A-level
PHILOSOPHY
7172/2

Paper 2 The metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind

Mark scheme
June 2020

Version: 1.0 Final Mark Scheme

206A7172/2/ms

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this mark scheme are available from aqa.org.uk

Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 3 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 25 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A

The Metaphysics of God

0 1 What does Hick mean by eschatological verification?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content for 3 marks

- Hick understands eschatological verification as being (1) the removal of rational doubt concerning a claim (2) based on some kind of (predicted) experience which (3) can only happen at the end of time/after our death.

- Students may also represent eschatological verification as: 1) the possibility of establishing the meaningful (cognitive or factual) content of some religious claim (or language) by 2) some confirmatory experience (proof) 3) at the end of time/after death.

Notes:

- Eschatological verification does not, by definition, have to concern traditional religious claims made in the West (e.g. concerning 'God' or 'heaven'), but Hick was writing with these claims in mind, and it is likely that this is how students will answer.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 2 Outline Leibniz's cosmological argument from the principle of sufficient reason.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Students might make any of the following contextual points about Leibniz's argument:
  - It is a deductive argument.
  - It focuses on the contingency of facts (or things/begins/events).
  - It can be seen as a development/improvement on Aquinas' Third Way.

P1 The principle of sufficient reason: every fact has an explanation that provides a sufficient reason for why things are as they are and not otherwise.

P2 There are two kinds of truth: those of reasoning and those of fact:

P2a Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible. The sufficient reason for a truth of reason is found by a priori analysis: a finite process of analysis will resolve it into primitive truths of identity.

P2b Truths of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible. The sufficient reason for a truth of fact cannot be found in other contingent truths, because these too will require a reason, and so on: no finite process of analysis will resolve into primitive truths of identity.

C1 Therefore, to provide a sufficient reason for any contingent fact, we must look outside the sequence of contingent facts.

C2 Therefore, the sufficient reason for contingent facts must be a necessary substance (or being) that is a sufficient reason for all contingent facts.

C3 This necessary substance (or being) is God.

C4 Therefore, God exists.

- The above version of Leibniz's argument focuses on 'facts' and is based on Leibniz's *Monadology*. However, students might focus the argument on 'things' or 'beings' (as in the *Theodicy*), and this would be equally acceptable.
- In brief, the aforementioned argument would be that: 1) contingent beings require a sufficient reason/explanation for their existence); 2) this reason/explanation cannot (ultimately) be any other contingent beings or collection thereof (since this would simply add to the beings we are trying to explain); so 3) we require a reason/explanation outside the collection/set of contingent beings; 4) this sufficient reason/explanation is a necessary being: God.
- Students may equally present the argument with the focus on events.

NB:

- Students who progress to Level 3 and beyond will be clear that this is an argument for the existence of God (or a necessary being) from contingency.
- Students progressing to Level 5 will show understanding of how the principle of sufficient reason contribute to this argument (although this may be implicit in the logic of their argument, and that is fine).
- Students progressing to Level 5 will also outline the argument in a conceptually consistent way: there may be some vacillation between 'truth/fact/event' and 'being', but if there is any blurring with 'causal' arguments, this will be treated as an imprecision (or as inaccurate if it is a persistent feature).

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 3 Explain how inductive and deductive arguments for the existence of God differ.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Students may choose to answer this by discussing what in general makes an argument for God fit into either of these categories, or they may use one or more specific examples of arguments to explain the difference.

The following table indicates the sort of content we would expect to see in responses:

	Inductive argument for the existence of God	**Deductive argument for the existence of God**
Type of argument / conclusion	An inductive argument is one where the argument is intended to be strong.	A deductive argument is one where the argument is intended by the proponent to be valid.
	An inductively strong argument: if the premises are true, the conclusion is probable (it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false).	A deductively valid argument: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true (it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false).
	An inductively strong argument with actually true premises is “cogent”.	A deductively valid argument with actually true premises is “sound”.
	An inductive argument provides reasons at best to believe that the conclusion is probably true.	A deductive argument provides reasons to believe that the conclusion is certainly true.
Application to the existence of God	Successful inductive arguments for God at best establish God’s probable existence.	Successful deductive arguments for God establish the existence of God with certainty.

