



A-level PHILOSOPHY PHLS2

Unit 2 Ethics and Philosophy of Mind

Mark scheme

June 2019

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1 9 6 A P H L S 2 / M S

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly level 3 with a small amount of level 4 material it would be placed in level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A - Ethics

1 What is ethical naturalism?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
1	Fragmented points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content**Indicative for 3 marks**Ontological claim:

- The view that ethical properties [exist and] are reducible to natural/physical properties
- The view that ethical properties [exist and] are natural/physical properties

Epistemological claim:

- The view that ethical properties can be investigated/discovered empirically
- The view that ethical properties can be investigated/discovered using the (methods of the) natural sciences.

NB: For full marks students need to explain both the ontological claim and the epistemological claim, though they do not need to refer to them using that terminology.

Indicative for 2 marks

- Students can access Level 2 by explaining either the ‘ontological claim’ or the ‘epistemological claim’ clearly and correctly.

Indicative for 1 mark

- Students can access Level 1 by identifying ‘ethical naturalism’ (as a meta-ethical theory of moral language) with ‘moral realism’ and/or ‘cognitivism’.
- Students can access Level 1 if they describe/illustrate a particular ethical naturalist theory (e.g. utilitarianism), without ever defining the general concept.

Notes:

- The parts of text in square-brackets are not required.
- Students may give brief examples of ethical/natural properties: right/wrong, good/bad, just/unjust, happy/unhappy, pleasurable/painful etc. This is not a requirement, but if it is correct it should not be interpreted as redundancy.

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

2 Explain Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may well begin by outlining features of Kant's deontological ethics: a normative ethical theory concerned with establishing duties based on our motives and the good will ("duty for duty's sake"). Students may also proceed straight to the central issue, however, and that would be fine.
- The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative is used as a way of deriving more specific duties. It is stated thus: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 1785, 4:421)
- Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test (ie cannot be so willed) is morally wrong. Acting on maxims that pass this test (ie can be so willed) are morally permissible (NB: they are not morally obligatory)
- A maxim fails the test of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised, so it would be impossible for everyone to act on it, for example:
 - In the case of lying to get what you want, Kant would argue that your maxim would be, 'I can tell a lie, if it gets me what I want.' If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say 'all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when it gets them what they want.' The whole point of lying presupposes that people generally take you at your word, but, in this world, the practice of giving your word (of truth telling in anything but self-interested cases) would not exist, and so my maxim would simply make not make sense in in a world where lying for reasons of self-interest reasons was a universal law. Nor is this a world that I could reasonably will given that I often rely on people telling me the truth (regardless of their interests).
- Students may explain the latter through a distinction between the following types of duties:
 - 1) perfect duties: these are duties to never do X, and they arise from a contradiction in conception (a logical contradiction);
 - 2) imperfect duties: these are duties to do Y to (at least sometimes / to some extent), and they arise from a contradiction in the will (ie they contradict something that we rationally must will).
- This distinction could be developed in more detail (possibly using Kant's examples) and distinguished in terms of application (eg we can't help all others or develop all talents).

NB:

- Students who get to Level 3 and above, will go beyond making accurate points about Kant's ethics. They will clearly and correctly explain the 'universal' dimension of the first formulation of the categorical imperative, which is at the core of that version.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

3 Explain the issue of circularity involved in Aristotle’s definition of ‘virtuous acts’.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is correct and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students may begin by placing the issue within the context of Aristotle’s (agent centred) virtue theory of ethics (although this is not necessary).
- Aristotle defines a ‘virtuous act’ as an act which would be done by a ‘virtuous person’ in a particular situation.
- Aristotle also defines a ‘virtuous person’ as a person who is disposed to do ‘virtuous acts’. The problem here is that the problem with the definition of a ‘virtuous act’, as ‘an act which would be done by a virtuous person in a particular situation’, is that it contains the term being defined, because for Aristotle ‘virtuous person’ means ‘a person who is disposed to do virtuous acts in a particular situation’ (and vice versa).
- Now assuming that we do not already know what a virtuous act is, or what constitutes a virtuous person, we are not left any the wiser following the definitions that Aristotle provides.

