

1 (A): What is ethical naturalism? [3 Marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

Indicative for 3 marks

Ontological claim:

- The view that ethical properties [exist and] are reducible to natural/physical properties
- The view that ethical properties [exist and] are natural/physical properties

Epistemological claim:

- The view that ethical properties can be investigated/discovered empirically
- The view that ethical properties can be investigated/discovered using the (methods of the) natural sciences.

NB: For full marks students need to explain both the ontological claim and the epistemological claim, though they do not need to refer to them using that terminology.

Indicative for 2 marks

- Students can access Level 2 by explaining either the 'ontological claim' or the 'epistemological claim' clearly and correctly.

Indicative for 1 mark

- Students can access Level 1 by identifying 'ethical naturalism' (as a meta-ethical theory of moral language) with 'moral realism' and/or 'cognitivism'.
- Students can access Level 1 if they describe/illustrate a particular ethical naturalist theory (e.g. utilitarianism), without ever defining the general concept.

Notes:

- The parts of text in square-brackets are not required.
- Students may give brief examples of ethical/natural properties: right/wrong, good/bad, just/unjust, happy/unhappy, pleasurable/painful etc. This is not a requirement, but if it is correct it should not be interpreted as redundancy.

1 (B): What is moral realism? [3 Marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

NB: For full marks students must make reference to the idea that moral facts are mind-independent.

Examples of answers that should get 3 marks:

- The view that 'ethical language makes claims about mind-independent reality that are true' (AQA Specification).
- The view that moral judgements can be true (or false), and they are made true (or false) by something in the real world outside our (human) attitudes/opinions.
- The view that ethical language makes claims about mind-independent reality and that at least some of these moral claims are true.
- The view that there are mind-independent moral facts/properties.
- The theory that claims that moral judgements are made true or false by objective moral properties that are mind independent (in some sense).
- The view that moral judgements are truth-apt (cognitivism) and are in some cases true in virtue of mind-independent moral facts/properties.
- The view that moral claims can be true or false and that there are true moral claims in virtue of mind-independent moral facts/properties.
- The view that moral facts exist in virtue of mind-independent facts which may not be moral in and of themselves.

Examples of answers that should get 2 marks:

- The theory that there are objective moral facts / truths.
- The theory that moral facts / properties exist (narrowly understood in terms of the physical / natural world).
- The theory that moral facts / properties exist (narrowly understood in terms of a transcendent world, possibly with references to God).

Examples of answers that should get 1 mark:

- Moral realism is a (cognitive) theory of ethical language.
- Moral realism argues that there are moral facts / truths.

NB: Examples are not asked for or required, but clear and relevant ones should not be counted as redundancy.

2 (A and B): Explain Moore's open question argument [5 Marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Moore's "open question argument" (OQA) attempts to prove that moral properties cannot be reduced to any non-moral properties, that they are their own unique sort of properties.
- He describes them as being *sui generis*, which means "of its (his, her, or their) own kind; in a class by itself; unique".
- Moore uses the OQA to support his non-reductive non-naturalist position (intuitionism).
- He argues against any theory that attempts to reduce moral properties to non-moral ones (theories such as: utilitarianism; virtue ethics, Divine Command Theory).

Moore's distinction between an open question and a closed question:

- A closed question is a question whose answer is decided by the meanings of the concepts involved in the question whereas an open question is a question whose answer cannot be decided in this way.

Here is the "open question argument" set out in standard form (though students may present it differently).

- P1: For all concepts in the place of <X>: <It is X, but is it morally good?> is an open question
- P2: If so, then no other concept has the same meaning as the concept <morally good>. (This is a claim about what makes two concepts synonymous)
- P3: If so, then the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to any other property
- C: Therefore, the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to any other property.

This can be applied to specific theories (e.g. utilitarianism below) but Moore claims that it works regardless of which property we use in the underlined spot:

- P1: <It is pleasurable, but is it morally good?> is an open question
- P2: If so, then the concept <pleasurable> does not have the same meaning as the concept <morally good>
- P3: If so, then the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to pleasurableness
- C: Therefore, the property of moral goodness is neither identical to nor reducible to pleasurableness.

Some students might mention (w/o redundancy) that although Moore used this to support his non-reductive non-naturalist position (intuitionism), it arguably doesn't quite go as far as proving that:

- Firstly, it proves that IF moral properties exist, then they must be *sui generis*. This means that it doesn't prove that they do exist - for this reason; non-cognitivists and error theorists have used this argument to help to support their position.
- Furthermore, even if moral properties do exist, this argument doesn't prove that they must be non-natural - so a non-reductive naturalist might say that so long as moral properties are *sui generis* natural properties, this argument would not threaten them –
- Expect students to set up the OQA as an attack on naturalism – this is acceptable.