<table>
<tr><td>Clear examples from the specification that may be used</td><td>Analogical design argument (as presented by Hume).
Swinburne’s abductive/analogical design argument.</td><td>Anselm’s, Descartes’ and Malcolm’s ontological arguments; Descartes’ cosmological argument/s (my mind’s continuous existence and the “trademark” argument); and any of Aquinas’s first three ways (from motion/change, from efficient causality, from possibility and necessity).</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">More complicated / controversial examples</td><td colspan="2">Paley’s design argument
Though some have historically interpreted it as analogical…
…the standard current interpretation is that it is deductive.
Plus, regardless of whether the argument for a designer is deductive or inductive, the further inference from “designer” to “God” (as traditionally understood) if not intended to be valid would then be inductive.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Most cosmological arguments are more difficult to characterise:
The first stage of proving a first cause/first beginner/prime mover/first changer/necessary being is deductive (intended to be valid).
There may then be differences between whether the proponents of such arguments see the next step to this being God as deductive or inductive.</td></tr>
</table>

- Students are not required to explain what such arguments have in common – ie that they are arguments for the existence of God. However, some might explain what is meant by God’s existence in this context (ie, what kind of being’s existence these arguments are intending to establish).
  - A being with a large proportion of the following characteristics (there is obviously dispute over the characteristics): omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent/morally perfect, eternal or everlasting.
  - Or, in more generally terms: a supremely perfect being (Descartes); the greatest conceivable being (Anselm); an unlimited being (Malcolm).

- There is disagreement about how the term ‘inductive argument’ should be understood. Some understand abductive and or analogical arguments as being types of inductive argument. Some see one or both of these as being distinct from inductive arguments. We will accept all such interpretations.

NB: Students who progress to Level 3 and beyond will apply the distinction between the types of argument with specific reference to arguments for the existence of God.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 4 Outline St Anselm's ontological argument **and** explain Gaunilo's 'perfect island' objection.

[12 marks]

AO1 = 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Outline St Anselm's ontological argument

- It is worth beginning by recognising that there is dispute over what the exact logical form of Anselm's argument is. We will present one version below.
- Anselm argues that "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" (hereafter, the Greatest Conceivable Being (GCB)) must exist.
- We have focused on his first presentation of the argument (to which Gaunilo responds) rather than his formulation in *Proslogium* 3.

- Anselm's ontological argument in Chapter 2 of the *Proslogium*:
  - P1: The concept of a being than which none greater can be conceived (ie, the greatest conceivable being/the GCB/God) exists as a (coherent) concept in the mind (in the 'understanding').
  - P2: Suppose, for *reductio*, that the GCB exists only in the mind and not in reality.
  - P3: A being that exists in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only in the mind.
  - C1: Therefore, there is something greater than the GCB (a contradiction derived from P2).
  - C2: Therefore (denial of P2), the GCB must exist in the mind and in reality.

  - C3: Therefore, the GCB exists.

- In Chapter 3 of the *Proslogium* he continues the argument (students are not expected to include this extra piece of argumentation, though some may):
  - P1: The concept of a being than which none greater can be conceived (ie, the greatest conceivable being/the GCB/God) exists as a (coherent) concept in the mind (in the 'understanding').
  - P2: Suppose, for *reductio*, that the GCB can be conceived of as not existing.
  - P3: A being that cannot be conceived of as not existing is greater than a being that can be conceived of as not existing.
  - C1: Therefore, there is something greater than the GCB (a contradiction derived from P2).
  - C2: Therefore (denial of P2), the GCB must exist necessarily.

- Both arguments from Anselm can be seen being "reductio ad absurdum" arguments – ie they show that the assumption that the GCB only exists in the mind leads to a contradiction and should therefore be rejected.
- Students may mention that this argument is deductive (ie, intended to be valid) and a priori (all of the premises are a priori and so can be justified independently of experience).

and explain Gaunilo's 'perfect island' objection.

