AQA

AS
PHILOSOPHY
PHLS1

Unit 1 Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion

Mark scheme

June 2019

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Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A - Epistemology

1   What is a priori knowledge?

[2 marks]

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content for 2 marks

- A priori knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that can be acquired independently of experience (ie without needing any experience).

- A priori knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that is justifiable independently of experience (ie justified without needing any experience).

- A priori knowledge is knowledge acquired/justifiable through reason *alone* [students must include *alone* to get full marks].

Indicative content for 1 mark

- A priori knowledge is knowledge acquired/justifiable through reason
- A priori knowledge is knowledge known before experience

NB: Responses which offer analytic propositions as *examples* of a priori truths should not be penalised, but responses which blur the *definition* of a-priori with analytic should get 1 mark only.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

2   Explain the empiricist distinction between simple and complex concepts.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- **Difference 1:** Simple concepts are phenomenally simple or 'uncompounded', such as shades of colour and tastes. They cannot be analysed in terms of other concepts whereas complex concepts can be broken down (eg a table into legs, a flat surface etc).
- **Difference 2:** Simple concepts are the effects or copies of impressions (Hume) or of reality (Locke), but complex concepts need not be a copy of anything that exists and are formed through combination (to form concepts of even non-existent things (like golden mountains, virtuous horses, unicorns etc) or through abstraction to form general complex concepts (like dog[ness] etc).
- **Difference 3**: [For Locke] Complex ideas are of modes, substances and/or relations whereas simple ideas are of qualities (sensation) or operations of mind (reflection).
- **Difference 4:** [For Locke] Simple ideas are always adequate (ie they represent the intended object fully): they "perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from: which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them" (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1689, II.xxxi.1). This is because they are just the effects of their causes (and effects cannot exist without a cause). Complex ideas (eg of substances) may not be adequate.
- **Difference 5**: [For Locke] Words standing for simple ideas are less likely to be misapplied: "Simple ideas are least likely to be false in reference to others of the same name*."* It would be odd, if not impossible, to apply the word 'red' to the idea 'green'. But words for complex ideas are more likely to be misapplied: we are "much more uncertain; it being not so easy to determine of several actions, whether they are to be called justice or cruelty, liberality or prodigality" (*Essay* II.xxxii.9–10).

NB: It is likely that candidates will draw their answer from the material contained in the first two bullet points, and if done well that would be sufficient for full marks.

Notes:

- Examples are not asked for or required, but they will probably be given, and if they help to make points clearer and the answer fuller in relevant detail then they should be credited within the levels.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

3   Briefly outline the tripartite view of knowledge **and** explain how a case of a lucky true belief (a Gettier-style problem) can be used to argue against this view.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- This question relates to propositional knowledge (knowing 'that'), which may be distinguished from acquaintance knowledge (knowing 'of') and ability knowledge (knowing 'how').
- The tripartite view (the 'traditional' view, the Platonic view, JTB theory) is the view that S knows that p if and only if (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true, and (3) S believes that p. These conditions are both individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge.
- Gettier-style problem have been used to show that the conditions are not sufficient (Gettier's own original claim), such that someone can have a justified true belief that p, but not know that p. But they can also be used to argue that one of the conditions is unnecessary (eg justification).
- Students could discuss the idea of a Gettier-style case in the abstract but, firstly, this is unlikely, and, secondly, a specific example is very likely to increase the clarity of the answer. Examples that students will use may very well include one (or more) of the following:
    - Cases of justified true belief when a propositional belief happens (by luck) to match some factual state of affairs: eg Gettier's own example where Smith and Jones are going for the same job; Smith has good reasons for believing that the man with "ten coins in his pocket" is "the man who will get the job"; a man matching that profile does indeed get the job (Smith); but when Smith formed this true belief, he actually had Jones in mind.
    - Cases of justified true belief which are due to a lucky disjunction: eg the second of Gettier's own cases, this time concerning Smith, Jones's car, and the location of Smith's friend, Brown. In this case Smith forms the true belief that "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", inferring the latter from the (seemingly well evidenced) former; but

the former is false (Jones *hired* the Ford), and the latter is true by pure chance (Smith *had no idea* where Brown was): it was an arbitrary statement / lucky guess.
  o Non-inferential cases of justified true belief: eg Goldman's Barn Country example, where Henry's true belief is lucky because he just happens to have correctly identified the only barn (in Barn Country) that is not a fake (he is not aware of the context in which he is forming his belief).

