or are disposed to perform) virtuous acts.
- The relationship between the good for the individual and (wider) moral good: Must a trait really contribute to Eudaimonia in order to be a virtue? There may be virtues relating to our treatment of the environment and wider society which do not contribute to our Eudaimonia.
- Aristotle's account of ethics leaves too much down to luck (and yet, perhaps in tension with this, Aristotle holds people responsible for their ignorance of virtue).
- The Application of Mackie's argument from relativity: If there are moral facts (e.g. about the virtues), then why is there not more agreement about them?
- Objections to the function argument:
   - Humans do not have a function: there cannot be a function without a function-giver (Sartre's point that, without God, "existence precedes essence").
   - Even if something is our unique function this does not imply that we should fulfil it---this could be linked to Hume's is-ought gap.
   - Application of Moore's 'open question' argument to insist that goodness/virtue cannot be reduced to the possession of certain virtues.

- o (Some) animals share the functions that Aristotle sees as uniquely human (reasoning, deliberation, language). Aristotle wrongly excludes animals from moral consideration and contribution.
- o There are other unique human functions (some being morally suspect/bad) which are ignored in Aristotle's account.
- o Even if we do have the unique function of reason, this capacity can be used for bad ends as well as for good---this way be linked to Hume's view that "reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*).

NB: Students are free to advocate one or more rival moral theory (e.g. Kant's deontological ethics) over against Aristotle's virtue ethics. They may also critically compare Aristotle's position with one or more rival moral theories (e.g. act and rule utilitarianism). But discussion of these alternative theories is only credit worthy to the extent that it is used to analyse and evaluate Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Notes:

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments: the focus is on AO1 (understanding) and AO2 (evaluation). Persistent misattribution of arguments would be an imprecision that would justify not awarding an argument full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Philosophy of Mind

6   What is epiphenomenalist dualism?

[3 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

For the **full three marks** students should show their understanding of **all three** of the follow components, although their wording may differ:

> **1. Dualism (of some form) is true**
>   a. Substance dualism: minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (the mental and are physical are ontologically distinct).
>   b. Property dualism: there are at least some mental properties that not reducible to physical properties (there is one substance but ontologically distinct properties: mental properties and physical properties).

NB: students are not expected to distinguish between these forms of dualism. They may use either (or both) so long as there is evidence that they understand the position.

> **2. Mental events are caused by physical events**
> They are a "by-product" of physical events.

> **3. Mental events are causally impotent: they are (merely) epiphenomena**
> Mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events.
> Property dualists might put the impotency point in the following way: events are causes in virtue of their physical and not mental properties.

NB: The account above is how epiphenomenalism is normally understood. It is worth noting, however, that some claim that the following view (which differs slightly from 2 and 3 above) would also count as an epiphenomenalist view and so we include it in case a student presents the theory in this way:
• Non-physical mental events are caused by physical events but they do *not* themselves have any effects on physical events though they may have mental effects.

Indicative content for two marks

• Students accessing this level will show clear understanding of two of the three components outlined above: e.g. 'Epiphenomenalist dualism is the view that mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties, but the former are simply a by-product of the latter.'

Indicative content for one marks:

- Students accessing this level will show clear understanding of <u>one</u> of the three components outlined above: e.g. 'Epiphenomenalist dualists believe that mind and matter are two distinct substances.'

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

7   **Explain the issue of circularity that logical/analytical behaviourists face when defining mental states.**

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may begin by explaining what logical/analytical behaviourists claim: all statements about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (analytically reduced/translated without remainder) into statements about behaviour (or behavioural dispositions).
- The issue of circularity might be understood in (at least) two ways:
  - **General circularity:** Mental states (in general) cannot be analysed without reference to other mental states (of some kind or another), so mental states are being analysed in terms of mental states, which is circular; for example: the logical behaviourist may try to reduce someone's 'desire for A' to the 'disposition to do B when A is available', but whether someone is actually 'disposed to do B' will depend on other mental states: e.g. whether someone '*believes* that A is available and is not *fearful* of C'. So a complete analysis of statements about mental states does not translate (without remainder) to statements about behaviour or dispositions to behave: the analysis always comes back 'mental states'.
  - **Specific circularity:** The attempt to reduce statements about specific mental states (without remainder) to statements about behaviour (or behavioural dispositions) will ultimately lead back to the specific mental state with which the analysis began. For example: 'the *belief* that…' may be analysed in terms the 'disposition to do B in situation C'; whether one is actually 'disposed to do B in situation C', however, will depend on whether one has a 'desire for D'; but then a 'desire for D' is analysed in terms of what someone might do if they held 'the *belief* that…'. So a complete analysis of statements about mental states does not translate (without remainder) to statements about behaviour or dispositions to behave: the analysis always comes back to the same kind of 'mental state' with which it began.
- A student may explain either (or both) these ways and received full marks.
- Both ways of explaining the issue might be put in terms of the 'holism of the mental'.