- Gaunilo argues that Anselm's original argument must be invalid, given that if it worked it would justify absurd conclusions.
- Gaunilo claims that this argument, if it were valid, could be applied equally well to greatest conceivable species of object – his example being the greatest conceivable island.
- It is not expected that students would set it out as follows, but this is included to indicate how such parallel arguments would run:
  - P1: The concept of an island than which none greater can be imagined (ie, the greatest conceivable island/the GCI) exists as a (coherent) concept in the mind (in the 'understanding').
  - P2: Suppose, for *reductio*, that the GCI exists only in the mind and not in reality.
  - P3: An island that exists in the mind and in reality is greater than an island that exists only in the mind.
  - C1: Therefore, there is an island greater than the GCI (a contradiction derived from P2).
  - C2: Therefore (denial of P2), the GCI must exist in the mind and in reality.
  - C3: Therefore, the GCI exists.
- This objection has become known as the "overload" objection, presumably since it claims that similar arguments would overload reality with "greatest conceivable" objects.
- Although it is not the most famous part of the objection, in his reply *On Behalf of the Fool*, Gaunilo does question a basic premise of Anselm's argument that 'the fool' must have 'the idea of a being greater than which nothing can be conceived' before it is suggested to him.
- Gaunilo also argues that he would need some (independent) 'proof' of the existence of a being before he could assent to its purposed greatness.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 5 Is the concept of 'God' incoherent?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and

	counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.
1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Students may well explain what is meant by the concept 'God':
    - A being with a large proportion of the following characteristics (there is obviously dispute over the characteristics): omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent/morally perfect, eternal or everlasting.
    - Or more generally, as a supremely perfect being (Descartes); the greatest conceivable being (Anselm); an unlimited being (Malcolm).

- Conclusions may (and are likely) to be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions, drawing from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive):
    - **YES**: The concept of God is incoherent
    - **NO**: The concept of God is not incoherent (as it stands)
    - **NO:** The concept of God is not incoherent (so long as it is understood in a particular way).

YES: The concept of God is incoherent.

- **Omnipotence:**
    - **The paradox of the stone**: an omnipotent being is impossible
    - **Various other "paradoxes of omnipotence"**
        - God cannot change the truth-value of necessary truths of maths/logic/geometry etc.
        - God cannot change the past.
        - God cannot sin/commit evil acts (given that God is supremely good).
        - God cannot control free human beings (assuming that a supremely good God would create humans with free will).
    - Responses to such issues might involve claiming that there is no issue so long as we have a particular understanding of 'omnipotence', eg:
        - the ability to do the logically possible.
        - the ability to do the logically possible tasks which do not undermine his perfection.
        - the ability to do the logically possible tasks which do not conflict with other attributes (eg that do not undermine is omnibenevolence).

- **Supreme goodness/omnibenevolence:**
    - **The Euthyphro dilemma**: there is no coherent/satisfactory way of understanding God's relationship to morality/moral truths. This could be developed as an attack on God's perfect goodness or an attack on God's omnipotence (or, indeed, both).

- Responses to such issues might involve denying that there is a real dilemma here, or objecting that the dilemma assumes (erroneously) a distinction between the divine nature and the divine will (eg Aquinas and philosophers in the Thomist tradition):
  - Things are good because God wills them, but it is first and foremost God who is (metaphysically) good (parallels could be drawn with Plato's Form of the Good); and unlike human beings there is no division in God (eg between passion and rational will), and so God's will perfectly reflect the divine nature (which is good), so there is no possibility of arbitrary or wicked commands. (Some students may argue that this response undermines God's omnipotence).
  - God wills things because they are good, and the independent standard of goodness (natural or non-natural) can be known without any reference to (or knowledge of) God. But that does not make moral goodness distinct from God, since God created the world including the foundation of moral goodness.

- **The incompatibility of God's omniscience and human free will** – and therefore the incoherence of God's omniscience and his supreme goodness assuming that a supremely good God would create humans with free will.
- **Various other issues with God's omniscience**:
  - God cannot know particular temporal truths, eg what time it is (if God is considered to be eternal).
  - God cannot know phenomenal truths (truths about qualia), eg what it is like to experience redness.
  - God cannot both be immutable and omniscient (eg Kretzmann): no being can both know what time it is as time goes on, and be immutable.
- Responses to such issues might involve arguing:
  - These arguments often presuppose a temporal perspective on actions and events, but God is eternal, and all actions and events are eternally present to God.
  - Qualia do not exist, and so there is no deficit in divine knowledge.
  - A God who is omnipresent and omniscient God could know phenomenal truths (if arguing from a Christian perspective, students could invoke the Incarnation).
  - The attribute of 'omniscience' just means that God can 'know everything that it is possible to know', which excludes things like future contingents.