NB: For students progressing beyond Level 2, we are looking for their responses to go beyond an outline of the circle: eg ‘Virtuous acts are those performed by virtuous people; and virtuous people are those who perform virtuous acts...’ We are looking for students to explain what the issue is with the circularity: that it does little (or nothing) to inform us about the nature of virtuous acts (some will then tease out some of the problems which follow from this, given that this is a normative ethical theory).

Notes:

- If responses are given in terms of ‘what someone with a virtuous character would do’ (rather than ‘virtuous people’), this is equally acceptable.
- Although the question is about circularity with reference to ‘virtuous acts,’ students may equally well frame the issue as a problem with determining what is meant by ‘virtuous people’ or ‘virtuous character’, as long as the issue of circularity with respect to ‘virtuous acts’ is clear in their answer.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

- 4 Explain the similarities and differences between what emotivists and prescriptivists say about ethical language.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	<p>A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form.</p> <p>Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.</p>
7–9	<p>A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely.</p> <p>Integration is present, but may not be sustained.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.</p>
4–6	<p>A clear answer, in a coherent logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated.</p> <p>Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
1–3	<p>There are some relevant points made, but no integration.</p> <p>There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Similarities

- Students may frame these positions as meta-ethical theories of moral language. Both can be seen as consequences of (or responses to) the challenge of logical positivism and the verification principle: the attempt to determine the meaning of claims by virtue of their capacity for demonstrable truth (analytic or empirical).
- Both are (in some sense) non-cognitivist about ethical language.

- Ethical statements do not make, or at least do not only make, descriptive claims about reality which are true or false (fact-stating). They express an internal/subjective feeling, attitude, sympathy, commitment.
- But when people are making ethical utterances they are not (or are not merely) expressing states of mind which are beliefs, and both views (arguably) imply a strong connection between moral views and moral actions.
- Both typically agree that moral statements are still meaningful (but not because they state facts).
- From the above, both are (in some sense) anti-realistic about ethical language: neither hold that there are mind independent moral properties or facts about which (potentially) true claims are made.
- For at least some proponents of both views the primary purpose of moral language is to influence others in some way (Stevenson for emotivism and Hare for prescriptivism).

Differences

Emotivism	Prescriptivism
Ethical language expresses emotions or attitudes – ‘pro-attitude’ or ‘con-attitudes’.	Ethical language makes recommendations / prescriptions about actions.
<p>Ethical utterances are expressions of emotion: ‘X is right’ is the equivalent of cheering and ‘X is wrong’ is the equivalent of booing (the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory). So ‘Stealing is wrong’ means ‘Stealing, boo!’.</p> <p>Ayer claims, ‘You were wrong to steal that money’ does not state/imply anything more than ‘You stole that money’ in terms of its descriptive content since ‘you were wrong’ simply expresses moral disapproval. (Stevenson: in addition they aim to influence the feelings of others.)</p>	<p>Ethical utterances are imperatives prescribing how everyone should behave:</p> <p>Once a standard has been chosen by someone it must be applied universally to all relevantly similar agents/contexts/actions.</p> <p>‘X is right’ means ‘Do X’. So ‘Stealing is wrong’ means ‘Do not steal’.</p>
It is not possible to speak of rational consistency in relation to ethical statements and argument (there is no ‘logic of norms’), so ethical statements cannot therefore play a role as premises in arguments.	It is possible to speak of rational consistency in relation to ethical statements and argument (there is ‘a logic of norms’), so ethical statements can still play a role as premises in arguments.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

5 Is utilitarianism correct?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained.</p> <p>A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content.</p> <p>Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance.</p> <p>Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear.</p>

	Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.
1–5	Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument. There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided. There might be some use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Credit can be given for responses which consider (a) utilitarianism in general, (b) focus on one particular version of utilitarianism, or (c) consider two or more versions in the course of the essay.

General points:

- Utilitarians (as consequentialists) decide whether actions are morally right or wrong based on their effects.
- The best decision is the decision that maximises utility: creates the greatest net utility (NB: utility can be understood in different ways, see below).
- A utilitarian would consider the effects on happiness of all those affected; no-one would be ignored during the calculating process. This is the impartiality dimension of the position: “every man to count for one, nobody for more than one” (Bentham).

