

Question 1

Paper A:

AO1 = 3

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|--|
| 3 | A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy. |
| 2 | The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision. |
| 1 | Relevant, but fragmented, points. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

Indicative content

- A priori knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that can be acquired independently of experience (ie without needing any experience).
- or
- A priori knowledge is (propositional) knowledge that is justifiable independently of experience (ie justified without needing any experience).
- or
- A prior knowledge is knowledge acquired / justifiable through reason *alone*. Students must include *alone* to get full marks

Paper B:

AO1 = 3

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|--|
| 3 | A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy. |
| 2 | The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision. |
| 1 | Relevant, but fragmented, points. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

Indicative content

- A true proposition for which it is logically possible that it be false.
- A true proposition that could possibly be false (it is not necessarily true)
- A true proposition that may not be true in all possible worlds

Question 2

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|---|
| 5 | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy. |
| 4 | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy. |
| 3 | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2 | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear. |
| 1 | Fragmented points, with no logical structure. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

Paper A:

Indicative content

- The relevant line in the specification is: "replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (ie reliabilism)". (However, some [namely, reliabilists about justification] see this as more an analysis of what is meant by justification. For them, justification is best understood in terms of reliability of process. It is fine for students to discuss reliabilism in this sense [or even to explain both senses] as the question does not specify.)
- Students are likely to explain the general view in the following way (or similar)
 - S knows that p iff (if and only if)
 - (1) p is true;
 - (2) S believes that p ;
 - (3) S's belief that p was produced by a reliable cognitive process.
- This may be explained as being the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and these terms might be explained. Knowledge is true belief produced by a reliable method.
- The reliability of a cognitive process will most likely be explained in terms of its tendency to cause true beliefs. Examples of reliable cognitive processes given by philosophers have included: memory, perception, testimony, introspection.
- Some students may mention implications, eg:
 - This is often seen as an "externalist" view whereby information about the process itself and its reliability need not be accessible to the agent in order for the agent to have knowledge.
 - This may mean that nonhuman animals might be capable of knowledge (presuming that they are capable of having beliefs).
- Some students may give examples of specific reliabilist accounts, e.g. Goldman's causal account, Nozick's truth-tracking account, etc.

Note: This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Paper B:

Indicative content

- The relevant line in the specification is: "replace justified with an account of epistemic virtue (V+T+B)"
- Students are likely to explain the general view in the following way (or similar):
 - S knows that p iff (if and only if)
 - [p is true]
 - S believes that p
 - S's belief that p was produced by an act of epistemic virtue
- This may be explained as being the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and these terms may be explained: Knowledge is a [true] belief produced by an act of epistemic virtue.
- Epistemic virtue may be explained as an attempt to demonstrate that knowledge is good in a way that falsehoods or true belief gained by luck isn't.
 - They may refer to Zagzebski who states that an act of epistemic virtue must contain two components: motivation (the person involved must care about knowing the truth) and success (the person/process must be reliable in forming truth beliefs).
 - They may refer to Sosa who states that an act of epistemic virtue should be accurate (true), adroit (skilfully formed) and apt (accurate because it is adroit)
- This content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate

Question 3

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|---|
| 5 | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy. |
| 4 | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy. |
| 3 | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking, but the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2 | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear. |
| 1 | Fragmented points, with no logical structure. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

Indicative content

- Primary qualities:
 - are those that are intrinsic to the object, existing independently of how we perceive them.
 - Include solidity, extension, motion, number and figure/shape
 - Are perceived indirectly
- Secondary qualities:
 - Are those that (only) exist in the object as 'powers' to produce particular experiences in us.
 - Include colour, taste, smell and sound
 - Are perceived directly
 - Secondary qualities represent (but do not resemble) primary qualities
- There is no requirement for students to critique Locke's example here
- This content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate

Question 4

Paper A:

AO1 = 12

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|--|
| 10–12 | The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 7–9 | The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 4–6 | The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response. |
| 1–3 | There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

Indicative content

Direct realism: Direct realism is a theory of perception that makes two key claims: (a) an external world of mind-independent objects and properties exists and (b) we perceive it directly. E.g.:

- The immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties (spec)
- We directly perceive mind-independent physical objects in the external world
- There are no 'intermediaries' (e.g. sense-data) which we directly perceive or are directly aware of and in virtue of which we perceive a mind independent world indirectly.
- Accept comparisons with other theories of perception (e.g. idealism and indirect realism) as long as they serve the question.

