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KNOWLEDGE IS MERELY TRUE BELIEF

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I propose the following analysis of "*S* knows that *p*":

(1) *p* is true

(2) *S* believes that *p*.

Each of the two conditions is necessary; together, they are sufficient.

Now the reaction of a typical philosopher to this account is likely to fluctuate between amusement and irritation. Indeed, it is questionable whether, since the earliest discussions of the issue, any philosopher has explicitly taken the position I defend in this paper.[1] It is sometimes blithely claimed at the outset of a consideration of knowledge that our practices or our intuitions or our pre-analytic commitments show that we are already committed to a distinction between knowledge and true belief.[2] Now whatever may be the fact of the conceptual matter, I will argue that we are not pre-analytically committed to any such thing. Since no one denies that some condition beyond truth and belief is required for knowledge, no one has offered an elaborate argument to the effect that some other condition is required. For the most part, we get a perfunctory appeal to our practices, along these lines: we do not count a lucky guess as knowledge, so something besides truth and belief is required. Thus, the project of this paper can be construed as an attempt to show that our practices are at best equivocal in this regard. I often appeal to "what we would say" in certain cases. This is not because I hold that ordinary language is invariably a good guide to meaning, or because I think there is no distinction between pragmatic contraints on utterance and semantic constraints on definition, but simply because the only arguments which appear to demand a serious response are framed in terms of linguistic practice.

I will hardly offer "proof" of the claim that knowledge is merely true belief, and this may seem an overwhelming shortcoming of the following discussion, considering that a position as unusual, not to say perverse, as this seems to bring with it an overwhelming burden of proof. What I shall try to do is suggest reasons why the burden of proof might be held in suspension.

I. COUNTER-EXAMPLES

Let us begin by treating belief as a propositional attitude. To believe on this initial formulation is to commit oneself to the truth of some proposition. On this picture of belief, it is clear what strategy will be used to generate counter-examples to the claim that knowledge is merely true belief. Such examples arise in circumstances in which the connection between the belief and the truth of the believed proposition is not of the right kind.

Consider, then, the following counter-examples to the claim that knowledge is merely true belief:

(1) Having no training in geometry, I dream that the Pythagorean theorem is true. On that basis, and for no other reason, I come to believe that it *is* true. And of course it is. But it seems that the connection between the theorem and my dream that it obtains is arbitrary. To put it another way, I have no *good* reason to believe that the theorem is true. Or to put it yet another way, it appears that my belief is unjustified.

(2) I close my eyes, put my finger on the name of a horse on the racing form, and then bet the baby that the horse to whose name I have pointed to will win the fifth race. (The horse does indeed win the race.)

(3) While I sleep, I am anesthetized and whisked away to an operating room, where a mad scientist performs a surgical procedure on my brain. I am returned to my bed, and I awake to find myself disposed to assent to the utterance "Goldbach's conjecture is true." Goldbach's conjecture is that any even number greater than two is the sum of two primes. (Presumably some glitch has been inflicted on my "hard-wiring.") Let us suppose that Goldbach's conjecture *is* in fact true, but that no one has demonstrated it to be true.

(4) I come to believe on the basis of reading some tea leaves that the swallows have returned to Capistrano. Or take a case of an omen or a divination or an astrological forecast to the same effect. On the present account, such "occult" phenomena are in principle as capable of yielding knowledge as is the most careful observation. It need only be the case that the palm or the crystal ball or the tea leaves lead their interpreter to believe something that happens to be true. This case adds the dicomfiting element of ridicule. If the account I am giving really led us to put astrological predictions on the same footing as careful observation, the position would appear to be pernicious, its proponents credulous to the point of stupidity.

Now to claim that a position is stupid and pernicious is not to bring a philosophical objection to it. But the philosophical objection in all these cases is equally clear. The belief in question in each appears to be generated in a non-rational and unreliable way.

II. Some Remarks on Belief

In case (3) as described we have, I agree, a deep-seated tendency to deny that the subject knows that Goldbach's conjecture is true, whatever the subject himself might claim. Nevertheless, the case itself is severely underdescribed. For example, am I supposed to know other propositions about number theory, which I bring to bear on my claim about Goldbach's conjecture? Do I, for example, know the difference between even and odd numbers, or what a prime number is? The strongest way to frame the counter-example, one which makes it clear that the belief is not justified on any account of justification, is to isolate the belief completely, to suppose that I am a mathematical naif. But a problem arises here, namely: *is this a case of belief*?