NB:
- Students who only make accurate points about the nature of logical/analytical behaviourism **cannot get beyond Level 2**: they must address the <u>issue of circularity</u> in order for the "substantive content of the explanation" to be present.
- Students who discuss the 'multiple realizability' of mental states can only receive credit in so far as they use this to address "the issue of circularity"; otherwise it is redundant / irrelevant.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

8   Explain what is meant by 'folk-psychology'.

[5 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Context

NB: Some of the best students will focus precisely on 'folk psychology' from the outset. But students may very well mention the connection between 'folk-psychology' and 'eliminative materialism'. Given that 'folk psychology' appears in the 'eliminative materialism' section of the AQA Specification, and given the pervasive association between the two in the general literature, references to 'eliminative materialism' (if brief) should not be counted as "redundancy". If a student's answer contains material which is *presented as a criticism* of 'folk psychology' then that should be counted as "redundancy".

Folk psychology

- A "full, clear and precise" explanation of what is meant by 'folk-psychology' will involve the following (students do not need to discuss all three of the aforementioned features, but the very best responses are likely to draw on more than one):

  1. It is an 'untutored' or 'ordinary' understanding of the mind (one's own mind and the minds of others) that develops among ordinary/normal people in ordinary/normal circumstances without any special education: it is distinct from a 'scientific' understanding of the mind that is the subject-matter of specialists such as psychologists and cognitive scientists.
  2. It involves the positing of the existence of 'inner' mental states/events with certain features (i.e. semantic, intentional, causal, phenomenal). Such states include propositional attitudes / intentional states (e.g. 'I believe that it will rain') and qualitative/phenomenal states (i.e. experiences/feelings/sensations).
  3. It enables people to explain and predict human behaviour: e.g. if one knows that S wants to sit down and that S believe a free chair is nearby one can predict that (all else being equal) S will sit down; when one sees S fall, wince, and cry out, one can confidently explain their behaviour as a result of pain.

- Some students might describe 'folk psychology' as an 'empirical theory' (held in some sense within the general population).
- If students describe 'folk psychology' as a theory 'which has not changed / advanced for thousands of years unlike the scientific study of the mind', then this can also be credited. This

point is of course used by some philosophers to undermine folk psychology but it could simply be presented as a descriptive fact (and it is of course consistent with the view that 'folk psychology has not changed / advanced a great deal because it has always proved highly effective').

- Students might also add that that 'folks psychology' include a commitment to the existence of a process by which one might access one's own mental states: i.e. introspection.

NB: There is some disagreement over how the term is used. Just to cover all permutations, a student can also explain 'folk-psychology' (implicitly or explicitly) in the following terms:

- Some see folk-psychology as being an underlined theory of human behaviour *accepted* by individuals (consisting of common-sense generalizations from which specific predictions/explanation may be drawn).
- Others understand folk-psychology as a set of cognitive capacities *possessed* by individuals (e.g. capacities for predicting/explaining the behaviours of others by mentally simulating their mental states).

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

9 **Explain the problem of other minds facing dualism <u>and</u> how the argument from analogy responds to this.**

[12 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.
	7-9	A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely. Integration is present, but may not be sustained. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	A clear answer, in a coherent logical form. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
	1-3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

"Explain the problem of other minds facing dualism…"

- Students may begin with a brief outline / explanation of some form of dualism:
  - Substance dualism: minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (the mental and the physical are ontologically distinct).
  - Property dualism: there are at least some mental properties that are not reducible to physical properties (there is one substance but ontologically distinct properties: mental properties and physical properties).

- The problem/s of other minds emerges for dualism due to the epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds.
- If dualism is true then the minds of others cannot be accessed through the kind of empirical observations which typically yields knowledge of the world.

- A distinction can be made between the 'epistemological' and the 'conceptual' problem. Students are likely to refer to the epistemological problem only, but there is no problem if (in addition or in place of) they explain the problem in conceptual terms.