The time-lag argument:

- Students may present the time-lag argument in relation to any of our senses. The most common forms of the argument focus on sight and hearing.
 - P1 It takes time for light to reach our eyes from the object we are perceiving (eg it takes 8 minutes for the light from the sun to reach us and 1.3 seconds for the light from the moon to reach us).
 - P2 During that time the object (a) may have changed or (b) ceased to exist.
 - C1 Therefore, the object of my immediate experience is distinct from the aforementioned object because (a) it may have different properties or (b) because you can't perceive something that doesn't exist.
 - C3 Therefore, the immediate object of our visual experience is not identical to the object being seen (the "ordinary object of perception").
 - C4 Therefore, direct realism is false.

Note:

- Answers that give detailed accounts of direct realism without reference to the time lag argument can be given a maximum 4 marks.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Question 4

Paper B:

AO1 = 12

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|--|
| 10–12 | The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout. |
| 7–9 | The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 4–6 | The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response. |
| 1–3 | There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately. |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

Indicative content

Direct realism: Direct realism is a theory of perception that makes two key claims: (a) an external world of mind-independent objects and properties exists and (b) we perceive it directly. E.g.:

- The immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties (spec)
 - We directly perceive mind-independent physical objects in the external world
 - There are no 'intermediaries' (e.g. sense-data) which we directly perceive or are directly aware of and in virtue of which we perceive a mind independent world indirectly.
 - Accept comparisons with other theories of perception (e.g. idealism and indirect realism) as long as they serve the question.
-
- An illusion is a distortion of the senses, when what you perceive is different from how an existing object actually is.
 - Direct realism claims that we perceive mind-independent objects directly.
 - Illusions challenge the direct realist claim that we perceive mind-independent objects directly, because they show that things are not always as they seem.
 - Students do not have to specify the version of direct realism they are applying the argument to (although some of the best answers may do this). If students only appear to be critiquing naive realism, they should not be penalised for this.

A step-by-step version of the argument (though there are other reasonable ways of phrasing this argument):

- P1: During illusions, it appears to you that something is F.
 - [P2: If it appears to you that something is F, then you must immediately perceive something which is F (the 'phenomenal principle').]
 - C1: Therefore, you immediately perceive something that is F.
 - P3: There is no suitable mind-independent object that is F.
 - C2: Therefore, during illusions, the thing which you immediately perceive (which is F) is not a mind-independent object.
 - C3: Therefore, during illusions, the thing which you immediately perceive (which is F) is a mind-dependent object.
- Students may continue the argument in the following way, although this is not required for full credit:
- P4: Illusions can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical experiences.
 - [P5: Subjectively indistinguishable experiences must involve immediate perception of exactly the same kind of object.]
 - C4: Therefore, the thing which you immediately perceive is a mind-dependent object even in veridical cases.
 - C5: Therefore, DR (the claim that we perceive mind-independent objects directly) is false.

Notes:

- No example necessary, but the argument might be put in terms of sticks-in-water or visual illusions, like the Müller-Lyer.
- Please note that many philosophers describe perceptual variation as a form of illusion (eg Ayer discusses different perspectives on a coin in his discussion of illusions), so accept examples of perceptual variation as well.
- Square-bracketed parts are not at all necessary but are elements of detail.
- Students may claim that this argument supports the existence of sense data (Russell).
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.