3 (A): Explain why emotivism is a non-cognitive theory of ethical language [5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Non-cognitivists about ethical language claim that:
 - Ethical statements do not (cannot) make, or at least do not (cannot) only make, descriptive claims about reality which are truth-apt (ie true or false / fact-stating).
 - When people are making ethical utterances they are not (or are not merely) expressing beliefs.
- (Note: Some students might explain that emotivists/non-cognitivists do not claim that there is never any descriptive content implied by moral utterances: eg 'It was wrong of Jim to hit his brother' implies that 'Jim hit his brother' is true; but the word 'wrong' adds no descriptive content to the utterance. Adding 'It was wrong' simply expresses moral disapproval, according to the emotivist.)
- Emotivists make both of these claims above and add the following:
 - Our moral judgements are (or at least involve) expressions of our emotions - so saying 'Murder is wrong' is like saying 'Murder..Boo!!'.
 - 'X is right' might be seen as the equivalent of cheering and 'X is wrong' as the equivalent of booing (informally, the 'boo-hurrah' theory). So 'Stealing is wrong' means 'Stealing, boo!'.
 - Ethical language expresses emotions or attitudes – 'pro-attitude' or 'con-attitudes'.
 - Moral statements are still meaningful but not (only) because they state facts – they instead have 'emotive meaning'.
- NB: Emotivists do not think that moral judgements give a report on our emotions. So according to an emotivist, 'Murder is wrong' does not mean 'I do not like murder'. Those who do think this would be cognitivists.

3 (B): Explain what Mackie's error theory claims about the status of ethical language [5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Error theory is
 - (1) a cognitivist theory:
 - ethical language is cognitively meaningful
 - ethical language makes claims about mind-independent reality
 - ethical language claims that there are mind-independent moral facts/properties
 - such ethical judgements/claims are truth-apt
 - (2) but also an anti-realist theory about morality:
 - these moral judgements/claims are false
 - there are no such mind-independent moral facts/properties
 - when we make such ethical judgements we are in error / mistaken.
- If students neglect to explain point (1) - so they may say that error theory is the claim that moral statements are false - this is not as serious an omission as neglecting to explain point (2). This is because moral statements can only be false if they are truth-apt.
- However, if they omit to explain point (2), this is more serious, as this would not distinguish error theory from moral realism.

NB: It is possible for a student to explain points (1) and (2) clearly without mention of the underlined terminology.

- To clarify (2) above: The moral judgements that error theorists claim are false are those moral judgements whose truth would presuppose the existence of moral properties (ie the judgements 'murder is wrong' and 'murder is right' are both false). However, some judgements about morality (namely, those that do not presuppose the existence of moral properties) are of course still true - eg the anti-realist claim 'There are no moral properties' is true according to error theorists.
- It is possible to respond by explaining how error theory contrasts with alternative positions (e.g. moral realism).
- Some students may attribute this view to Mackie and some may also explain one or more of his argument/s in support of this view (the argument from relativity and the metaphysical and/or epistemological arguments from queerness)..

4 (A): Outline moral realism and explain why Mackie’s argument from relativity challenges this view [12 marks]

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Context

- Students may contextualize their response by noting that this is an ‘inductive argument’: it is an argument for the implausibility (or improbability) of moral realism rather than its impossibility.
- Some students will frame the argument in stronger terms: e.g. as showing that moral realism ‘could not possibly be true’. This is incorrect, but if it is an occasional rhetorical overstatement rather than a persistent misunderstanding, it should not stop a student accessing the top band of marks (10-12).
- For Mackie this argument opposes moral realism and supports moral anti-realism. Students may place these philosophical aims within the context of Mackie’s ‘error theory’ (but this is not necessary).
- The responses are likely to be tackled in two parts by students:
“Outline moral realism...”:
 Students might outline it in one of the following ways:
 - The view that moral judgements can be true (or false) and they are made true (or false) by something in the real world outside our (human) attitudes/opinions (e.g. ‘by objective moral properties’).
 - The view that ethical language makes claims about mind-independent moral reality and at least some of these claims are true.
 - The view that there are mind-independent moral facts/properties/values.
 - The view that moral judgements are truth-apt (cognitivism) and are in some cases true in virtue of mind-independent moral facts/properties/values.
 - The view that moral facts exist in virtue of mind-independent facts which may not be moral in and of themselves (but are reducible to those mind-independent facts).
 NB:
 - A precise outline of ‘moral realism’ should not simply include the ‘cognitive’ component but the ‘realist’ component: there exists a mind independent moral reality (which makes some moral judgements true).“... explain why Mackie’s argument from relativity challenges this view”
 - The argument from relativity (sometimes called the argument from disagreement) sees moral disagreement as constituting evidence against the moral realist hypothesis (and so as supporting the moral anti-realist hypothesis).
 - It is, therefore, an inductive/abductive argument – an argument to the best explanation.