The epistemological problem of other minds:
- P1: I could have knowledge of the existence and nature of other people's minds / mental states only if:
    - o I had direct experience of their mind/mental states
    - o [and I knew that it was their mind, rather than my own, that I was experiencing]
- P2: If dualism is true then this condition [in P1] cannot be met since according to dualism I only have direct access to my own mind
    - o [and, even if I could have direct experience of someone else's non-physical mind, the second condition could not be met as I couldn't be sure it was someone else's mind rather than my own that I was experiencing]
- C1: Therefore, if dualism is true, I cannot have knowledge of the existence and nature of other people's minds / mental states.

…and the response using an argument from analogy.

- The response based on an argument from analogy is likely to be drawn from Mill (but correct attribution is not vital).
- The response starts with the subject him/herself and their introspective awareness of their own mental states being regularly and frequently preceded (and so, assumingly, caused) by certain types of input and succeeded by (and so, presumably, causing) certain types of intentional or unintentional behavioural outputs. They then conclude that, given the similarity in input-output combinations that they observe for others, it is likely that there is a similar intermediate mental event akin to that which they experience.
- It is, broadly, an inductive argument: the conclusion is seen as probable though not certain.
- As an argument from analogy it argues that given X and Y are similar in respects a, b, c, d, then they are likely to be similar in respect e.
- Here is one way of setting the argument out, though students need not present it like this and they are able to access the full range of marks using standard continuous prose:
    - o P1: I have mental states of certain kinds.
    - o P2: For me they are preceded/caused by certain kinds of inputs and succeeded by/cause certain kinds of behaviours.
    - o P3: Other bodies have similar kinds of 'inputs' and exhibit similar kinds of 'outputs' (behaviours).
    - o [P4: Similar effects normally have similar causes and similar causes normally have similar effects.]
      C: Therefore, other bodies (probably) have minds with mental states of similar kinds to mine (in the similar scenarios) which are the effects of inputs and are the causes of their behavioural outputs.

NB: The 'conceptual issue' challenges the possibility of even speaking/thinking meaningfully about other minds. In the (unlikely) event that the argument is framed in conceptual terms (with reference to 'meaninglessness'), then the argument from analogy should of course be reframed in those same terms in order to meet the precise nature of that challenge.

Notes:

- Some students attempt to use Wittgenstein's 'beetle in the box' analogy to address the problem of other minds. This was originally used with the context of Wittgenstein's 'private language argument', but there is no problem with students adapting the analogy in something like the following way: 'we can never see into other people's boxes (i.e. we can never observe their minds), and so we can never know whether there is anything in the box to which the word "beetle" refers (i.e. whether other minds exist in the bodies I see)'.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

10 **Are mental states identical to brain states?**

[25 marks]

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
25 AO1-5 AO2-20	21-25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained. A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones. Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.
	16-20	The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained. A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument. Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.
	11-15	A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed. A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content. Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.
	6-10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear.

		Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.
	1-5	Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument. There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided. There might be some use of philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

It is likely that students will see an affirmative answer to this question as being that given by identity theory (in either its type or token version).

NB: Answers may talk interchangeably about mental/brain states, properties or events, and the mark scheme below will likewise use different terms according to context.

- Type identity theory: (all) mental state types are brain state types.
- Token identity theory: (all) mental state tokens (particular instances of some mental state) are brain state tokens (particular instances of some brain state).
- This is invariably (but not necessarily) seen as an 'ontological reduction' rather than an 'analytic reduction': mental states are identical to brain states ('ontological reduction') although 'mental state' and 'brain state' are not synonymous terms (so not an 'analytic reduction'). This may be put in terms of Frege's sense/reference distinction-–a mental concept/term and a brain concept/term may have different senses but the same reference. This point may well be used by students to respond to some of the issues that arise.
- Some have treated this identity claim as a contingent truth (it seems that, e.g. Smart does this when he claims that dualism is possible); others (post-Kripke) have seen this as having to be a necessary truth. This may come out during discussion/evaluation.

However (as will be covered below) there is certainly room for subtlety in student responses since:
- Functionalists might claim that for humans (and perhaps animals) mental states are brain states, though for other types of 'system' (e.g. robots) some other kind of state might realise mental states.
- Some dualists could claim that although some mental states are brain states, some are not and are instead non-physical (in some sense).