Question 5

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme |
|-------|---|
| 21-25 | <p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p> |
| 16-20 | <p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p> |
| 11-15 | <p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p> |
| 6-10 | <p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p> |
| 1-5 | <p>There is little evidence of an argument.</p> <p>There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.</p> <p>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.</p> <p>There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p> |
| 0 | Nothing written worthy of credit. |

Question 5

Indicative content

- Conclusions may include:
 - YES: knowledge is justified true belief (JTB).
 - YES...but: knowledge is JTB with minor modifications of what is understood by one or more of the three conditions (for example, by arguing that the justification condition needs to be strengthened, e.g. infallibilism).
 - NO: knowledge is not JTB because the conditions need to be added to or replaced.
 - NO: knowledge is not JTB because one or more of the conditions are not necessary.
 - NO: knowledge is not JTB because knowledge is unanalysable and explanatorily fundamental and basic (students may support this claim by arguing that there will always be a Gettier-type counter-example for every analysis of knowledge).
- This question relates to the definition of propositional knowledge (knowing 'that') – which may be distinguished from acquaintance knowledge (knowing 'of') and ability knowledge (knowing 'how').
- The subject of the question is the tripartite view (the 'traditional' view, the Platonic view, JTB theory) that S knows that p if and only if (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p. These conditions are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

The following issues relating to the JTB theory of knowledge may be discussed to support one of the positions above.

- Issue: the conditions are not individually necessary.
 - Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge (e.g. "I know but I don't know how/why I know").
 - Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge (through scepticism about truth).
 - Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge ("she knows that p but doesn't believe that p": e.g. a series of reliably good answers in a quiz that S would characterise as guesses).
- Issue: the conditions are not jointly sufficient.
 - Cases of lucky true beliefs show that the justification condition should be either strengthened, added to or replaced (i.e. Gettier-style counter-examples: inferential cases (e.g. Gettier's Smith/Jones interview or car/location examples) and/or non-inferential cases (e.g. the 'barn façade' example)).
 - Responses to this include:
 - strengthen the justification condition so that it implies truth: infallibilism and the requirement for an impossibility of doubt (Descartes).
 - Arguments for infallibilism, such as the possibility that they avoid Gettier-style problems and the (intuitive) link between knowledge and certainty/not being able to be wrong.
 - Arguments against infallibilism, such as the possibility that it goes too far and we could end up able to make almost no knowledge claims, leading to scepticism.
 - add a 'no false lemmas' condition (J+T+B+N) : adding a requirement to JTB that you do not infer your belief from anything false.
 - Arguments for JTB with no false lemmas, such as that it deals with Gettier's examples.
 - Arguments against JTB with no false lemmas, such as the possibility of constructing examples of JTB with no false lemmas which do not count as knowledge and the possibility of examples of knowledge where there are false lemmas.
 - replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (reliabilism) – may be linked to externalism.
 - Arguments for reliabilism, such as it being implausible to claim that we need justification for all knowledge claims, or that our knowledge claims do need to be based on absolute certainty; it allows children/animals/those incapable of reasoning to have some knowledge.
 - Arguments against reliabilism, such as the difficulty in formulating a clear notion of 'reliable', the problem of individuating methods, and the necessity of an internalist concept of justification.
 - Add a 'truth tracking' condition (Nozick) or a causal condition (Goldman).
 - replace 'justified' with an account of epistemic virtue (V+T+B).
 - Arguments for virtue epistemology, such as their success in dealing with Gettier's examples, because the beliefs there are true because of luck/coincidence, rather than intellectual virtue.
 - Arguments against virtue epistemology, such as the possibility of constructing cases of beliefs which are true because of intellectual virtue, but those not counting as knowledge.

Notes:

- As the focus of this question is primarily AO2, do not penalise students for misattributing arguments.
- This indicative content is not exhaustive: other creditworthy responses should be awarded marks as appropriate.