Credit can be given for consideration of one or more versions of utilitarianism (made complicated by the fact that utilitarians differ in their answers to various questions, forming a complex matrix of possible positions):

- Which consequences matter?/What is meant by ‘utility’?
 - the quantity of pleasurable sensations (Bentham's quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism (his utility calculus)
 - the quality of pleasure (Mill's qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism (higher and lower pleasures)
 - the satisfaction of preferences (preference utilitarianism – Hare and Singer)
 - various ‘ideals’/values (ideal utilitarianism - Moore)
- The consequences of what?
 - particular acts (act utilitarianism)
 - rules (rule utilitarianism)
- The consequences for whom?
 - do animals count?
 - do all human beings count, and if not, what are the criteria?

Possible lines of argument:

NO: Utilitarianism is not correct: arguments/points against (‘external’ criticism/debates)

- Problems with calculation:
 - Difficulties with predicting/knowning the relevant consequences.
 - Difficulties with measuring utility (eg for Mill, is any amount of ‘higher’ pleasure of more value than an infinite amount of ‘lower’ pleasure?).

- Utilitarianism has the strange result that we cannot know whether we have done the right thing until after we have done it (and we may never know) – a related question: Is it actual or expected consequences that matter in terms of the rightness of the decision made?
- How much of the future can, or ought, the calculation take into account?
- There are difficulties with making calculations quickly and accurately enough for the right decision to be made in time (and rule utilitarianism as a possible response to this concern).
- Issues that utilitarianism presents regarding fairness and individual rights/liberties (including the risk of the 'tyranny of the majority'):
 - It fails to take seriously the distinctness of persons (Rawls).
 - It treats people only as a means to an end, violating the Kantian principle (and Kant may be used to make this point), so the rights/liberties that central to other ethical systems are the best way of securing these).
 - The point about fairness may be put in economic terms, ie as an argument that a utilitarian distribution of wealth would not be a fair distribution (which might be argued on various grounds. Rule utilitarianism might be brought in and evaluated as a response to this concern.)
- Utilitarianism ignores both the moral integrity and the intentions of the individual (eg the desire to do good):
 - Virtue ethics may be discussed in this context as the right (and a better) account (the morally right thing to do is that which is the expression of virtue and virtuous character).
 - (Utilitarians may respond by arguing that they are able to morally evaluate motive and character so long as this is itself done on utilitarian grounds).
- Issues around partiality: utilitarianism ignores the possible moral status of particular relationships (family/friendship) we may have with others, and indeed ignores the special duty we may have to ourselves.
 - Singer's example of the drowning child and donations to charity might be discussed in this context (he, as a utilitarian, argues that nationality and distance are not in themselves morally relevant factors). This point may be linked to the following point...
- Utilitarianism is too demanding on us – it requires us to do 'supererogatory' acts (acts which are normally seen as praiseworthy but not obligatory).
- Certain versions of utilitarianism take sensations of pleasure too seriously:
 - Aristotelian critiques: pleasure, though important, is not the highest good for humans, since it is what we share with animals.
 - Kantian critiques: we should act out of duty rather than to attain/maximise happiness – it is God who will ensure that the 'highest good' (including happiness) will be achieved for those who do the right thing.
 - Nozick's experience machine: pleasure is not all we care about since we would not plug into a pleasure-machine; we also care about our experiences being 'real' and our desires being realised/coming true. (This, for many, is a point in favour of preference utilitarianism.)
- Counter-intuitive results: utilitarianism might ask us to do things which we intuitively think are wrong (eg removing the organs of a healthy person to save 5 lives, torturing the innocent child of a terrorist to obtain information about a bomb threatening thousands of people etc).

NO: Utilitarianism is not correct: arguments based on metaethics and the assumption that utilitarianism is naturalist (eg hedonistic naturalism):

- appeal to the is-ought gap (Hume);
- the naturalistic fallacy (Moore): 'good' cannot be defined/analysed in terms of any other (natural) property;
- the open-question argument;
- Mill's 'proof' the principle of utility fails;
- moral disagreement: goodness cannot be happiness since there is not wide enough agreement on this.

