



AS

PHILOSOPHY

7171

Paper 1 Epistemology and moral philosophy

Mark scheme

June 2020

Version: 1.0 Final Mark Scheme

206A7171/MS

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the performance at the mid-point of the level. There are marks in each level. For the 2 and 5 mark questions that have only 1 mark in each level you need only apply step 1 below.

To support you in your marking, you will have standardisation scripts. These have been marked by the Lead Examiner at the correct standard. Generally, you will have a standardisation script to exemplify the standard for each level of the mark scheme for a particular item.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start by reading the whole of the student's response and then, using the mark scheme level descriptors and the standardisation scripts, place the response in the level which it matches or best fits.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. Start with the middle mark of the level and then look at the student's response in comparison with the level descriptor and the standardisation script. If the student's response is better than the standardisation script, award a mark above the mid-point of the level. If the student's response is weaker than the standardisation script, award a mark below the mid-point of the level.

For the 15 mark questions examiners should bear in mind the relative weightings of the assessment objectives and be careful not to over/under credit a particular skill. This will be exemplified and reinforced as part of examiner training.

Guidance

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other appropriate points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded zero marks.

Section A - Epistemology

0	1
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 What is a contingent truth?
[2 marks]

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- A proposition/fact/state of affairs which is true in some possible worlds, including this one, but not true in all possible worlds.
- A true proposition whose truth depends on how the world actually is.
- A true proposition which could be false (in different circumstances).
- A true proposition/fact/state of affairs which is true given the circumstances, but which would be false in other circumstances.
- A true proposition/fact/state of affairs which is not true in all possible worlds.
- A true proposition/fact/state of affairs whose contrary does not entail a contradiction.

Incorrect responses

- A proposition which is true or false.
- A state of affairs which could be different.

0 2 Explain John Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

John Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities in Book II Chapter 8 of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Some further points about our simple ideas*.

- A ‘quality’ is ‘the power to produce an idea in our mind’ (II.8.8).
- ‘Primary qualities’ are ‘utterly inseparable from a body, whatever state it is in. Qualities of this kind are the ones that a body doesn’t lose, however much it alters, whatever force is used on it, however finely it is divided’ (II.8.9).
- Examples include: extension, shape, mobility (motion and rest), and number.
- ‘Secondary qualities’ are ‘really nothing but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities’ (II.8.10).
- Examples include colours, smell, sound, and taste.
- Primary qualities are mind-independent, inherent properties (of mind-independent objects) (ie properties which the object possesses independent of us).
- Secondary qualities are mind-dependent, relational properties (of mind-independent objects) (ie properties which the object only possesses in virtue of its relation to a perceiver).
- Our ideas of the primary qualities of bodies resemble them.
- Our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble them.

Students might explain the distinction by drawing on some of Locke’s own examples:

- Eg Locke draws an analogy with the secondary qualities of heat and pain to show how the secondary qualities are not mind-independent.
- Eg Locke points out that the colour of porphyry vanishes with the light despite no ‘real’ alteration being made to it. This suggests that colour isn’t an inherent quality. He gives a similar example with grounding up an almond.
- Eg Locke gives an example of the same water appearing to be different temperatures. This suggests that the perceived temperature is relative to the perceiver and mind-dependent.

Notes:

- The precise interpretation of Locke’s account of secondary qualities is debatable. High quality responses will be likely to be clear that secondary qualities are qualities of mind-independent objects and will not confuse ‘the powers to produce sensations in us’ with ‘the sensations they produce’.

- Responses which unreflectively suggest that secondary qualities ‘are all in the mind’ or identify secondary qualities with the sensations they produce should not be penalised if they explain the distinction in this way.
- However, responses which reflectively point out that Locke at times suggests that secondary qualities ‘are all in the mind’ (eg when he draws a parallel with secondary qualities and pain), so that it is hard to see if Locke is really committed to secondary qualities being ‘the power to produce sensations in us’ rather than ‘the sensation they produce’ should similarly not be penalised for exercising scholarship.

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 3 Outline direct realism **and** explain the issue of perceptual variation.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	<p>The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
4–6	<p>The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
1–3	<p>Some relevant points are made, but no integration.</p> <p>There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Direct realism:

- Direct realism is the position that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties (inherent or relational). Our perception is therefore not mediated by ‘sense-data’ and therefore not indirect.