NB: Students need not use an original Gettier case (nor the alternative suggested above). The important thing here is that students make the appropriate connection between the tripartite view they have outlined and the details of their chosen case---a case which is designed to show that justified true belief does not always yield knowledge (because of the luck involved).

Notes:

- Students should not be penalised for using more than one case/example, but equally they do not need more than one case/example.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

4   Explain Locke's arguments against innatism.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Some students will begin by defining innatism as a doctrine which claims that human beings are born with at least some concepts/knowledges.
- In general, as an empiricist, Locke argues against the existence of innate concepts and knowledge (ie against innatism) and claims that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa (a blank slate). Students may discuss any of the following arguments which oppose innatism (though this is not exhaustive):

Lack of universal agreement

- P1: If a concept or item of knowledge was innate, then it would be universal (every person's mind would contain it from birth).
- P2: There are no such universal concepts or truths.
- C: Therefore, there are no concepts or items of knowledge that are innate.
  o In support of P2, Locke discusses 'children and idiots' (by the latter, he means those with severe learning disabilities) who lack supposedly innate knowledge such as 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'.
  o He also discusses the different concepts of God (sometimes offered as an example of an innate concept) that exist in different cultures, along with the absence of any concept of God in some cultures.

Impossibility of innate truths/concepts that one is not aware of

- Locke also argues against the claim that these items of knowledge/concepts could be present universally without people (yet) being aware of them. He claims that if a person's mind contained an innate concept or item of knowledge from birth, that person would have to be aware of this from birth. (This argument may be conjoined with the argument above by students.)

Alternative explanations

- Locke argues that any suggested examples of innate concepts and items of knowledge can be adequately explained in some other way: as being based on experience, or as being acquired through reason without being innate, or as not existing at all (for example, he denies that we have a 'positive idea of infinity').

Universal agreement does not guarantee innateness

- He argues (therefore) that even if there were universal agreement on certain concepts or items of knowledge, this would not mean that they were innate (presuming the agreement can be explained in other ways – see the previous point).

Problems distinguishing innate from non-innate

- Locke argues in general that if 'possession of innate knowledge' means 'capacity to discover it at some point', then this does not adequately distinguish it from other items of knowledge. Specifically, he argues that if certain truths were present in the mind from birth but not universally assented to until the development of reason, then this would not adequately distinguish innate from non-innate knowledge. Examples:
  o Since it is through reason that all the maxims (axioms) and theorems (derived truths) of mathematics are discovered, it would mean that they are all innate.
  o Any proposition of the form 'X is not Y' will pass the test; but this will mean that there are 'legions' of innate propositions.

No innate concepts so no innate knowledge

- Locke argues that there could be no innate knowledge unless there were innate concepts, so any argument against the existence or possibility of innate concepts is ipso facto an argument against innate knowledge. For example, 'yellow is not red' will be universally assented to, but "there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience" (*Essay* I.i.18) than to claim that concepts like 'yellow' and 'red' are innate.

Transgression of supposedly innate moral principles

- Locke also argues that the fact that people so confidently and serenely break supposedly innate moral principles is evidence that they are not innate.

NB: Credit should be given to students for showing clear understanding of innatism. If students were only to do this, however, then they could not be awarded any more than 3 marks.

Notes:

- There is a lot of possible content here, and Locke does give further arguments in addition to those above. Students do not need to consider all of the arguments for full credit to be given.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

5 Are direct realists right to claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent?

[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13–15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct, and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.
10–12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.
7–9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.
4–6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.
1–3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Note on QWC

The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 15-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptors.

The QWC requirement for the clear and coherent organisation of material, in an appropriate style or styles, is addressed by the requirements for the selection and deployment of material in the form of argument.