- Students may set out the argument in standard form, and here is an example of how this could be done:
 - P1: It's an empirical fact that there is an enormous amount of intractable variation / opposition in moral views (across history and across geography)
 - P2: There seem to be two ways of explaining this (two hypotheses):
 - Option A (the moral anti-realist hypothesis): This variation merely “reflect[s] adherence to and participation in different ways of life” (Mackie) and there are no mind-independent moral facts/properties.
 - Option B (the moral realist hypothesis): This variation occurs because there is a realm of mind-independent moral facts to which some communities/cultures/eras have inferior epistemic access than others.
 - P3: Option A is better/simpler/more likely (partly because any attempt to give an account of Option B is not going to be easy/plausible).
 - C: Therefore, it is unlikely that there are any mind-independent moral facts / properties and so it is unlikely that moral realism is true.

4 (B): Explain the similarities and differences between what emotivists and prescriptivists say about ethical language [12 marks]

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Similarities

- Students may frame these positions as meta-ethical theories of moral language. Both can be seen as consequences of (or responses to) the challenge of logical positivism and the verification principle: the attempt to determine the meaning of claims by virtue of their capacity for demonstrable truth (analytic or empirical).
- Both are (in some sense) non-cognitivist about ethical language.
 - Ethical statements do not make, or at least do not only make, descriptive claims about reality which are true or false (fact-stating). They express an internal/subjective feeling, attitude, sympathy, commitment.
 - But when people are making ethical utterances they are not (or are not merely) expressing states of mind which are beliefs, and both views (arguably) imply a strong connection between moral views and moral actions.
 - Both typically agree that moral statements are still meaningful (but not because they state facts).
- From the above, both are (in some sense) anti-realistic about ethical language: neither hold that there are mind independent moral properties or facts about which (potentially) true claims are made.
- For at least some proponents of both views the primary purpose of moral language is to influence others in some way (Stevenson for emotivism and Hare for prescriptivism).

Differences

Emotivism	Prescriptivism
Ethical language expresses emotions or attitudes – ‘pro-attitudes’ or ‘con-attitudes’.	Ethical language makes recommendations / prescriptions about actions.
Ethical utterances are expressions of emotion: ‘X is right’ is the equivalent of cheering and ‘X is wrong’ is the equivalent of booing (the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory). So ‘Stealing is wrong’ means ‘Stealing, boo!’.	Ethical utterances are imperatives prescribing how everyone should behave: Once a standard has been chosen by someone it must be applied universally to all relevantly similar agents/contexts/actions.

<p>Ayer claims, 'You were wrong to steal that money' does not state/imply anything more than 'You stole that money' in terms of its descriptive content since 'you were wrong' simply expresses moral disapproval. (Stevenson: in addition they aim to influence the feelings of others.)</p>	<p>'X is right' means 'Do X'. So 'Stealing is wrong' means 'Do not steal'.</p>
<p>It is not possible to speak of rational consistency in relation to ethical statements and argument (there is no 'logic of norms'), so ethical statements cannot therefore play a role as premises in arguments.</p>	<p>It is possible to speak of rational consistency in relation to ethical statements and argument (there is 'a logic of norms'), so ethical statements can still play a role as premises in arguments.</p>

5 (A and B): How convincing is Aristotelian Virtue Ethics? [25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>
16–20	<p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>
11–15	<p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p>
6–10	<p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>
1–5	<p>There is little evidence of an argument.</p> <p>There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.</p> <p>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.</p> <p>There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>
0	<p>Nothing written worthy of credit.</p>

Indicative content:

Aristotle's ethical view, in general, is based around the development of good moral character: it is agent centred rather than act centred.

When explaining Aristotle's views students are likely to make reference to one or more of the following:

- 'The good' for human beings: the meaning of eudaimonia (living well and doing well) as the 'final end' for human beings (and the relationship between eudaimonia and pleasure).
- The function argument (with rationality understood as the distinctive characteristic of human beings (or rational activity as the characteristic activity - "a life of reason in accordance with virtue.")) and the relationship between virtue/excellence and function/ergon.
- Aristotle's account of virtues and vices:
 - virtues as character traits/dispositions and the importance of feelings (virtue may perhaps be distinguished from mere continence)
 - the role of education/habituation in the development of moral character (perhaps including reference to the state and to family/role-models)
 - the skill analogy
 - doctrine of the mean and its application to particular virtues
 - the relationship between virtues, actions and reasons and the role of practical reasoning/practical wisdom
 - Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary actions.

It is likely that students will focus primarily on Aristotle, but the word "Aristotelian" in the question allows for the whole essay to be focused on those writing in the virtue ethics tradition. If the student does this, there is no problem with this.