The issue of perceptual variation:

- Perceptual variation is the phenomena that the qualities of the object seem to change depending on factors external to the object (ie conditions/context of perception, eg the position of the perceiver).

The logic of the issue can be outlined as follows:

- P1) The object I directly perceive changes (eg its colour, shape, or size)
- P2) The physical object doesn’t change
- C1) Therefore, the object I directly perceive cannot be the physical object
- C2) It follows that direct realism as defined above is false.

The logic of the issue can also be expressed using the phenomenal principle: ‘if it appears that there is an x which has the sensible quality *f* then there is an x which does possess that quality *f*’

- P1) The object I directly perceive appears to change (eg its colour, shape, size)
- P2) If the object I directly perceive appears to change, then the object I directly perceive must change
- P3) The physical object doesn’t change
- C1) Therefore, the object I directly perceive isn’t the physical object

C2) It follows that direct realism as defined above is false.

Students may draw on Bertrand Russell's argument from perceptual variation which is found in *Problems of Philosophy* chapter 1. He uses the example of different people having different perceptions of the same table to show that there is a gap between 'reality' (the physical object which exists independent of us) and 'appearance' (what we perceive) so that we do not immediately perceive the physical object but must infer its existence and reality. Russell's arguments show how the colour, the texture, and the shape of the table are all perceptually variable.

Students need to be careful not to conflate the argument from perceptual variation with the argument from illusion (in particular) and hallucination.

Notes:

- Responses that argue that direct realism claims that my perception is constituted by the physical processes should not be penalised for exercising scholarship.
- Responses that argue that the direct realist claim of directness and immediacy is, however, not a claim of temporal directness or immediacy, but of epistemological directness and immediacy should not be penalised for exercising scholarship.
- Some students may include the second prong of the argument from perceptual variation which points out that (1) perceptually variant perceptions and perceptions which are not perceptually variant are phenomenally indistinguishable, (2) the phenomenal indistinguishability is best explained in terms of perceptions of the same kind of object, (3) since we have concluded in the first prong of the argument that perceptually variant perceptions are not perceptions of physical objects it follows that non-perceptually variant perceptions are not perceptions of physical objects either.
- Students who leave the second prong out should not be penalised and can still access the top band since it is unclear whether there are any non-perceptually variant perceptions.
- Students can specify what the direct realist takes to be the direct objects of perception in a number of ways, eg 'physical,' 'mind-independent', 'external'.

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 4 Outline innatism **and** explain how Plato’s ‘slave boy’ argument supports it.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	<p>The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
4–6	<p>The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
1–3	<p>Some relevant points are made, but no integration.</p> <p>There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Plato’s innatism:

- Innatism is the position that we are born with some innate concepts/propositional knowledge which is therefore not given to us or justified by empirical experience.
- Propositional knowledge is based on concepts, so having innate propositional knowledge entails having innate concepts (but not vice versa).
- Innatism can be related to ‘rationalism’, the position that we have some synthetic a priori knowledge (however, students should take care not to identify synthetic a priori knowledge with innate knowledge as synthetic a priori knowledge need not be innate).
- Students may refer to innatism as presented in Plato’s *Meno*:
 - Plato argues that we have innate knowledge (*episteme*). He is therefore also committed to innate concepts.
 - Some students may refer to Plato’s ‘theory of forms’. However, since ‘the theory of forms’ is only developed in dialogues which are subsequent to the *Meno* in which the slave boy argument is found, students should be able to gain full marks if they do not make reference to ‘the theory of forms’, and students should be careful not to answer the question wholly in terms of ‘the theory of forms’ without referencing ‘innatism’ and the specific conclusion of ‘the slave boy’ argument as it is given in the *Meno*.
 - In the *Meno*, innatism is the position that ‘all learning is recollection’ (*anamnesis*). The soul already possesses all knowledge but it forgets it at the time of birth. Prompted by relevant stimuli (eg by being asked successive questions) the soul recollects (remembers) the knowledge again.

Plato's innatism commits him to the claim that we possess 'tacit' or 'subconscious' knowledge which is in our mind from birth.