The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

- Students may well explain what is meant by 'mind-independent objects'– objects which exist whether or not they are perceived or conceived of.
- Students may also expand slightly on the definition of 'direct realism' implicit in the question: the theory that 'the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties' (AQA Specification).
- A distinction may also be made between 'naïve realism' (that we directly perceive mind independent objects, and that those objects are always as they appear in our perceptions), and 'sophisticated' or 'scientific' direct realism (that we do *directly* perceive mind independent objects, but this does not entail that the world of mind independent objects always is at it appears: there are good scientific reasons for the differences between appearance and reality which do not require a mediator (eg sense data).

Positions students may take

Conclusions may be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions, drawing from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive):

YES: the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent (ie arguing for direct realism) *for broadly metaphysical/ontological reasons*:

- This avoids problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) represent mind-independent objects: there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of representation - this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content and/or Berkeley's "likeness" principle.
- This avoids problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense data) are caused by mind-independent objects: there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of causation – this may be linked to questions about mind-body causation and so put as an anti-dualist and pro-materialist argument.
- This avoids other problems associated with sense-data: location issues (where are they?), and the issue of indeterminacy (eg the speckled hen problem).

YES: the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent (ie arguing for direct realism) *for broadly epistemological reasons*:

- Such immediate awareness of mind-independent reality is required in order for knowledge of reality to be possible (a transcendental-style argument) – this view avoids the scepticism that faces indirect realism (when faced with the 'veil of perception' which seems to shroud the world on this view).
- This is how things appear introspectively (the 'transparency' of experience).

- Statements about external mind-independent objects are irreducible to statements about 'mere' experiences.
- It can be argued that arguments against this view (see below) are invalid and/or rest on confusions and hence pose no real threat.

NO: the immediate objects of perception are never mind-independent, although mind-independent objects (probably/definitely) do exist: ie arguing for indirect realism.

- The argument from illusion (possible exploiting the 'phenomenal principle').
- The argument from hallucination (the possibility of experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception).
- The time-lag argument (challenging the immediacy of perception of the world given the speed of light and/or sound).
- The argument from science (differences between the ordinary or folk conception of objects and the scientific conception).

NO: the immediate objects of perception are never mind-independent because mind-independent objects do not exist (ie arguing for either idealism or some form of phenomenalism).

- Berkeley's 'Master' argument (and other arguments he gives) can be interpreted as demonstrating that we cannot have a meaningful or coherent concept of anything mind-independent, and it may therefore follow that such objects are impossible.
- Berkeley's attack on Locke's 'primary and secondary quality' distinction, which is crucial to many versions of indirect realism, and may be used to support idealism.

NO: the immediate objects of perception are not mind-independent, ie arguing generally against direct realism.

- The argument from perceptual variation (Russell's table example), which can be used to support either indirect realism (typically with a 'sense data' meditator) or idealism.
- Again, Berkeley's arguments against Locke's primary/secondary property distinction: intended this time to show that all the immediate properties of perception are mind-dependent (whether or not this is used to defend idealism).

SOMETIMES: the immediate objects of perception are sometimes but not always mind-independent, ie arguing for a metaphysical disjunctivism in which illusions and/or hallucinations do have sense-data as immediate objects of perception (eg as with Austin).

- Doing so by attacking the 'common factor principle' in arguments from illusion and hallucination, ie denying that subjectively indistinguishable experiences must involve immediate perception of the same kind of object.

CAN'T BE ANSWERED: this is a question that, for some reason, it is impossible to answer: perhaps because there is no way of telling, from the first-person perspective (from 'the inside'), what it is that you are aware of during perception.

Notes:
- This question type is weighted towards AO2, and within AO1 the emphasis is on understanding. The misattribution of arguments should not, therefore, be penalised harshly. It should be treated as an imprecision, and students can still access the top band of marks while showing some confusion over the names of philosophers.