The overall positions that students adopt my include the following:
- **It depends:** some but not all mental states/properties are brain states/properties (e.g. pain as physical and neural, but imaginings as non-physical).
- **NO:** mental properties are non-physical properties of brains (i.e. property dualism). These properties are neither identical to nor logically supervenient upon physical properties.
- **NO:** minds and their properties are non-physical (substance dualism).
- **YES:** type or token versions of identity theory (as explained above) are correct.
- **NO:** minds and their properties are not neural because they do not (and perhaps could not) exist at all (appealing to eliminative materialist arguments).

Conclusions may be supported by arguments drawn from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath:

NO: Minds and/or their properties are non-physical: i.e. non-physical substance or at least non-physical mental properties exist (so defending dualist arguments).
- The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes)
- The conceivability argument for substance dualism: the logical possibility of mental substance existing without the physical (Descartes)
- The 'philosophical zombies' argument for property dualism: the logical possibility of a physical duplicate of this world but without consciousness/qualia (Chalmers)
- The location problem: brain states have precise spatial locations which thoughts lack
- The 'knowledge/Mary' argument for property dualism based on qualia (Jackson)
- The argument from intentionality for property dualism: only mental states have intrinsic (as opposed to derived) intentionality (the irreducibility of intentionality)
- Arguments rooted in concerns about chauvinism and the apparent multiple realizability of mental states.

NO: Minds and their properties are not non-physical, but neither are they part of the physical world---in fact they do not (and perhaps could not) exist physically or non-physically (eliminative materialist arguments).
- Eliminative materialists may combine dualist arguments that would show that the mind, if it were to exist, could not be identified with anything physical, with materialist arguments that suggest that the mind could not possibly be non-physical---together this would imply that minds are neither physical nor non-physical because they do not exist.

YES (but not necessarily so): Minds and their properties are neurally realised in the actual world (in humans and, perhaps some animals) but should be understood functionally meaning that there may be possible worlds in which they are realised by different physical systems and maybe even by non-physical systems that function appropriately.
- Mental states are multiply realizable: what characterises mental states (e.g. pain) is not that they are physical or non-physical in nature but rather their functional/causal role (role functionalism).
  - Token identity theory may here be used as an attempt to deal with multiple realizability issues.

YES: Minds are brains and mental properties/states are (identical to) brain properties/states
- The strength of such a position could be located in the extent to which it successfully avoids problems facing dualism.
  - It avoids the problems facing interactionist dualism, including conceptual and empirical causation issues (e.g. on the latter: dualism is inconsistent with the widely accepted view that the physical world is causally closed and that energy is conserved).
  - It avoids the problems facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including: (a) the causal redundancy of the mental; (b) the argument from introspection; (c) issues relating to free will and responsibility; (d) epistemological problems (e.g. how can I know that I am having a red experience if the quale has no causal power?).
  - It avoids problems arising from the view that non-physical mental states represent physical reality (there is not enough in common to sustain this relationship of representation---this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content)
    NB: intentionality issues cut both ways and some see intentionality of mental states as constituting an argument against physicalism (see earlier).

- o It makes mental states empirically discoverable by science and so arguably solves the problem of other minds facing versions of dualism.
- o It arguably makes claims about the mind (at least potentially) verifiable and so mental terms/talk meaningful (an argument often made by behaviourist materialists).
- o Naturalistic arguments: the purely physical origin and physical constitution of each individual human being---supported by the theory of evolution by natural selection---suggest there is no explanation for the origins of an immaterial mind.
- o Evidence for the neural dependence of all mental phenomena (e.g. the effects of drugs and brain damage, MRI scans of the brain) is best explained by supposing that minds are brains (or at least that any mind that existed is likely to be physical).
- o Successful reductions in the history of science (e.g. sound to compression waves of air), give us (inductive) reason to believe that an equivalent reduction is possible for minds.
- o Ockham's razor: physicalism is to be preferred over dualism as it requires fewer entities so long as it explains the phenomena (at least) as well as dualism (see dualist arguments).
- o There may also be sceptical responses to dualist arguments which nevertheless acknowledge the (possibility inherent) limitations of materialist accounts: e.g. we may not have (or ever have) the theoretical/conceptual apparatus needed to understand/carry out a naturalistic reduction of the mind to the brain but this does not show that it is not reducible in such a way (McGinn's epistemological pessimism).

Notes:

- Students should not be unduly penalised for misattributing arguments: the focus is on AO1 (understanding) and AO2 (evaluation). Persistent misattribution of arguments would be an imprecision that would justify not awarding an argument full marks, but it should not be regarded as a reason for excluding it from the top band (assuming everything else meets the requirements of the level descriptors).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.