The 'slave boy' argument:

- The 'slave boy' argument is developed as a reply to Meno's paradox that learning is impossible, and students may – but need not – outline Meno's paradox and explain how the 'slave boy' argument provides an answer to it (by denying that it is impossible to learn that which you already know since you may recollect it).
- The slave boy, who hasn't been taught geometry, is asked to double the area of a 2x2 square – students may go through the example in detail and explain how the slave boy begins by doubling the lengths of the lines and draws a 4x4 square. He subsequently draws a 3x3 square, before reaching the aporetic stage of the example. Finally, the slave boy agrees that to double the area of a square you need to draw a new square which is based on the length of the diagonal of the original square.
- Meno and Socrates agrees that Socrates has only asked the slave boy questions, that the slave boy has been prompted by those questions to recollect the right answer, that the right answer – and thereby the relevant knowledge – was already within the slave boy, and that the slave boy therefore possess innate knowledge (tacitly or subconsciously).
- It is agreed that 'all learning is recollection'.

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

0 5

Is there a convincing response to philosophical scepticism?

[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13–15	<p>The student argues with clear and sustained intent.</p> <p>A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct, and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully.</p> <p>The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used consistently and correctly throughout.</p>
10–12	<p>The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained.</p> <p>A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>There is recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
7–9	<p>There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question.</p> <p>An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always correctly.</p>
4–6	<p>There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question.</p> <p>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided.</p> <p>There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings.</p> <p>Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.</p> <p>There is some limited use of philosophical language.</p>
1–3	<p>Simple mention of points, no clear argument.</p>

	Philosophical terms might be mentioned.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Conclusions may include:

- Yes, there is a convincing response to philosophical scepticism.
- No, there is no convincing response to philosophical scepticism.

Students could also draw a distinction between global and local philosophical scepticism and argue:

- No, there is neither a convincing response to global philosophical scepticism nor to particular examples of local scepticism.
- Yes, there is a convincing response to global philosophical scepticism but, no, there isn't a convincing response to particular examples of local scepticism.
- Yes, there is both a convincing response to global scepticism and to particular examples of local scepticism.

Students may want to define philosophical scepticism, eg the claim that our usual methods of justification for claiming that our beliefs amount to knowledge – eg perception or inductive reason – are, contrary to what we normally assume, inadequate.

Students may want to distinguish philosophical scepticism from normal incredulity.

Students may want to distinguish global and local scepticism. Global scepticism can be understood either (narrowly) as external-world scepticism or as (more broadly) scepticism in the academic tradition of inviting a suspension of knowledge claims regardless of subject-matter including knowledge of one's states of mind and a priori claims.

Philosophical scepticism:

There are numerous sceptical scenarios to be found in the anthology texts which students can outline to argue in favour of philosophical scepticism eg:

- Descartes' three waves of doubt as outlined in the *Meditations*.
- The problems of the existence and nature of the physical objects which indirect realism in general presents us with (including Berkeley's challenge to the primary/secondary quality distinction).
- Russell's arguments in *The Problems of Philosophy* that the existence and nature of physical objects must be inferred.

Students may also draw on material from outside of the syllabus and the anthology text eg:

- Ancient Greek Scepticism (including Pyrrhonism)
- The brain in a vat scenario and similar 'Matrix' type scenarios
- The problem of causation (Hume)
- The problem of induction (Hume)
- New riddles of induction (Nelson Goodman).

Typical examples of philosophical scepticism will include:

- Having any knowledge whatsoever (the evil demon scenario)
- Knowledge of the existence of the external world
- Problems of other minds
- Moral knowledge
- Knowledge of the existence of God
- Knowledge of 'the self'
- Knowledge of the future
- Knowledge of causal relations.