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Philosophy of Religion

6   In his ontological argument, how does Descartes define God?

[2 marks]

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content for 2 marks

- A (supremely) perfect being
- The most perfect (possible) being
- The sum of all perfections / perfect qualities
- A being with all the perfections / perfect qualities

Indicative content for 1 mark

- Perfect
- A supreme being
- A being with perfections (like omnipotence)

NB: Because the 'ontological argument' is actually named in this question, and because this 'proof' is held in close connection with how Descartes understands/defines God, if students go on to say that Descartes derives God's existence from this perfection, then we will not treat it as significant redundancy.

Notes:

- Students may confuse Descartes's definition of God in his version of the ontological argument with Anselm's definition in his version: any mention of 'greatness' or 'a being greater than which nothing can be conceivable' confuses the two and should not be awarded any marks. If students blur the two, including aspects of both, then 1 mark should be awarded.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

7   Explain how **one** of the options in the Euthyphro Dilemma is problematic**.**

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- The dilemma is likely to be presented as posing a problem for the God of classical theism, although some students may acknowledge that the problem arose within the polytheistic context of Plato's writings about popular religion, when the focus was on 'gods' and 'piety' rather than 'God' and 'moral goodness'.
- Students may claim that the dilemma poses a problem for God's omnibenevolence, omnipotence, or both.
- Some students will present the dilemma is question form: e.g. 'Are things good because God wills that they be so, or does God will those things because they are good?' As a 'dilemma', the claim is that there are two potential responses, both of which present significant (if not insurmountable) challenges. Here are the two options with their associated difficulties:

- Option 1: God wills what is good because it is good.
  - This implies that morality is independent of God/what God wills. From this it follows that God could not make what is wrong be right (and vice versa). This challenges the notion that God is omnipotent – that he could do anything.
  - This also seems to contradict any notion that there is an essential connection between God's will and moral goodness, with the former conforming to (rather than dictating) the latter.
  - Students may also argue that this option conflicts with some scriptural accounts of God as a lawgiver, whose all-powerful will defines the good, just as God pleases, at any given time.

- Option 2: What is good is good because God wills it.
  - If good is whatever God wills, the content of morality appears arbitrary: there is no <u>reason</u> why God wills as God does, and there is no criteria for moral goodness. The claim 'good is whatever God wills' doesn't say anything substantive about moral goodness– it is a tautology, empty of ethical content.

- o If good is whatever God wills, then praising God cannot be an acknowledgement of moral achievement on God's part, since *any* exercise of the divine will constitutes goodness under this option.
- o If good is whatever God wills, then God could will things that our moral intuitions would classify as evil (students may offer examples from scriptural accounts of divinely ordained violence or other apparent abominations sanctioned by God which seems to confirm this image of an arbitrary God).

Notes:

- Students do not need to cover all points relating to their chosen option to access the top band, but they must explain at least one point in sufficient detail/clarity.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

8 Outline Aquinas' First Way (the argument from motion).

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Aquinas' First Way is an a posteriori cosmological argument: it begins with an empirical observation about the cosmos and reasons towards the existence of a first cause. It was originally presented as a deductive argument.
- Students may explain that for Aquinas, 'motion' is more than simply movement, but rather changing between two states. Students might refer to Aquinas' example of wood catching fire and changing from cool (actual state) to hot (potential state).
- The argument does not have to be set out in steps (as below) but it must be clear how the various premises of the argument work together to support the intermediate and main conclusions.
  - P1 Things in the world are in motion.
  - P2 Movement is a reduction from potentiality to actuality.
  - P3 Nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something already in actuality.
  - P4 The same thing cannot be both potentially and actually something.
  - C1 Therefore a thing that is moved cannot move itself.
  - C2 Therefore what is moved must be moved by another.
  - P5 There cannot be an infinite regress.
  - C3 Therefore there must be an unmoved mover, which is God.
- Students may offer further support for P5, stating that if there was an infinite regress (of movement or change) there would be no first mover, and without a first mover there would be no subsequent secondary movers, which we know is false. Therefore, there cannot be an infinite regress.