In the case as decribed I wind up, I know not how, with a disposition to assent, say to produce some word or conventional sign of agreement, when someone utters the sentence "Goldbach's conjecture is true" in a way that solicits my assent or dissent.[3] But if this is to be a case of belief, that cannot be the whole story. Such a disposition could be produced, for example, in someone who spoke no English, and had no knowledge of mathematics, by a schedule of re-inforcement. (We starve the subject and then begin to feed him whenever he produces the desired response.) In a case such as this, it is surely misleading to say that the subject believes that Goldbach's conjecture is true. And in a case where I just started saying "Goldbach's conjecture is true" out of the blue, and I could not state the conjecture, or even say what a prime number is, the proper response would be "you *said* it, but you didn't even know what it meant: you didn't believe it."

And consider also example (2). Here the relevant consideration is whether I have a sufficient degree of commitment to the proposition that the horse will win the race to be said correctly to believe it. Now it is perfectly possible for me to act as though I believe something (say, by betting the baby on it) when in fact I do not believe it. If I am a compulsive gambler, I may look for some technique to pick horses without having any pronounced confidence that the technique is a good way to pick winners, or that any particular application of the technique will lead to the desired result. In such a case, I may act as though the proposition is true without believing it.

Thus, first, no belief stands in isolation; I cannot have the belief that Goldbach's conjecture is true and fail to have any related beliefs. The belief is constituted as a belief within a system of beliefs. In fact, the belief that Goldbach's conjecture is true depends not only on beliefs, but on knowledge.[4] I must know some things about numbers, and I must know what Goldbach's conjecture is, in order to believe it. Further still, the claim that someone believes something entails that that person has some degree of serious commitment to the claim. If the claim is withdrawn as soon as it is brought into question, for example, we may rightly say that it was not believed. It is also

surely possible to entertain or test hypotheses which we do not believe, or to treat them *as if* we believed them when in fact we do not.

So we need, on any account of knowledge, to have a sufficiently rich notion of belief to capture what is missing in cases such as these. That is, to formulate the case described in (3) in such a way that it counts as a counter-example to the view that knowledge is merely true belief, we must give a more substantive sense to belief than mere disposition to assent, and in case (2) we must give a more substantive sense to belief than a disposition to act in other ways as though a proposition is true. However, *I* need a sufficiently *impoverished* notion of belief to keep my view from collapsing into triviality, as it would do if I claimed that anything that counted as a belief was *ipso facto* justified. I am not going to provide an account here that satisfies these constraints. I will remark, however, that I think that counting (2) and (3) as cases of knowledge will seem somewhat (though only somewhat) less implausible if they are framed in terms of belief rather than mere disposition to assent or to act as though committed to the truth of some proposition.

These remarks on belief will perhaps seem obvious or trivial. But arguments to the effect that some third condition is required for knowledge often play on an insufficiently rich notion of belief. Such arguments, again, often take the form simply of pointing out that a lucky guess does not count as knowledge.[5] But of course, in the usual case, a lucky guess is not even a belief. If I know that I am merely guessing, I would have to be epistemically perverse actually to believe, for example, that the horse to whose name I have pointed will win; at a minimum I would need some further beliefs about the reliability of my guesses. So it is really not enough to establish that some third condition is required that a lucky guess does not count as knowledge.

III. "How Do You Know?"

Another supposed fact about the use of the word "know"—also on the level of linguistic practice—that has been taken to lend support to the claim that knowledge is at least justified true belief is that it is always legitimate, when someone claims to know something, to ask *how* she knows it.[6] In passing, it might be noted that, even if it were true, this would not in itself establish a disanalogy between knowledge and mere true belief, or even between knowledge and mere belief, or even between knowledge and mere assertion. It is equally legitimate to ask someone who reports that she believes something *why* she believes it (here, the syntax of the terms makes the question of how she believes it rather different). Similarly, she might be asked "What makes you think so?" or even "Why do you say that?." In all these cases, justification may be demanded (though the request may also be for the causal genesis of the belief). However, there *is* a disanalogy between the case of knowledge and the case of belief or assertion: in the case of knowledge, the answer to the question "How do you know?" is relevant to whether in fact you *do* know. That is, if the question is not answered in a satisfactory way, it may be proper to respond that "You didn't know after all." In the case of belief or assertion the response to a demand for justification does not always bear on whether one does believe or assert what one says one believes or what one asserts. But again here, no disanalogy is established between knowledge and true belief, if the demand for a justification is thought of as a demand that the proposition which one claims to know be supported, that is, that reasons should be given to regard it as true.