Yes, there is a convincing response because:

- Descartes' successfully overcomes his three waves of doubt by applying intuition and deduction to prove, via proofs of God's existence, the capacity of his mind to have knowledge (in particular knowledge of the external world but also a priori knowledge).
- Locke successfully argues to the existence of the external world from the fact that our experiences are involuntary and can be verified by more than one sense-experience (eg touch and sight).
- Berkeley's idealist response, albeit anti-realist, adequately overcomes scepticism; we can infer God as an ontological and epistemological guarantor.
- Although he doesn't give a deductive proof, Russell successfully infers the existence and nature of physical objects as the best explanation for the coherence and consistency of our sense-data.
- Reliabilist responses to scepticism (eg Alvin Goldman's argument that whilst the sceptic is right to point out that we cannot give 'the verification conditions' for knowledge, we can nevertheless give the 'truth conditions' for knowledge, which shows that knowledge is possible although we might not know that we possess it).
- The problem of induction is not a genuine problem outside of the philosopher's study and can therefore be mitigated (Hume).
- Reason relies on induction wherefore we cannot reasonably undermine it so the problem of induction isn't a genuine problem at all (A.J. Ayer).
- Transcendental idealism as a partial response to scepticism: Kant shows that although we cannot have any knowledge about the noumenal world we can nevertheless have synthetic a priori knowledge about objects in the phenomenal world (eg that they are causally connected).
- Gilbert Ryle's responses to both global and local Cartesian scepticism.
- Moorean responses to scepticism are successful (various interpretations of Moore's response to scepticism are available).
- Wittgensteinian responses are successful in arguing that scepticism is somehow incoherent or self-defeating (eg via his 'private language' argument).
- Post-Kantian transcendental responses to scepticism (eg P. F. Strawson).
- Post-Wittgensteinian contextualist responses to scepticism (eg Michael Williams's arguments in *Groundless Beliefs* and *Unnatural Doubts*).

No, there is no convincing response because:

- Descartes' doesn't successfully overcome his own methodological scepticism (eg because of the Cartesian circle and/or because Descartes fails to prove the existence of God).
- Locke's arguments are not successful (eg because they beg the question against sceptical scenarios).
- Berkeley's idealism is not satisfactory (eg because it is a kind of scepticism and therefore doesn't overcome it, eg because the role God plays in Berkeley's system is problematic).
- Russell's inference is not the best explanation.
- Reliabilism fails to refute scepticism since we cannot draw a rigid distinction between 'truth-conditions' and 'verification-conditions' of knowledge (eg Bonjour's general criticism of why any externalist, reliabilist account fails).
- Kant's transcendental idealism is not satisfactory (eg because it is a kind of scepticism and therefore doesn't overcome it).
- Hume and Ayer fail to overcome the problem of induction.
- Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' is not successful.
- Contextualist responses are not satisfactory as they in fact concede scepticism rather than give a response to it.

Any combination of the points above.

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Section B – Moral philosophy**0 6** What is preference utilitarianism?**[2 marks]**

AO1 = 2

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
2 AO1	2	A clear and correct answer, with no significant redundancy.
	1	A partial answer, possibly in the form of fragmented points. Imprecise and/or significant redundancy.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Preference utilitarianism argues that the morally right/good action is the action which as a consequence fulfils the greatest amount of interests of the greatest amount of people/morally relevant beings.
- Preference utilitarianism argues that our actions should have as a consequence the greatest amount of preference satisfaction for the greatest amount of people/morally relevant beings.
- Preference utilitarianism argues that actions are morally right/good to the extent that they fulfil the interests of people/morally relevant beings.

Notes:

- It shouldn't matter whether the student phrases the position in terms of 'preferences', 'wants', 'desires' or 'interests' etc.
- It shouldn't matter whether the student phrases the position in terms of 'satisfaction' or fulfilment' etc.
- It shouldn't matter whether the student suggests that 'people' or 'morally relevant beings' (eg the preferences of animals are morally salient according to some, but not all, preference utilitarians) are the subject of our preference calculation.
- It must be clear from the response, however, that the student doesn't conflate preference utilitarianism with any other type of utilitarianism (including hedonistic utilitarianism as formulated by Bentham).

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 7 Outline Aristotle's function argument.

[5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students might contextualise the argument as Aristotle's attempt to set out what eudaimonia (ie living well) might be for humans.
- Students may first explain his view of function in general (with reference to the function of knives for example) or may go straight to applying it to humans.