NB:
- The distinctive features of this cosmological argument (as opposed to the others on the AQA Specification) include the following: 1) it is an argument from the observable phenomena of 'motion/change'; 2) it attempts to account for this observable phenomena using the Aristotelian concepts of 'potentiality' and 'actuality'; and 3) to avoid the logical difficulties of an infinite regress (which is an ambition common to most if not all cosmological arguments), it posits a prime/first mover: an 'unmoved mover / unchanged changer', a being with no potentiality, only actuality, which accounts for that order of motion/change we know to exist through sense experience. Response which access the top band of marks will show an understanding of most (if not all) of these features.
- Students who blur this argument with Aquinas' 'Second Way' and 'Third Way' to any significant degree cannot access the top band of marks: how many marks are awarded will depend on the extent of the blurring/confusion.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

9   Outline the problem of evil **and** explain Hick's soul-making response to it.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely.
	There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.
	Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified.
	The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.
	Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
1–3	Some relevant points are made, but no integration.
	There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.
	There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Outline the problem of evil
- In general terms the problem of evil concerns the challenge that pain and suffering in the world (moral or natural) posed to those who also believe in the God of classical theism: understood as omnipotent, omniscient and supremely good. More specifically and technically, it can refer to either (or both) of the following arguments:
  - the logical problem of evil (deductive) - the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and supremely good God is incompatible the existence of evil, and so God cannot possibly exist.
  - the evidential problem (inductive) - the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and supremely good God is unlikely (or highly improbable) given the existence/ extent/distribution of evil.
- There is no requirement for students to discuss both versions, but the best responses will clearly connect Hick's response to the version/s outlined.

explain Hick's soul-making response to it
- The soul-making response addresses these problems by arguing that God creates a world permitting (not creating) evil because it is required for the moral growth and character-development of his creation in its movement towards perfection.
- Evil is necessary for the development/cultivation of good character, and the development of our nature towards the perfect is part of God's providential plan.
- The general argument can be laid out as follows, but it need not be explained in a step-by-step way:

- o P1: A world containing evil is required for humans to be capable of moral development, including the acquisition of certain virtues (eg compassion, courage, charity)
  - o P2: A supremely good God would want his creatures to be capable of moral development, including the acquisition of such virtues, as we strive for perfection / to be like God (a process which continues after our physical death)
  - o C1: Therefore, if God creates a world, then it must be a world with evil.
- For Hick it is crucial that this process continues into the afterlife (this is part of how he explains seemingly pointless ('dysteleological') suffering.
- Students may use analogies for P1: eg parents allow children to make mistakes so that they learn from this (eg through the cultivation of compassion and acts of charity).
- For Hick, although there seems to be too much evil for there to be a God (the evidential problem explained above), it is important that this is the case in order for there to be sufficient 'epistemic distance' in order for us to freely love God and develop as moral agent. Otherwise, we would be overwhelmed by the reality of God's presence and any meaningful our autonomy would be lost.
- Students may discuss the way in which this Hick's argument deals specifically with physical/natural evil.

NB:

- In the (unlikely) event that students only produce credit worthy material on the problem of evil, then the most that they can be awarded is 4 marks: clear and correct, but lacking sufficient relevant material and integration.
- Do not penalise students who omit 'omniscience' in their articulation of the problem of evil, but if they do use it then they should, of course, use it correctly and consistently.
- If students refer to our 'perfectibility' when explaining Hick's theodicy, or the process whereby we become 'like God', then this can be taken to imply the eschatological dimension that is crucial to Hick's argument (since 'perfection' and 'God likeness' seem otherwise unachievable), and they can be awarded full marks (assuming all other requirements are met).

Notes:

- Although 'free will' does not play the central role in Hick's theodicy that it does in some other responses to the problem of evil, it is not irrelevant. Freedom is an important gift from God: the value attached to the performance of moral actions and the cultivation of moral character depends in large part on this freedom.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

10   Is religious language meaningless?

[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13–15	The student argues with clear and sustained intent. A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully. The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.
10–12	The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained. A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. There is a recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.
7–9	There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.
4–6	There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided. There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings. Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.
1–3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Note on QWC

The level descriptors focus on the philosophical skills which students are required to demonstrate, through the medium of written communication. The Quality of Written Communication (QWC) requirements (which are assessed in the 15-mark questions) are essential to philosophical argument, so are subsumed within the level descriptors.