Be this as it may, the demand "How you know?" can be pressed to the point of absurdity. If you tell a child that you know that elephants have trunks, the child may ask *how* you know it. Perhaps you tell her that you have seen pictures of elephants, or actual elephants, and that they had trunks. The child then asks how you know that what was pictured or seen was really an elephant. Here perhaps you appeal to authority, and by inference to a causal connection of some sort to the facts of the matter. The child then asks how you know the authority was telling the truth, and you may proceed by enumerating the authority's degrees, or by appealing to the authority's well-known veracity, implying that appealing to the authority is a reliable procedure for generating beliefs. The child may still not be satisfied. It is a revealing fact about the use of the word 'know' that at some point you will silence your young interlocutor by saying that you *just do know* that some claim in the chain is true. That is, at some point you will assert that further justification is unneccesary. I am not pressing a regress here, but simply pointing out

that the demand for justification will eventually be rejected with regard to some proposition embedded in the justification of the original claim. So in some cases where we make a knowledge-claim, and where the believed proposition is in no sense self-justified or *prima facie* justified, we reject the demand for justification. And though this rejection may ultimately be illegitimate for conceptual reasons, it certainly does show that the actual use of the word "know" is very far from clearly suggesting that every case of knowledge is a case of justified belief.

On this basis I would like briefly to offer some counter-examples to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief. They are cases where it seems legitimate to reject the demand for a justification, cases where the demand seems inappropriate. We generate such cases where we are pressed to continue justifying claims which justify our knowledge, or where scepticism is pushed beyond tolerable limits. But there are other sorts of cases as well.

(a) Some problems in a variety of disciplines have been solved in what is sometimes termed "a flash of insight," as when a mathematician who has been struggling with a problem suddenly "sees" the solution. Here, it might be argued that there is indeed a subterranean justification, for example, that ratiocinative processes are going forward at a sub-conscious level; after all, the mathematician has, by hypothesis, been *working* on the problem. Yet the proof might follow rather than precede the insight, and the mathematician might report that she knew the solution very well before she proved it. That is, she might report that she knew the solution but that a justification of it was not available to her. If we were to recognize the legitimacy of such a claim, we would have to admit that not all knowledge is justified true belief.[7]

(b) Here is another interesting case: that of religious faith. Let us for the sake of argument consider religious faith to be belief that God exists that is indifferent to any argument or objective evidence on either side of the question.[8] Then if we countenance the claim that religious faith could constitute knowledge if indeed God exists, we at once admit that not all knowledge is justified true belief. And again, it is hard to see what makes this a case of knowledge (if it is) except that it is a case of true belief. I said at the beginning that no philosopher has explicitly held that knowledge is merely true belief. But any philosopher who holds that religious faith in this sense can rise to the level of knowledge is obliged to hold that not all knowledge is justified belief. Or think of more mundane cases of faith, such as the faith we occasionally repose in persons. A father whose son is accused of murder might believe, in the face of overwhelming evidence, that his son is innocent. Asked *how* he knows, he responds impatiently that he just does. Let us stipulate that his son is indeed innocent. If this is a case of knowledge (as the father most assuredly believes) then not all knowledge is justified belief. And again, it is hard to see what makes this a case of knowledge, except that it is a case of true belief.

(c) Here is another sort of case in which we might recognize that someone has knowledge without justification. Consider circumstances in which it is appropriate to produce the utterance "I knew it all along." On some occasions, this means that though I believed something during a certain segment of time t (say, that Nixon was involved in the Watergate cover-up) a justification of it was not available to me at t. At $t1$ I find out that my belief is justified. Then I might say not that I *now* know it, but that I knew it all along. In this case, though my belief comes at $t1$ to be justified, it is perfectly natural to say I knew it at t. This seems to me to mean that at t I believed it, and at t it was true.