The function argument applied to human beings:

- The function (or *ergon*) of something is its characteristic form of activity (that sets it apart from other things).
- Being alive or perception cannot be the function because these are shared with other animals.
- Being guided by (practical) reason is distinctive of a human life (a contrast may be drawn between human life on the one hand, and animal or plant life on the other).
- Therefore, the function of a human is to be guided by (practical) reason.
- A human is a good human if s/he performs his/her function well.
- Therefore, a good human lives a life well guided by (practical) reason.
- Some students may make a link between function, virtue and eudaimonia.
- The function (or *ergon*) of something is its characteristic form of activity.
- In order for a human to fulfil his/her function s/he will need certain qualities – such a quality is called a virtue/excellence (*arete*).
- Therefore, a good human being ought to live according to the virtues' excellences (live virtuously/excellently).
- It is in this that eudaimonia (living well and doing well) consists: ie rational activity in accordance with virtue/excellence.

Notes

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 8Explain Bentham's utilitarianism **and** explain how it faces problems with calculation.**[9 marks]**

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	<p>The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
4–6	<p>The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
1–3	<p>Some relevant points are made, but no integration.</p> <p>There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content**Utilitarianism**

Students should outline Bentham's utilitarianism in general:

- Bentham is a hedonistic utilitarian
 - [Utilitarian] he argues that actions are morally right/good to the extent that they maximise utility.
 - [Hedonistic] by "utility" he means happiness which he understands as the balance of pleasure over pain (maximising pleasure, minimising pain). He claims that only pleasure is intrinsically/ultimately valuable: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." (*The Principles of Morals and Legislation*, chapter 1).
- Bentham is a quantitative utilitarian. For Bentham, it is the quantity of pleasure that matters. He does not (as Mill does) see there as being any morally important difference between types of pleasure. He does not make any qualitative distinctions between pleasure based on its type, its origin or indeed what the pleasure is being taken in.
- Utilitarians, as consequentialists, decide whether actions are morally right or wrong based on their effects/consequences.
- Bentham is ordinarily understood as an act utilitarian (eg the maximisation is decided on a case-by-case basis).
- Bentham's utilitarianism would impartially consider the effects of the decision on all those whom the theory identifies as 'morally salient creatures' (every man to count for one, nobody to count for more than one').

How it faces problems with calculation

There are a number of different problems students can discuss.

- Students are likely to focus on the practical problem of calculating ‘utility.’ It can be objected that it is practically impossible to calculate utility because even if ‘utility’ is specified as ‘pleasure and the absence of pain,’ the ‘felicity calculus’ needs to take into account the following variables:
 - We must look into the value of the initial pleasure or pain itself which is caused by the action by considering:
 - The intensity of the pleasure/pain
 - The duration of the pleasure/pain
 - The certainty that the pleasure/pain will occur
 - The propinquity of the pleasure: how soon it will occur.
 - We must then find out what the likely further/later effects of the action will be (after the initial pleasure/pain) by considering:
 - The fecundity of the action: how much it leads to the same kind of sensation
 - The purity of the action: how little it leads to the opposite kind of sensation.
 - Finally, we must then consider the extent: ie the number of people affected by the action.
- Even if we, in principle, could accurately account for the variables mentioned above, there is the additional problem of having the time/means to discover the values of the relevant values.
- ‘Utility’, however defined, is immensurable.
- The commensurability issue: there isn’t a single scale to use as a measurement (eg Bentham ignores the distinction between higher and lower pleasure).
- There is at least one problem of partiality: Utilitarianism aims to be impartial. However, it is a psychological fact that we have unconscious biases. This suggests that it is impossible to make the calculations impartial.
- If the utilitarian calculation is also to take into account other creatures than human beings, eg. animals, not only will the utilitarian be faced with the epistemological problem of accurately assessing the utility (pleasure) of those creatures but he will also be biased towards anthropocentric calculations.
- The utilitarian is faced with the problem of knowing when to stop considering the consequences (eg how much of the future does my calculation need to apply to).
- Problems of calculating actual vs. expected utility.
- The problem of what takes priority: maximising the absence of suffering (minimising pain) or maximising pleasure?
- The problem of knowing your own mind and/or the minds of others (including whether they have a mind at all).

Notes

- Students need to be careful to answer the question of the problems with calculations in a focused manner and avoid answering the slightly different question of whether a calculation is moral (eg by arguing that the utilitarian’s calculations lead to the tyranny of the majority, or by arguing that the question of what pleasures/preferences are moral is prior to the question of calculation).

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

0 9 Outline moral anti-realism **and** explain the issue that it cannot account for moral progress.