YES: Utilitarianism is correct:

- Mill's 'proof' of the greatest happiness principle (which may then be assessed);
- the importance of consequences: if something (eg murder, lying) is bad and we are faced with the choice of acting in such a way that something bad will happen either way, consequences determine the morally proper act (eg in the trolley problem.)
common sense: It is evident/obvious that everyone's ultimate concern is to maximise happiness/pleasure and minimise unhappiness/pain – ie one can ask "Why do X?" and eventually one will get to "Because it brings happiness" but one can't pursue it by then asking "Why seek happiness?"
- universality: takes into account all agents/all those capable of feeling pain/pleasure; happiness/unhappiness, thus bringing animals into the moral sphere.
- practicality/ease: we can work out what to do using a clear 'decision procedure';
- objectivity: the calculation above is objective and would give the same results for anyone;
- egalitarian: each agent/relevant being counts as equal in the calculation (in the sense that one starts by treating each person as equal before calculations commence).
- focuses on human wellbeing and promotes benevolence towards others: we should each seek to maximise happiness of the greatest number.
- provides a secular framework for ethics; alternatively, it might be argued with utilitarianism is at least consistent with the values of one or more religious traditions.

DEPENDS: Students may conclude that whether utilitarianism is correct depends on which version you take and dismiss/defend other versions.

NB: Students who write about alternative ethical theories should do so for the purpose of analysing and evaluating utilitarianism.

Notes:

- This question type is weighted towards AO2, and within AO1 the emphasis is on *understanding*. The misattribution of arguments should not, therefore, be penalised harshly. It should be treated as an imprecision, and students can still access the top band of marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Philosophy of Mind

6 What is interactionist dualism?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
1	Fragmented points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Interactionist dualism consists of the following claims:

1. **Dualism:** dualism (of some form) is true, so either
 - a. Substance dualism: minds exist and are distinct from (ie not identical to) the physical.
 - b. Property dualism: there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
2. **Causal interaction:**
 - a. Mental events cause physical events (for property dualism this might be put in terms of mental properties being causally relevant within causal explanations of physical events).
 - b. Physical events cause mental events (for property dualism this might be put in terms of mental properties being causally relevant when we explain the effects of physical events).
 - c. [mental events cause other mental events – *students need not mention this; a and b above are the important points*].

NB:

- Students need not specify both substance and property dualism (ie they could understand dualism as being either without mentioning the name of the specific view).
- But if students do specify one particular form of dualism they are referring to, then they need to be precise when explaining that form to be awarded full marks.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

7 Outline Descartes' conceivability argument for substance dualism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

This is an argument for substance dualism: the view that there are non-physical/mental substances in addition to physical substances (that minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies).

- The argument might be stated as:

P1: I can conceive of my mind/myself existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) existing.

P2: Anything that I can ('clearly and distinctly') conceive of is (metaphysically) possible (Descartes puts this as: "God could make it so")

P3: Therefore, my mind/myself existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) is (metaphysically) possible.

P4: If it is (metaphysically) possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.

P5: Therefore, my mind/myself is not identical with my extended physical body (nor is it identical with any part of the physical world).

- Students might present the argument in terms of clear and distinct ideas (ie I have a clear and distinct idea of mind and body as having distinct essences and thereby as being distinct substances, and, therefore, they are distinct substances).
- P1 is linked to the *cogito* and the fact that Descartes can doubt the existence of physical reality, but not the existence of his mind.
- It is a deductive and (arguably) a priori argument.
- Students may phrase the argument in terms of what God can do or not (see P2).

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

- 8 Explain the argument that it would be self-refuting to articulate eliminative materialism as a theory.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students may well start by explaining what eliminative materialism is: the claim that some or all mental states, as understood by folk-psychology, do not exist, so folk-psychology is false or at least radically misleading. Folk-psychology could be explained in terms of a psychological theory constituted by the common views about the mind that ordinary people are inclined to endorse (cf. 'folk physics').

- This argument against eliminative materialism is that it is self-refuting in the sense that it cannot be adequately articulated because this articulation itself would be the articulation of a belief and so would require the truth of the very theory that they claim is false (ie the truth of folk psychology).
- In order to propose a theory one must believe it (or believe that alternative theories are false) but, according to some eliminative materialists (eg the Churchlands) there are no such things as beliefs. Thus in proposing eliminative materialism the proponent is contradicting themselves.
- This could be put in terms of other mental states: eg a 'desire' to persuade people of the truth of eliminative materialism so that they have the same 'belief' about it.
- A step-by-step outline of the argument follows (though, of course, (a) it need not be explained in this order or format, and (b) the fact that the question asks students to 'explain' rather than 'outline' might mean that the students' answers are more likely to be written in continuous prose than to be in step-by-step form):

P1: According to folk psychology, belief is a (genuine) mental state/there are and can be such things as beliefs

P2: The eliminative materialists (sincerely) assert that folk psychology is false

P3: (Sincere) assertions are the expressions of belief

C1: The eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false

C2: The eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine mental state/the eliminative materialist believes there are and can be no such things as beliefs

- (C2 involves a contradiction).