- **Multiple attributes:**
  - **The logical problem of evil**:
    - It is incoherent to claim that a supremely good, omnipotent and omniscient being exists assuming that evil exists.
    - The concept of a supremely good, omnipotent and omniscient being that created a world containing (the risk/possibility of) evil is incoherent.
  - Responses to such issues might involve denying there is any incoherence here:
    - The free will defence (eg Plantinga and 'transworld depravity', Augustine).
    - 'Soul making' theodicy (eg Hick).
    - 'Best of all possible worlds' theodicy (ie Leibniz).

Other positions (less likely to be argued, but should be credited):

- **YES**: The concept of God is incoherent, but this does not matter.
- **NO**: The concept of God is not incoherent (though it might seem so), but we (humans) are unable (currently) to understand/recognise this.

    - These two positions could be understood within the context of fideism whereby we should not attempt to understand God using reason, but rather faith (eg Pascal or Kierkegaard).

- **NO**: The concept of God is not incoherent (as it stands).
    - Leibniz argues that the concept of God can only be incoherent if the perfections that God is meant to have contradict each other. One perfection of God could only contradict another if these two perfections themselves have properties/parts that contradict each other. However, perfections have no properties/parts - they are, as Leibniz calls them, “simple” and “unanalyzable”. This means that perfections cannot possibly contradict each other and this means that the concept must be coherent.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

Section B

The Metaphysics of Mind

0 6 What is 'hard' behaviourism?

[3 marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content for 3 marks:

- Hard behaviourism claims that 'all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states' (AQA Specification definition).
- The view that all (1) statements (or propositions) containing mental concepts can be (2) analytically reduced to statements containing the (3) concepts of physics.
- The view that all (1) language about the mind (or psychological language) can be (2) reduced without loss of meaning to (3) the language of physics (or the natural sciences).

Hempel puts it in the following way: "All psychological statements which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle verifiable, are translatable into statements which do not involve psychological concepts, but only the concepts of physics" ('The Logical Analysis of Psychology').

- Some students might link this to the verification principle – ie that only if they can be reduced in this way can such sentences be genuine (meaningful) propositions.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 7 Explain how the claims made by eliminative materialism and mind-brain identity theory differ.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

(1) Eliminative materialism (EM): the claim that some or all mental states, as understood by folk-psychology (FP), do not exist so folk-psychology is false or at least radically misleading.
(2) Mind-brain type identity theory (Type-IT): the claim that mental states can be ontologically (but not analytically) reduced to brain states.

- There are a number of ways in which the difference/s might be explained and it should be noted/recognised that there are subtleties in the ways in which specific proponents of each view have expressed those views.

Mind-brain type identity theory	Eliminative materialism
Type-IT claims that mental states / properties (as understood by folk-psychology) exist…	…whereas EM claims that (at least some) mental states/properties (as understood by folk-psychology) do not exist.
Type-IT claims that FP concepts are in good standing as they pick out neural properties…	…whereas EM says that these concepts are not in good standing as fail to pick anything out and must be replaced by concepts of a mature science.
Type-IT is an ontologically reductive theory…	…whereas EM claims that there are no phenomena that need 'reducing'.

Type-IT sees statements about the mind that use ordinary mental language as making claims that are meaningful and true…	…whereas eliminative materialists see them as making (at least some) claims that are false.

NB: To score marks when defining these two (physicalist) theories, students must implicitly be noting points of difference between the two. Those who progress to Level 3 or beyond will explicitly address those differences.

Notes:

- The table format above works on the assumption that students will often try to explain two or more points of difference. If they do this with sufficient precision then they can score full marks (there is no requirements to 'integrate' their points on these 5-mark questions, though some of the best might do so).
- It is also possible for students to take one difference and develop it fully, explaining it with logical precision and (possibly) supplementing it with illustrations (although examples are not a requirement of this question).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 8 Outline Descartes' indivisibility argument for substance dualism.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Descartes' indivisibility argument supports substance dualism, namely…
    - the view that minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies;
    - the view that there is a non-physical realm (the realm of mental substance/s – *res cogitans*) distinct from the physical realm (the realm of physical substance – *res extensa*);
    - the view that non-physical minds exist as separate things which persist through property changes.
- Some students may explain that this is a deductive argument for dualism.
- Here is the indivisibility argument in standard form, though students may of course present it differently:
    - P1: All physical objects are (essentially) divisible [because I can conceive of them being divided].
    - P2: All minds/mental states/objects are (essentially) not divisible [because I cannot conceive of them being divided].
    - [P3: x = y (x and y are numerically identical - ie are the exact same thing) if and only if they have the exact same properties].
    - C: Therefore minds/mental states/objects are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.
- In support of P1 and P2, Descartes claims: "As for the faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and so on, these are not parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, understands and perceives. They are (I repeat) not parts of the mind, because they are properties or powers of it. By contrast, any corporeal thing can easily be divided into parts in my thought; and this shows me that it is really divisible" (*Meditations*).
- P3 may or may not be included – this is part of 'Leibniz's law': Leibniz's Law of Identity: two things are the same if, and only if, they have all of the same properties at the same time.