Of course, even if we admit such cases, they would establish only that justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge; more would need to be said in order to do more than merely suggest that true belief is sufficient. But again, I am not attempting a demonstration, but offering a plea for the suspension of burden of proof. Nevertheless, even in cases such as these, we don't simply find ourselves believing something without any history or cause of our coming to believe it. For example, in the case of the flash of insight there is a process of inquiry in the context of which the belief is generated, though we are supposing that nothing in that inquiry directs one to the solution one proposes. In the case of religious faith, the belief is created and sustained by an emotional commitment to the truth of the believed proposition. But if these sorts of processes count as justifications on the view of a proponent of the traditional view, it is

hard to see what beliefs are *not* justified. If the father is justified in believing his son innocent *in the face of overwhelming evidence*, then the notion of justification has been weakened to such a great extent that its continuing relevance to the theory of knowledge is questionable. For example, if the notion of justification is weakened to this extent, an account is required of why (1)-(4) do not count as cases of justified true belief (if they are described in such a way that they count as cases of belief).

IV. Justification and Truth

It may well be asked, however, how the present account is going to deal with cases such as those with which I started this paper. Now I suspect that the proponent of the view that knowledge is at least justified true belief is simply going to deny that cases like (a)-(c) are cases of knowledge. Likewise, I am simply going to affirm that cases like (1)-(4) are cases of knowledge, if they are described so that they are cases of belief. Notice, however, that, if someone claims to know a proposition that I do not believe to be true, or about which I have no opinion, it may be perfectly legitimate for me to deny the knowledge-claim when the claimant cannot produce good reasons. That is, it may be perfectly legitimate to deny that the claim is true, or at any rate to suspend belief about it, until good reasons to suppose that it is true have been produced.

One way to put my point is that justification is a *criterion*, though not a logically necessary condition, of knowledge. Let us take a criterion, roughly, to be a test of whether an item has some property, a test that we apply if we are in doubt as to whether the item has that property or not. For example, it is a criterion for something to be gold that it yields a certain characteristic taste when bitten. In cases where we are in doubt about whether something is gold or not, we may well employ this criterion in deciding the matter. But it is hardly a logically necessary condition of something's being gold that it yields this taste when bitten. To see this, notice that, in a possible world in which the taste apparatus of persons is differently configured, gold would not yield the taste it does yield in this world. By contrast, the fact that an item has the atomic number 79 is a logically necessary condition for it to count as gold. Again, I claim that justification is a criterion for knowledge in the sense that, if the case is doubtful, the request for a justification acts as a test of whether S knows that p. But justification is not a logically necessary condition of knowledge.

Nevertheless the position that (1)-(4) count as cases of knowledge if they count as cases of belief sounds like rank irrationalism, like an argument for claiming to know anything you please on any grounds whatever, or on no grounds at all. It sounds like a defense of mysticism and obscurantism, of irresponsibility in inquiry, of charlatanry and quackery of all kinds. It seems that, on the present account, there is nothing wrong with coming to believe something on the basis of dreams, guesses, divinations. In fact, however, this charge is misplaced. There is something clearly wrong with such belief-generating strategies on the present account: *they yield beliefs that are not justified.*

It must be asked, however, just what the activity of justification is. On the present account the practice of justification fundamentally consists in the attempt to ascertain or confirm whether some proposition is true.[9] Now there is wide agreement among proponents of foundationalist, reliabilist, and even coherentist accounts of justification that justification must be *truth-conducive*, that is, that there must be reason to think that beliefs that are justified on any adequate account must be likely to be true. This indicates, though it hardly proves, that justification is subordinate to truth, that our epistemic goal is true belief, while justification is a means by which we reach this goal and a means by which we confirm that this goal has been reached. Indeed, Laurence BonJour goes so far as to say that "It is only if we have some reason for thinking that epistemic justification constitutes a path to truth that we as cognitive beings have any motive for preferring justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones. Epistemic justification is therefore in the final analysis only an instrumental value, not an intrinsic one."[10]

My opponents and I would agree that knowledge is a very valuable thing. Here, that means that, in the case of every proposition with which we are epistemically concerned, we ought to believe it just if it is true. On the present account any process by which we come to believe the truth is a process by which we gain knowledge.

Now careful argumentation and empirical observation are far superior to dreams, guesses, or divinations in this regard. So on the present account there is every reason in the world to pursue the former and neglect the latter. Hence, the claim that knowledge is merely true belief is hardly a prescription for epistemological anarchy.