- Students may collapse the argument by making the point entirely in terms of belief.

P1: According to folk psychology, belief is a (genuine) mental state/there are and can be such things as beliefs

P2: The eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false

C1: The eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine mental state/the eliminative materialist believes there are and can be no such things as beliefs

- (C1 involves a contradiction).

- Some students may frame the argument in terms of semantic properties (eg meaning and truth) rather than beliefs. They may also connect the latter to the subject of intentionality (eg the 'aboutness of belief'), but this is by no means expected.

NB: A good understanding of eliminative materialism is clearly relevant to this question, but students who only give an account of eliminative materialism (however full, clear and precise) cannot progress beyond 2 marks as the 'substantive content' (Level 3) of an answer to this question concerns 'the argument that it would be self-refuting to articulate eliminative materialism'.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

9 Explain the similarities and differences between functionalism and mind-brain type identity theory.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	<p>A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout.</p>
7–9	<p>A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely. Integration is present, but may not be sustained.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.</p>
4–6	<p>A clear answer, in a coherent logical form.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
1–3	<p>There are some relevant points made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students may discuss functionalism generally or specific versions of it. It is unlikely that students will specifically discuss mind-brain token identity theory, but if they do, and they bring out the similarities and differences with functionalism, then credit should be given.

Similarities

- Students are most likely to say that mind-brain identity theory and functionalism are materialist/physicalist theories of mind, and this would be fine. A more precise approach still would be to say that both theories are compatible with the truth of materialism (many functionalists happen to be materialists, but they need not be).
- So, both theories are typically proposed as materialist/physicalist positions, and both are ontologically conservative: they posit one substance, the material/physical.
- It is possible to say that both type identity theory and functionalism are reductive theories in some sense: mind-brain type identity theorists reduce mental states/properties to neural states/properties and (some) functionalists reduce mental properties/states to functional properties/states.

- Both identity theorists and some (realiser) functionalists claim that for humans the mind is to be identified with the human brain and that mental states are neural states / functional states of the brain.
- Both theories claim that the mind exists and that mental vocabulary is meaningful (contra eliminative materialists).
- Both mind-brain type identity theorists and non-analytic functionalists recognise that their explanation of the nature of mental states will not be an analytic reduction and so will not issue in statements that are synonymous with statements containing mental state vocabulary (contra logical/analytic behaviourism).
- Both theories are criticised for giving an inadequate explanation of phenomenal properties (qualia): eg Mary may know all neural/functional facts about someone but not know what it is like for them to see red; neural/functional duplicates without consciousness (neural/functional zombies) are conceivable.
- All mind-brain type identity theorists and most functionalists would agree that mental states supervene on physical states in the sense that there can be no mental difference without a physical difference.

Differences

Functionalism	Identity theory
Mental states should be explained functionally (eg as with the definition of bridge as a structure built over a road, river or railway).	Mental states should be explained in terms of identity (eg as with the definition of water = H ₂ O).
Mental states are functionally defined so there is the possibility of non-humans having mental states (and so of non-human systems being minds).	Mental states are identical to human brain states so only humans can have mental states (only human brains can be minds).
So mental states are multiply realisable. This difference could be expressed in terms of 'liberalism' on the part of functionalism.	Mental states are not multiply realisable. This difference could be expressed in terms of 'chauvinism' on the part of identity theorists.
Mental states are defined in terms of their relations to other mental states and inputs/outputs (stimuli/behaviour).	Mental states are not defined in terms of their relations to other mental states and inputs/outputs (stimuli/behaviour).