NB: Students may score marks for explanations of substance dualism and the form the argument takes (eg 'deductive', 'presupposing Leibniz's law'), but those progressing to Level 3 and beyond will address the substance of the argument, which concerns the indivisibility of mind over against the divisibility of matter (whether in conception or as a matter of fact / metaphysical truth).

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 9 Outline epiphenomenalist dualism **and** explain the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge.

[12 marks]

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Outline epiphenomenalist dualism

Epiphenomenalist dualism claims that:

(1) Dualism (of some form) is true
   a. Substance dualism: minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (the mental and the physical are ontologically distinct).
   b. Property dualism: there are at least some mental properties that are not reducible to physical properties (there is one substance but ontologically distinct properties: mental properties and physical properties).
      i. **NB:** students are not expected to distinguish between these forms of dualism. They may use either (or both) so long as there is evidence that they understand the position.

(2) Mental events are caused by physical events - they are a "by-product" of physical events.

(3) Mental events are causally impotent: they are (merely) epiphenomena - mental events do not have any effects: they cause neither mental nor physical events. (Property dualists might put the impotency point in the following way: events are causes in virtue of their physical and not mental properties.)

ii. **NB:** The account above is how epiphenomenalism is normally understood. It is worth noting, however, that some claim that the following view (which differs slightly from 2 and 3 above) would also count as an epiphenomenalist view and so we include it in case a student presents the theory in this way:
    - Non-physical mental events are caused by physical events but they do not themselves have any effects on physical events though they may have mental effects.

and explain the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge

- Introspective self-knowledge is knowledge that is:
    - about the mind (about mental events, states, or processes, and not about what exists and occurs outside one's mind in the external world);
    - about only your mind (about someone's own mind only and no one else's);
    - acquired through direct/immediate experience/awareness and so non-inferential (rather than by requiring you to work this knowledge out from something else).

- The challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge:
    - According to some accounts of introspection/knowledge, introspective self-knowledge (knowledge of my mind) requires that the belief is caused by the mental events which it is about.
    - But this would require mental events to be causally efficacious.
    - For example, if epiphenomenalism is true, then I cannot possibly know that I am in pain because my pain does not cause anything, it has no effects. If my pain does not cause anything then it is impossible for my pain to cause me to believe (and so to know) that I am in pain.
    - Some may connect the latter to counter unitive implications concerning the status of ordinary our language about our mental states, which presupposes their causal efficaciousness.

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

1 0 Does functionalism give a convincing account of mental states?

[25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.

1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Credit can be given for reference to various versions of functionalism:
    - In the Specification for this qualification, functionalism is defined as being the claim that "all mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised."
    - Machine functionalism: mental states are machine states specified in terms of their inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states by a (deterministic or probabilistic) machine table.
    - Causal functionalism: mental states are defined in terms of the causal role they play in a network of inputs, outputs and relations to other internal states.
        - Psycho-functionalism: mental states are the entities postulated by the best scientific explanation of human behaviour and are specified causally in terms of the functional roles they play in producing the behaviour to be explained.
        - Analytic functionalism: all statements about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (analytically reduced/translated without remainder) into functional statements.
- For any of these species of functionalism there will be role and realizer versions:
    - Role functionalists identify the property of pain with a higher-level functional/causal/relational property.
    - Realizer functionalists identify the property of pain with the actual property that realizes the 'pain' role.
- Functionalist theories claim that mental concepts should be treated as functional concepts (like 'clock') rather than as compositional concepts (like 'diamond').
- Mental states are therefore multiply realisable: multiple functionally identical (functionally isomorphic) set-ups could realise a particular mental state.
- Functionalism is silent about the dualist/physicalist question, but many functionalists are in fact physicalists and claim that only something physical could realize a mental state or, indeed, could play any kind of functional role at all.