[9 marks]

AO1 = 9

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
7–9	<p>The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely.</p> <p>There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
4–6	<p>The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified.</p> <p>The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.</p>
1–3	<p>Some relevant points are made, but no integration.</p> <p>There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant.</p> <p>There may be some attempt at using philosophical language.</p>
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Anti-realism

Within the context of metaethics, anti-realism is the metaphysical position that mind-independent moral properties or facts do not exist. There are neither any natural moral properties or facts nor any non-natural properties or facts in the universe.

Students may relate anti-realism to:

- (a) anti-realist non-cognitivist positions (eg Ayer’s emotivism and/or Hare’s prescriptivism)
- (b) anti-realist cognitivist positions (eg Mackie’s error theory)
- (c) positions which they have studied beyond the specification (eg Joyce’s fictionalism or Gibbard’s norm-expressivism)
- (d) consider two or more positions.

Students may briefly explain the rationale for anti-realism (eg by referring to Ayer’s verification principle, the is-ought gap, Mackie’s arguments from queerness and relativity etc).

The problem of accounting for moral progress

- Relying on a correspondence theory of truth, students may explain moral progress in terms of discovering more and more of mind-independent moral properties/facts just as scientific progress is understood as discovering more and more mind-independent natural facts.
 - Students may then point out that progress defined in such terms will be impossible if there are no mind-independent properties facts.
- Relying on a coherentist theory of truth, students may explain moral progress in terms of more and more inclusive and internally consistent set of moral propositions/claims.
 - Non-cognitivist anti-realism, which denies that moral claims are truth-evaluable, will not be able to talk about consistency (eg the Frege-Geach problem).
- Students need not be clear on the distinction between correspondence and coherence.

- It is likely that students will illustrate the problem through the use of examples such as the abolition of slavery, equality legislation in areas such as gender, sexuality, etc. Relevant examples should be credited where these clearly demonstrate an understanding of how these are commonly taken to be examples of moral progress, and where students are able to explain the philosophical/logical presumptions or necessary conditions for this to count as moral progress.

Note

- Students should be careful not to conflate ‘anti-realism’ and ‘non-cognitivism’ in their response.

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.

1 0 How convincing is Kant's view on telling lies?

[15 marks]

AO1 = 7, AO2 = 8

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
13-15	<p>The student argues with clear and sustained intent.</p> <p>A complete and coherent argument leads to a clear conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and sufficient material is selected and deployed to answer the question fully.</p> <p>The conclusion is arrived at through a balancing of arguments, with appropriate weight given to each argument and to the argument overall. Where there are crucial arguments, these are distinguished from less crucial ones.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes – both relating to the content and to the logic – but they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used consistently and correctly throughout.</p>
10-12	<p>The student argues with intent, though this is not necessarily sustained.</p> <p>A complete and coherent argument leads to a conclusion. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>There is recognition of arguments and counter-arguments, but balance is not always present and the weight to be given to each argument is not always fully clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
7-9	<p>There is some evidence that the student is trying to answer the question.</p> <p>An argument to a conclusion is set out, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there may be some gaps and lack of detail.</p> <p>Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned, but not integrated in a coherent way. Alternative positions may be identified and juxtaposed, but not necessarily precisely and their relative weightings may not be clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always correctly.</p>
4-6	<p>There is limited evidence that the student is trying to answer the question.</p> <p>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There may be much that is missing, or the essay may be one-sided.</p> <p>There might be substantial gaps in the content, or evidence of serious misunderstandings.</p> <p>Several reasonable points are made and there are some attempts to make inferences.</p> <p>There is some limited use of philosophical language.</p>

1-3	Simple mention of points, no clear argument. Philosophical terms might be mentioned.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Students may argue either:

- Kant's view on telling lies is (entirely or somewhat) convincing
- Kant's view on telling lies is not (entirely) convincing (at all).

Students may contrast and compare how convincing Kant's view on telling lies is to other normative theories (eg utilitarianism or virtue ethics) but should focus on Kant's view to address the question directly.