The QWC requirement for the clear and coherent organisation of material, in an appropriate style or styles, is addressed by the requirements for the selection and deployment of material in the form of argument.

The QWC requirements for the use of appropriate vocabulary and for accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar are addressed through the philosophical requirement for clarity.

Indicative content

Students might adopt any any of the following stances
  o Yes – religious language is meaningless
  o No – religious language is not meaningless
  o To Some Extent: or possibly a more nuanced response, such as 'Some religious language is and some is not meaningless' or 'It depends what you mean by 'meaningless' …'

YES: Verificationists/Logical Positivists (such as Ayer): using the Verification Principle, either the weak or the strong form (as distinguished by Ayer), a proposition is only meaningful if either:
  • it is analytic: conceptual, tautological, logical. Or
  • (2a) its probable truth could be empirically verified potentially/in principle (the weak version) or
  • (2b) its truth could be conclusively empirically verified actually/in practice (the strong version).

• Applying this to religious language, some have argued that religious claims such as 'God loves me' and 'God answers my prayers' would be meaningless given that they do not meet either of the conditions above.

NO: It might be argued that Ayre's critique depends on the viability of the verification principle as a test of meaning, and arguably it is not viable: Does it pass its own test (judged against either the analytic or empirical criteria)? If not, then the critique does not get off the ground.
  • For a positive argument in favour of the meaningfulness of religious language, students may discuss Hick for whom religious claims are verifiable – because they meet the empirical requirements of the verification principle - but only eschatologically.
  • The latter argument may depend on the strength of the argument that eschatological verification is possible, and so students may discuss Hick's argument for the possibility/plausibility of post-mortem existence. If this argument is found wanting in any way, however, this may be used to defend Ayre's position against Hick.

YES: Flew and the falsification criteria of meaning: Flew's adaptation of Wisdom's 'parable of the gardener' shows that the religious believer will not accept anything as falsifying their utterance.
  • Rather than accept that their claims are false, the believer simply keeps modifying their claim – 'Death by a thousand qualifications'.

NO: Hare's non-cognitivism: religious language is meaningful, but not as assertions/claims about matters of fact, so the requirements of the verification principle do not need to be met.
  • Hare's 'Bliks' may be introduced and explained using the lunatic analogy—-religious utterances do not assert propositions, but particular world-views/ways of seeing the world. As such, they are

not the kinds of things which can be verified/falsified, because they determine what will (and will not) count as evidence.

NO: Mitchell's cognitivism: religious language can be interpreted as making claims that are falsifiable given what Mitchell regards as a broader and better understanding of what constitutes falsifiability.

- Mitchell's Parable of the Partisan suggests that religious believers will (and sometimes do) allow for falsification, since they accept that there is evidence which counts against their claim, but not necessarily decisively/conclusively.
- Even when evidence does weigh against a religious belief, it is not always possible to say in advance what the decisive factor would be. Analogies may be drawn with many other deeply held commitments, which may change due to new evidence, and yet it was not possible to know from the outset what the tipping point would be. This does not count against the potential truth of religious claims nor the meaning of religious language.

- Students can also receive credit for defending/critiquing other approaches to religious language, such as:
  - the *via negativa* (eg Pseudo-Dionysius and the apophatic tradition of philosophical theology);
  - analogy (eg Aquinas);
  - myth/symbol (eg Bultmann, Smart, Tillich);
  - other non-cognitive views (eg Wittgenstein's language gams; Braithwaite's values based interpretation of religious language, demonstrating commitments to certain ways of life; Phillips and his so called 'Wittgensteinian fideism');
  - by having innate ideas of God, this permits us to talk meaningfully about the divine nature, despite God being beyond experience (eg Descartes).

Note:
- This question type is weighted towards AO2, and within AO1 the emphasis is on understanding. The misattribution of arguments should not, therefore, be penalised harshly. It should be treated as an imprecision, and students can still access the top band of marks while showing some confusion over the names of philosophers.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.