It is possible that students may decide to focus quite specifically and in detail on certain of these features of Aristotle's theory, perhaps because their preferred lines of argument relate specifically to them (eg that in emphasising the importance of education/habituation Aristotle leaves too much to chance in the development of good character).

Some students may mention that Aristotelian virtue ethics can be situated in metaethical discussions as an example of moral realism and ethical naturalism: the truths of ethics are derived from (or reducible/identical to) facts about human nature that are discoverable through observation. They may do this in order to then evaluate this approach by applying arguments for or against moral realism and/or ethical naturalism.

The overarching positions adopted could be among the following:

- YES: it is (very) convincing---ie the student may support and/or defend an Aristotelian account.
- NO: it is not (very) convincing---ie the student may argue that it cannot be adequately supported and/or that there are (fatal) issues with the account.
- YES and NO: it is convincing in some respects but not in others---this may end up still meaning it is rejected, or alternatively it may be accepted but with some qualification.
- YES and NO: it is convincing but incomplete in some way.

Arguments will likely draw from the bullet-pointed lists underneath (though this is not exhaustive):

Support for Aristotelian virtue ethics:

- Eudaimonia (whether understood as 'happiness' or 'living well' or 'doing well') is a common (if not universal) aspiration of humankind and therefore an appropriate goal for the moral life.
- Anscombe supports an Aristotelian approach by noting that rigid laws/rules (as in Kantian deontological ethics) do not make sense in the absence of a law/rule-giver (eg God). Moral philosophers should therefore focus on the well-being/flourishing of a human life with all its dimensions working in harmony (holism).
- In the light of all that we know about the human species (eg through evolutionary biology and anthropology) human beings are still best understood in Aristotelian terms: eg as 'rational animals' (eg Geach). Students may therefore defend Aristotelian virtue ethics through the function argument, based as it is on this reputedly essential characteristic of human nature (ie rationality).

- Students may qualify the latter with an acknowledgment that our modern understanding of human biology and psychology make Aristotle's own views on women and slaves indefensible today, but his insights into the nature of 'man' can and should be expanded to be inclusive of all human beings and (possibly) some non-human animals (eg MacIntyre).
- Students may argue that the importance of education and habituation in the cultivation of moral virtue is empirically demonstrable (in those we admire as moral exemplars); by contrast, we do not (typically) attribute admirable moral decisions to the application of abstract universal principles or speculative consequential calculations. Furthermore, we recognise the truth that we are not born moral - so, no one is evil by nature.
- The 'doctrine of the mean'---properly understood to mean registering the appropriate feeling/emotion, at the appropriate time, motivating the appropriate action---is applicable to practical moral education with the potential to develop moral character throughout a lifetime.
 - "So too anyone can get angry, or give and spend money - these are easy; but doing them in relation to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, with the right aim in view, and in the right way. – that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy." II.9 Nicomachean Ethics
- Some students may argue that virtue ethics rightly places greater emphasis on how moral agents feel about their morally good action---eg commending those who take pleasure in acting for the good of others rather than seeing this as a form of self-interest without moral worth.

Criticism of Aristotelian virtue ethics:

- Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act: the doctrine of the mean is too vague (given that it depends on the person, the circumstance, and seems unmeasurable).
- The issue of clashing/competing virtues (eg might kindness clash with courage?).
- The possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and virtuous persons in terms of each other: virtuous acts as acts performed by virtuous people, and virtuous people as those who perform (or are disposed to perform) virtuous acts.
- The relationship between the good for the individual and (wider) moral good: Must a trait really contribute to eudaimonia in order to be a virtue? There may be virtues relating to our treatment of the environment and wider society which do not contribute to our eudaimonia.
- Aristotle's account of ethics leaves too much down to luck (and yet, perhaps in tension with this, Aristotle holds people responsible for their ignorance of virtue).
- The application of Mackie's argument from relativity: If there are moral facts (eg about the virtues), then why is there not more agreement about them?
- Objections to the function argument:
 - Humans do not have a function: there cannot be a function without a function-giver (Sartre's point that, without God, "existence precedes essence").
 - Even if something is our unique function this does not imply that we should fulfil it - this could be linked to Hume's is-ought gap.
 - (Some) animals share the functions that Aristotle sees as uniquely human (reasoning, deliberation, language). Aristotle wrongly excludes animals from moral consideration and contribution.
 - There are other unique human functions (some being morally suspect/bad) which are ignored in Aristotle's account.
- Application of Moore's 'open question argument' to insist that goodness (of a person) cannot be reduced to the possession of certain virtues.
- NB: Students are free to advocate one or more rival moral theories (eg Kant's deontological ethics) over Aristotle's virtue ethics. They may also critically compare Aristotle's position with one or more rival moral theories (eg act and rule utilitarianism). But discussion of these alternative theories is only credit worthy to the extent that it is used to analyse and evaluate Aristotelian virtue ethics.