Think of the circumstances in which it is appropriate to press the question of how someone knows something. First of all, such a query is not usually made in circumstances in which the belief is not controversial or obscure. If someone claims to know that 2+2=4 or that the sky is blue on a sunny day, it would be odd, to say the least, in typical circumstances, to ask how she knows it. But if she claims to know that Goldbach's conjecture is true, or that there are hippopotami in Madagascar, or that Quayle will be the next president, then it may be appropriate to ask how she knows; that is, the criterion of justification comes into play. Notice that in the usual case, if *I* already believe that there are hippopotami in Madagascar, I will not press the query. This indicates that, in the usual case, I am trying to ascertain whether the claim is true by asking for a justification. But if I do not know whether the claim is true, I may well ask "How do you *know*?" or, with a shift in emphasis, "How do *you* know?." "Professor Ersatz gave a proof in his recent article;" "Hippopotami are indigenous to sub-tropical climes;" "The Democrats have no viable contenders." These are replies to the first sort of question. The second asks more specifically about the claimant's access to the truth of the matter. "Ersatz demonstrated it to me in the most convincing way;" "I just read an article in *National Geographic*;" "None of the touted candidates looks very formidable to me." In either case, the process of giving a justification can be plausibly construed as giving reasons to believe the claim is true. On the present view, then, such responses are indeed attempts to establish knowledge-claims. But the demand for a justification operates as a pragmatic rather than as a conceptual restraint. That is, justification is a practice that has as its goal to show that the conceptual conditions of knowledge are met.

On the other hand, if we did (as we occasionally do) ask how someone who claims to have knowledge of some strikingly non-controversial claim knows that the claim is true, if for example we ask someone how she knows that 2+2=4, we may have several different (but highly unusual) things in mind. For example, we may be pressing sceptical doubts about mathematics, in which case, again, we are concerned to establish that the believed claim is indeed true in the face of some considerations that make the other way. We might say in such a case that if the sceptical doubts prove to be sufficiently compelling, she did not know it after all. But again, what is meant is that there are good reasons not to regard the claim as true. On the other hand, and this is where the present account runs into difficulties, we may be pressing the question of the source of the belief. For example, if we find out that the claimant in this case has recently emerged from a mental hospital, and regards the voices in her head as reliable sources of information, we may well ask how she knows that 2+2=4. If she now replies that one of these voices told her, we may say (though with some strain to common sense) that she didn't know it after all.

Now my account indeed obliges me to deny this claim. The mental patient in this case, on my account, does indeed know that 2+2=4, if she satisfies the conditions for believing the claim. What we are doing in such a case, on the present view, is reaching for a truth by means of a literal falsehood. The truth we are reaching for is that knowledge-claims made by the mental patient on controversial matters ought to be regarded as highly suspect. That is, we are impugning the doxastic procedures of the claimant, because we have noted that the doxastic procedures she employs are likely in many cases to lead her to false beliefs. So as soon as she moves afield from pedestrian assertions that we all know to be true, her knowledge-claims ought to be subjected to scrutiny. As David Armstrong puts it, "the man who has *mere* true belief is unreliable. He was right this time, but if the same situation crops up again he is likely to get it wrong. . . . But if it is empirically impossible or even very unlikely that the situation will crop up again, then the distinction [between true belief and knowledge] loses almost all its *point*."[11] But Armstrong does recognize that the point of justification is to establish the truth of beliefs over the long haul. And it is worth noting that the man who has true belief is *perfectly* reliable as long as he continues to have true belief. This should have made Armstrong suspect that the distinction between knowledge and true belief *does* lose its point.

When we impugn someone's doxastic procedures, we are claiming precisely that he will *not* in fact continue by their application to generate true beliefs. Nevertheless, my view obviously obliges me to affirm that the case of the mathematically inclined mental patient is a case of knowledge. And notice that it *is* natural in a case such as this one to say that we *all* know that 2+2=4; it is "common knowledge;" in a typical case it would be perverse to ask of any one person *how* she knows it.

When someone claims to know something, and we ask *how* she knows it, when we demand a justification, we may be doing one of two things. First, we may be attempting to establish whether she *does* know it, or rather only believes it. That is to say that we may be trying to establish whether the believed proposition is true. Second, we may be trying to ascertain the believer's overall rationality, to ascertain whether she believes only what she has good reasons to believe. This will in turn affect our assessment of her further claims to know, which will be assessed in the same way, and so forth.