- Some possible conclusions:
    - **YES**: functionalism gives a convincing account of mental states.
    - **NO**: functionalism does not give a convincing account of mental states.
    - **DEPENDS**: One version of functionalism gives a convincing account but one or more other versions do not.
    - **DEPENDS**: functionalism gives a convincing account of some mental states but not others.

- **YES**: functionalism gives a convincing account of mental states:
    - The (alleged) advantage of understanding how differently constituted beings (especially animals) can be considered minded.
    - It may be aligned in general with progress in the natural sciences; more specifically students may argue that functionalist approaches to mind receives support from advances in computing and robotics/AI and/or the possibility of extra-terrestrial life.

- This theory might improve upon the weaknesses of other theories:
  - It recognises the importance of reference to internal states (unlike logical/analytical behaviourism).
  - It allows for multiple realisability (unlike type identity theory).
  - It does this while still giving an explanation of what all mental states of a given type have in common (unlike token identity theory and logical/analytical behaviourism).
  - Though typically adopted by physicalists it is not dependent on the truth of physicalism and is compatible with forms of dualism.

- **NO**: functionalism does not give a convincing account of mental states:
  - Absent qualia/functional zombies (Block's "Chinese mind"):
    - P1: A functional zombie is functionally identical to something that has qualia/phenomenal properties (eg Block's "Chinese mind").
    - P2: A functional zombie is conceivable.
    - P3: If X is conceivable then X is logically possible.
    - C1: Therefore, a functional zombie is logically possible.
    - P4: If a functional zombie is logically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties.
    - C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.
      - There are of course challenges to the conceivability or possibility of this scenario: eg Chalmers' response based on gradual replacement of neurons with silicon chips and the impossibility of 'fading' or 'disappearing' qualia, demonstrating that two functional isomorphs would both experience qualia/phenomenal states.
      - It might also be argued that a "Chinese mind" made up of Chinese message passers is no stranger a scenario than a carbon brain made out of neurons.
  - Inverted qualia:
    - P1: It is conceivable that two functionally identical beings/systems could have inverted qualia with respect to each (the 'invert scenario').
    - P2: If X is conceivable then X is logically possible.
    - C1: Therefore, this 'invert scenario' is logically possible.
    - P4: If the 'invert scenario' is logically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties.
    - C2: Therefore, phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind.
      - There are challenges to the conceivability or possibility of this scenario: eg Chalmers's response based on the impossibility of 'dancing' qualia, demonstrating that two functional isomorphs would always be phenomenally identical.
  - Absent intentionality/understanding/semantics (Searle's "Chinese room"): Technically this is aimed at strong AI versions of functionalism according to which equivalence of input-output relations (ie with no regard for internal states) is sufficient for equivalence in mental states. Scenarios of notes being passed, the rule-book, and the non-Chinese speaking person in the room using the rule-book to output 'answers':
    - P1: The non-Chinese speaking person in the room who is functionally identical to a native Chinese speaker.

        - P2: The non-Chinese speaking person in the room does not understand Chinese (although s/he understands syntax, s/he has no grasp of the intentional content (the semantic meaning) of the statements).
        - C1: Therefore, being functionally identical is not sufficient for being mentally identical, so functionalism is false.
            - There are challenges to the conceivability or possibility of the "Chinese room" scenario': eg the whole system does understand Chinese (the 'systems' reply).
    - The Mary/knowledge argument applied to functionalism (Jackson): Even if all functional isomorphs would be mentally identical with regard to qualia (ie even if the absent and inverted qualia objections can be adequately responded to) it can still be argued that functional properties are not reducible to phenomenal properties:
        - P1: Mary knows all the functional facts about human colour vision before her release.
        - P2: Mary does not know all the facts about human colour vision before her release (she does not know the phenomenal facts).
        - C1: Therefore, there are non-functional facts about human colour vision. P3: Non-functional facts are facts about non-functional phenomenal properties.
        - C2: Therefore, there are non-functional properties.
        - C3: Therefore functionalism is a false (or at least incomplete) account of the mind.

- **DEPENDS**: One version of functionalism gives a convincing account but one or more of the other versions do not:
    - A student might argue, for example, that only realizer (and not role) functionalism can give a full/better explanation of mental causation than rival theories.

- **DEPENDS**: Functionalism gives a convincing account of some mental states but not others:
    - A student might argue, for example, that intentional states should be functionally understood but phenomenal states should not or cannot be (see qualia issues above).

Notes:

- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.