NB: Students do not have to discuss a balanced number of similarities and differences to access the top band of marks, nor do the similarities and differences have to be discussed in equal detail and with equal precision. But both similarities and differences must be addressed explicitly in order to access that top band.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

10 Does logical/analytical behaviourism give the correct account of mental states? [25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained.</p> <p>A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content.</p> <p>Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear.</p> <p>Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.</p>

1–5	<p>Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument.</p> <p>There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided.</p> <p>There might be some use of philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- In the AQA Specification for this qualification, logical/analytical behaviourism is defined as the view that “all statements about mental states can be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to statements about behaviour (an ‘analytic’ reduction)”.
- It is a view that is compatible with materialism/physicalism about the mind; it has typically been advanced as a view within that family of positions; and so it is highly likely to be treated as a materialist position: some rather narrow/strict views of materialism may want to exclude some forms of behaviourism (or some behaviourists may want to disassociate their position from materialism), but students need not concern themselves with these kind of debates.
- Students may adopt any of the follow positions:

YES: Logical/analytical behaviourism does give the correct account of mental states.

NO: Logical/analytical behaviourism does not give the correct account of mental states.

TO SOME EXTENT: In some respect(s) logical/analytical behaviourism gives the correct account of mental states, but in some respects it does not. This nuanced approach is fine so long as this conclusion is not self-contradictory)

YES: Logical/analytical behaviourism does give the correct account of mental states:

- Verificationism in support of philosophical behaviourism: in order for talk/communication about the mind to be meaningful, it needs to be empirically verifiable and must, therefore, describe events that are publically observable. This is what explains our ability to learn mental vocabulary.
- In this way, some see philosophical behaviourism as bypassing the ‘problem of other minds’ that faces other theories (notably dualism, especially substance).
- As a materialist theory, philosophical behaviourism does not face any issues that arise from the interaction of the non-physical with the physical (again, it overcomes a central problem with dualism).

NO: Logical/analytical behaviourism does not give the correct account of mental states:

- The distinctness of mind and behaviour:
 - a ‘conceivability’ argument (analogous to the usual one) can be applied as an argument against philosophical behaviourism (if the mind were just behaviour then we would not be able to conceive of mind existing without behaviour)
 - issues, including:
 - mind without behaviour is not conceivable
 - what is conceivable may not be logically possible
 - what is logically possible tells us nothing about reality (or what is metaphysically possible)

- a ‘philosophical zombies’ argument (analogous to the usual one) can be applied as an argument against philosophical behaviourism (if the mind were just behaviour then we would not be able to conceive of behaviour existing without mind).
 - issues, including:
 - a ‘philosophical zombie’/a ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable
 - what is conceivable may not be logically possible
 - what is logically possible tells us nothing about reality (or what is metaphysically possible)
 - the possibility of perfect actors; Hilary Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ and ‘Super-Super Spartans’.
- Issues relating specifically to qualia:
 - qualia are defined by their intrinsic properties yet behaviourism analyses (away) mental states into relational properties (behavioural dispositions) and so fails to capture qualia
 - the ‘inverted’ qualia objection might be used in this context – ie the conceivability/possibility of behavioural duplicates that are qualia inverts.
- Definitional problems:
 - Philosophical behaviourists face an issue defining mental states satisfactorily due to circularity (be this ‘general’ circularity (mental states cannot be analysed without reference to other mental states) or ‘specific’ circularity (the definition of mental state A will require reference to other mental states B and C as part of its analysis which, when themselves defined themselves, will ultimately require reference back to A).
 - Philosophical behaviourists face an issue defining mental states satisfactorily due to the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour (there is no specific way that one acts when in pain, and there are many, arguably infinite, possibilities).
- Issues with causal explanation:
 - Philosophical behaviourism gives an inadequate account of mental causation (what answer can a behaviourist give to the question, “Why did he raise his hand?”; “He wanted to ask a question and so raised his hand” no longer describes a causal sequence).
- Issues raised by self-knowledge and knowledge of others:
 - The asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states shows that philosophical behaviourism is false: philosophical behaviourism might even imply (counterintuitively) that I sometimes know others’ minds better than my own if I have a better view of their behaviour and its subtleties.

Notes:

- This question type is weighted towards AO2, and within AO1 the emphasis is on *understanding*. The misattribution of arguments should not, therefore, be penalised harshly. It should be treated as an imprecision, and students can still access the top band of marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.