Thus, I am in no sense advocating the end of systematic epistemology. The view that knowledge is merely true belief neither makes the question of justification a trivial one, nor relieves us of the epistemological burden of producing an account of justification. Now the truth of propositions is rarely a matter of the noetic states of the believer. (The truth of the proposition that I believe that there are hippopotami in Madagascar is a matter of my noetic states, but the truth of the proposition that there are hippopotami in Madagascar is a matter of the way the world is.) In establishing a knowledge-claim *per se* we are *only* concerned about the truth of the believed proposition; the view that knowledge is merely true belief makes the relation of a belief to other of the believer's noetic states strictly speaking irrelevant to whether he has knowledge, except insofar as such relations are required for belief, and leaving aside the case of belief about the believer's internal states. Nevertheless, we have also seen that the demand for justification may be a way of impugning or at any rate querying the doxastic procedures of the believer. The difference here is parallel in some repects to the difference between questioning the rightness of a person's actions and questioning the goodness of the person herself. It is like the difference, that is to say, between asking whether she does the right thing, and asking whether she does the right things *for the right reasons*. Here, we *do* demand that the person who makes a knowledge-claim tell us something about the relation of her belief to other of her noetic states (as well, perhaps, as to external matters). For example, we may be trying to determine whether the claimant is generally thoughtful, whether, as it were, she makes her beliefs run the gamut of her other beliefs and is at pains to be consistent. We might, that is, perfectly well be trying to determine whether some holistic coherence relation obtains between this belief and others. And note that, if the proposition she claims to know is controversial, our overall judgement of the claimant's rationality may well affect our assessment of the proposition's truth, and hence of the truth of the knowledge-claim itself.

V. Internalism and Externalism

Finally, it may well be asked what substantive advantages accrue for epistemology from accepting the view that knowledge is merely true belief. Obviously, my account yields an economical definition of knowledge. That, however, is of no help if the account is not itself plausible. But further, even if the account is *not* plausible, it may serve to challenge philosophers who take justification to be a logically necessary condition of knowledge to defend their view. I am unacquainted with *any* argument in the literature to the effect that justification is a logically necessary condition that is not fundamentally an appeal to intuition. It is worth noting that such intuitions (intuitions which, for example, motivate the Gettier problem) are not universally shared, and thus require defense.

A more fundamental advantage of the view that knowledge is merely true belief is that, on it, we are under no apparent pressure to *choose* between a broadly externalist and a broadly internalist account of justification. The pressure to choose between these views arises largely because proponents of each argue that their account is an account of the sense of justification that is *logically required for knowledge*. But justification is in *no* sense logically required for knowledge.

Externalists make justification fundamentally a relation between a belief and the way the world is. For example, the justification of a belief is construed as a matter of the objective reliablility of the method by which the belief was generated,[12] or of a lawlike relation between the belief and the state of affairs with which it is concerned.[13] A major problem for any such account is that it is compatible with a belief's being justified that the believer is in some sense irrational in adopting it, as would be the case if the believer did not believe that the belief was arrived at in a reliable way, or that the proper nomological relation held. Internalism, on the other hand, makes justification a matter of the relation between the belief in question and certain other of the believer's noetic states. For example, the question of justification has been construed as being a matter of its inferential relation to basic beliefs or non-doxastic introspectible states,[14] or as a matter of holistic coherence within the overall doxastic structure.[15] A problem here is that such an account stands in need of what BonJour calls an external "metajustification," an argument to show that the whole doxastic structure is not fantastic, is somehow tied to the world and hence that beliefs that have the proper position in the structure are likely to be true. Each broad kind of account does an admirable job of filling the deficiencies of the other. That is, externally justified beliefs are by definition likely to be true, while internally justified beliefs are by definition likely to be rationally adopted.

Now on the present account of knowledge, I can see no reason whatever to choose between these alternatives. As we have seen, on some occasions where a justification is demanded, the demand is for reasons to regard the believed proposition as true, whereas on other occasions, the demand is for reasons to regard the believer as rational. Since justification is not part of the theory of knowledge, *both* projects ought to be pursued: the externalist ought to continue trying to show how we ought to go about generating true beliefs, while the internalist ought to continue trying to show how those beliefs should be incorporated in a doxastic structure in order for the structure to be rational. One might think of this as the contrast between showing that a belief is justified and showing that some person is justified in adopting it. But the debate now ought to proceed *among* externalists and *among* internalists rather than *between* them.