Kant's deontology:

- Students may begin by outlining and explaining Kant's ethical theory.
- Kant argues that we have duties to do (or not do) certain things which are right (or wrong) in themselves.
- Kant argues that our moral duties are discoverable by reason and that only those who possess adequate rational capacities have such duties.
- Only the good will is good without qualification and to have a good will is to do your duty because it is your duty (other motivations are irrelevant).
- Moral duties are categorical and not hypothetical, because they are your duty regardless of what you want and are not a means to a further end.
- Kant's view may be distinguished from other moral theories: he does not base morality on consequences (unlike utilitarianism) and does not base morality on dispositions/character/nature (unlike virtue ethics).

Kant's view on telling lies:

- Kant argues that we have a categorical/absolute/perfect duty not to lie. If, for example, there is an axe-murderer at the door, given that you can never lie, you cannot even lie in order to save lives or protect the innocent.
- Only the good will is good without qualification, and to have a good will is to do your duty because it is your duty (other motivations are morally irrelevant). Therefore, one ought to tell the truth out of duty alone rather than for some other reason.
- Kant argues that our moral duties are discoverable by reason and so that only those who possess adequate rational capacities have a duty not to lie.
- Kant's view on lying in terms of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Formula of Universal Law): "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [or "universal law of nature"] (*Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*):
 - Acting on a maxim which does not pass this test is morally wrong. A maxim fails the test of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative if it cannot be consistently universalised, so it would be impossible for everyone to act on it. This may be referred to as a 'contradiction in conception'.
 - In the case of lying to get what you want, Kant would argue that your maxim would be 'I can tell a lie, if it gets me what I want.' If, however, you universalised this, then you would have to say, 'All rational agents must, by a universal law of nature, lie when it gets them what they want.' Lying presupposes people taking you at your word, but, in this world, the practice of giving your word doesn't exist. So my maxim cannot exist with itself as a universal law.
 - Thus, we have a (perfect) duty not to lie.

Kant’s view on telling lies is not convincing because:

- Consequences of actions determine their moral status and Kant’s theory of lying is open to some obvious counter examples which underlines this point (eg lying to the murderer at the door or telling a white lie to make someone happy).
- Kant ignores the value of certain motives, eg love, friendship, kindness. These are to be valued more than ‘not lying’ (eg you may lie to the murderous person at the door out of love to the person you are protecting or kindness to the person at the door whom you want to prevent from committing murder out of blind rage or misinformation).
- Kant’s account fails because only emotions/desires can motivate actions (eg Hume: ‘reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions...’).
- Kant’s system suffers from there being clashing/competing duties (eg ‘not lying’ versus ‘save lives’).
- Kant’s view means that we have the same duties not to lie to those who have done (or would do) wrong as we do to those that act morally. This seems at odds with morality.
- Kant’s argument is flawed in so far as not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral and not all non-universalisable maxims are immoral. The principle on which Kant prohibits lying is therefore wrong.

Kant’s view on telling lies is convincing because:

- Kant’s arguments are convincing (see arguments outlined above).
- Kant can give satisfactory responses to the objections levelled against him (see notes below).
- Kant’s view is more satisfactory than any alternative accounts (eg alternative accounts are merely based on ‘prudence’ and hypothetical imperatives, and the nature of morality is such that it cannot be based on those).

Notes

- It is most unlikely that students will try to interpret Kant as permitting lying. There is, however, justification in some of Kant’s other writings for exploring such an interpretation. One method is to argue that, in extreme cases, it is possible that the maxim one acts on in the telling of a lie could be universalised without contradiction (in the case of the ‘murderer at the door’, this usually involves the assumption that the murderer is ignorant of the fact that the person they are questioning knows his/her evil intentions, and so they are also engaged in an act of deception which the ‘victim’ has the right to resist).
- Kant does not consider it virtuous to acquiesce to being used as an instrument to some malicious goal, indicating that it may be legitimate to protect one’s self against someone who is using you as a means to their (wicked) ends by telling a lie. Here is one relevant passage from Kant’s *Lectures on Ethics*:
 - “[I]f we were to beat all times punctiliously truthful we might often become victims of the wickedness of others who were ready to abuse our truthfulness. If all men were well-intentioned it would not only be a duty not to lie, but no one would do so because there would be no point in it. But as men are malicious, it cannot be denied that to be punctiliously truthful is often dangerous...”.

This indicative content is not exhaustive; other creditworthy responses should be rewarded with reference to the generic mark scheme.