So I think that the view that knowledge is true belief is capable of doing a service to epistemology in the sense of cogently addressing some of its outstanding problems. But the most conspicuous advantage of the present over the traditional view is that it can allow that there is knowledge that is not constructed with the use of and cannot be manipulated with the tools provided by theories of justification. Problems are solved in a variety of ways, ranging from the reliable and rational to the perfectly inexplicable.[16] We should not falsify our own intellectual lives in a philosophical reconstruction of how those lives are conducted by pretending that knowledge always proceeds along the orderly path of justification.[17]

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NOTES

1. For a similar strategy, see Joseph Margolis, "Alternative Strategies for the Analysis of Knowledge," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 461-69. Some philosophers have denied that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. See, e.g., Peter Unger, "Experience and Factual Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy,* vol. 64 (1967), pp. 152-73. William Alston, "Justification and Knowledge," *Epistemic Justification* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 172-82. Fred Dretske, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), chap. 4. But these philosophers do add a third condition to the analysis of knowledge. In fact, I would say roughly that they all regard justification as internal, while the condition they adduce for knowledge beyond truth and belief is external. In what follws, such views are implicitly included among the traditional analyses.

2. "The term 'justification' in its pre-analytic sense may be thought of as being the name for that which

distinguishes knowledge from true belief which is not knowledge. . . We presuppose, then, that there is a valid distinction between knowledge and true belief which is not knowledge." Roderick Chisholm, "A Version of Foundationalism," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy,* vol. 5 (1980), p. 560.

3. According to R. B. Braithwaite "I believe that *p*" means "(1) I entertain *p*" and "(2) I have a disposition to act as if *p* were true." "The Nature of Believing," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 33 (1932-33), p. 132.

4. This has been pointed out by, among others, H. H. Price. "Some Considerations About Belief," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 35 (1934-35), pp. 236 ff.

5. See, e.g., Laurence BonJour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 4. Paul Moser, *Empirical Justification* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), p. 22.

6. "The theory of knowledge is an attempt to answer the question 'How do you know?'". . . In asking how a person knows something we are typically asking for his grounds for believing it. We want to know what *justifies* him in holding his belief." John Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), p. 7.

7. A mathematician of my acquaintance describes her process for solving problems in just this way. She reports that she knows the solution to the problem well before she can formulate a proof, and often before she has any story at all to tell about why the solution is right. This is by no means atypical. See Henri Poincaré, "Mathematical Creation," G. Bruce Halstead (tr.), *The Foundations of Science* (New York: The Science Press, 1913). Jaques Hadamard, *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945).

8. Kierkegaard defines fatih as "an objective uncertainty held fast in . . . passionate inwardness." *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (trs.) (Princeton: Princetown University Press, 1968), p. 182. It is important to realize that the "objective uncertainty" here is completely unjustifiable on any account, consisting as it does of a paradox. It should be noted that Kierkegaard contrasts faith with knowledge. However, he also contrasts knowledge with belief. James defines faith as "a believing attitude . . . [to which] our logical intellects may not have been coerced." "The Will to Believe," *Essays in Pragmatism* (New York: Hafner, 1948), p. 88. And again it should be noted that in the cases he describes, no good reasons incline one more to one view than the other. Whether James believes that faith in this sense could be knowledge is a difficult exegetical issue; I am inclined to think that he does.

9. See, for example, Laurence BonJour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, op. cit.*, chap. 1. Alvin Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 116-21. Moser, *Empirical Justification*, pp. 4-8.

10. BonJour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, op. cit.*, p. 8.

11. David Armstrong, *Belief, Truth, and Knowledge* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 173.

12. This is a simplistic version of the view advocated, e.g., by Goldman in *Epistemology and Cognition.*

13. Armstrong, *Belief, Truth, and Knowledge,* chap. 12.

14. For example, Chisholm, "A Version of Foundationalism."

15. BonJour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, chaps. 5 and 6.

16. Here, I pre-suppose that a solution to a problem must be true. Goldman has defended this position in *Epistemology and Cognition,* pp. 125-31.

17. I would like to thank Michael McKenna, John Post, Jeffrey Tlumak, and Josuha Tonkel for valuable comments on various drafts of this paper. It is usual to say that they are not responsible for the outcome; here, I make somewhat stronger disclaimer that they all disagree vehemently with my conclusion.