1: Define (a) acquaintance knowledge, (b) ability knowledge, and (c) propositional knowledge [3 Marks]

AO1 = 3

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
3	A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision.
1	Relevant, but fragmented, points.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- **Acquaintance knowledge: having acquaintance knowledge is…**
  - …knowing / having knowledge of X (by experience of X)
  - …knowing / having knowledge of X (a place/thing/person) by experience of X (it/him/her)
  - … knowing of'
  - e.g. I know Jim well; I know York (like the back of my hand).
- **Ability knowledge: having ability knowledge is…**
  - …knowing / having knowledge of how to perform/complete a task/action
  - …having the ability to perform/complete/carry out a task/action
  - … knowing 'how'…
  - e.g. I know how to ride a bike; I know how to tie my shoelaces.
- **Propositional knowledge: having propositional knowledge is….**
  - …knowing / having knowledge that some claim – a proposition – is true or false
  - …knowing / having knowledge that p (where p is a proposition)
  - …knowing / having knowledge that something is the case
  - …having knowledge that is expressed in the form of a true proposition/sentence/assertion.
  - …knowing / having knowledge of a fact/truth
  - …Knowing 'that'…
  - e.g. I know that 2 + 2 = 4; I know that the sky is blue
  - (Students might give a definition of a proposition (eg a declarative sentence) but need not do so)
  - Do not credit knowing 'about' something, as this does not sufficiently distinguish propositional from acquaintance knowledge.

Students might give an example for one or more of these but need not do so. Assign one mark for a correct definition of each type of knowledge. If the example is accurate but the definition is not, do not award a mark. E.g. "Acquaintance knowledge is knowledge about the world e.g. I know Steve". Gets 0 marks. Students may embed the definition in the example, which is fine. If a student response contains no credit-worthy definitions but one or more correct example is present, credit a maximum of 1 mark for fragmented relevant material assuming that what the student has written is correct. E.g. "I have acquaintance knowledge about Australia because I visited there last year".

2 Explain why justification truth and belief may not be collectively sufficient conditions for knowledge [5 Marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Gettier-style problem have been used to show that the conditions are not sufficient (Gettier's own original claim), such that someone can have a justified true belief that p, but not know that p.
- Students could discuss the idea of a Gettier-style case in the abstract but, firstly, this is unlikely, and, secondly, a specific example is very likely to increase the clarity of the answer. Examples that students will use may very well include one (or more) of the following:
  - Cases of justified true belief when a propositional belief happens (by luck) to match some factual state of affairs: eg Gettier's own example where Smith and Jones are going for the same job; Smith has good reasons for believing that the man with "ten coins in his pocket" is "the man who will get the job"; a man matching that profile does indeed get the job (Smith); but when Smith formed this true belief, he actually had Jones in mind.
  - Cases of justified true belief which are due to a lucky disjunction: eg the second of Gettier's own cases, this time concerning Smith, Jones's car, and the location of Smith's friend, Brown. In this case Smith forms the true belief that "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", inferring the latter from the (seemingly well evidenced) former; but the former is false (Jones hired the Ford), and the latter is true by pure chance (Smith had no idea where Brown was): it was an arbitrary statement / lucky guess.
  - Non-inferential cases of justified true belief: eg Goldman's Barn Country example, where Henry's true belief is lucky because he just happens to have correctly identified the only barn (in Barn Country) that is not a fake (he is not aware of the context in which he is forming his belief).

  NB: Students need not use an original Gettier case (nor the alternative suggested above). The important thing here is that students make the appropriate connection between the tripartite view they have outlined and the details of their chosen case---a case which is designed to show that justified true belief does not always yield knowledge (because of the luck involved).

3 Explain Descartes first and second 'waves of doubt'. [5 marks]

AO1 = 5

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.
3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content:

- Descartes' purpose is to subject himself and his opinions to radical scepticism (the 'method of doubt') with the aim of finding certainty/indubitability/knowledge. These two sceptical arguments are proposed in this context as part of his methodological doubt.
- Students may set it out as a step by step argument (though it may of course be differently explained/structured). Here are two possible formats, but there are others:

The first 'wave of doubt': the argument from illusion/perceptual error

- Here is a simple way in which this could be put as an argument:
    - P1: If my senses can deceive me then they cannot and should not always be trusted as a source of knowledge.
    - P2: My senses do and can deceive me.
    - C: Therefore, my senses cannot be completely trusted.
- Descartes discuss things that are very far away and things that are very small as examples.
- However, Descartes does not see such examples from unusual perceptual conditions as giving us reason to doubt all of our senses all the time. For example, he says he can know that he is sat by the fire wearing a winter dressing-gown and holding a piece of paper.
- Students might note that the very fact that we think of such cases as illusions, as one-off cases of error, shows that they are not endemic.

The second 'wave of doubt': the argument from dreaming

- However, he continues, such events (ie being sat by a fire wearing a winter dressing-gown and holding a piece of paper) are the sorts of events that can be dreamt. Thus, even when perception is at its best and we have managed to rule out the possibility of ordinary misperception, it is still possible that we are deceived.
- The dreaming argument is based on the claim that dreams can be subjectively/qualitatively/phenomenally indistinguishable from waking experiences – ie that for any given experience, there is no way of telling whether it is a dreamed or a veridical experience from the experience itself.
- Here are two examples of how this might be structured as an argument (for guidance only – students may explain this accurately and proficiently in many ways):
    - P1: In order for a perception-based belief about mind-independent reality to count as knowledge (for me to be certain of it) there must be no grounds for doubting it.
    - P2: For all such beliefs, the possibility that I am dreaming gives sufficient grounds for doubting them.
    - C: Therefore, I have no perception-based knowledge about mind-independent reality.

- P1: In order to know about the nature of the external world (what it is like), I need to be certain that I am not dreaming
  - P2: In order to be certain that I am not dreaming, dreams would have to be subjectively distinguishable from veridical experience.
  - P3: A vivid dream is subjectively indistinguishable from a possible veridical experience.
  - C: Therefore I cannot be certain that I am not now dreaming (it is possible that I am now dreaming and so I cannot know anything about what the external world is like.
- It is important to recognise that this argument applies specifically to perception-based ("sensory") knowledge claims about particular matters of fact.
- There are some beliefs that are not threatened by this sceptical argument: e.g. Descartes claims that the truths of maths and geometry, for example, are known whether we are awake or dreaming, and that mind-independent objects (which

4 Explain innatism and *explain how Locke argues against this view* **[12 marks]**

AO1= 12

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
10–12	The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
7–9	The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctlythroughout.
4–6	The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.
1–3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

Explain innatism...

- Innatism is a rationalist view that affirms the existence of innate knowledge and/or innate concepts and so denies that, at (and/or before) birth, the mind is a tabula rasa (a blank slate). (It therefore challenges empiricism which denies the existence of innate knowledge/concepts and claims that the mind is a tabula rasa at birth.)
- Students might say "at (and/or before) the moment that they are first conscious" rather than "at (and/or before) birth", but either is fine (the latter being how this view is normally expressed).
- Students may give examples of proposed innate concepts (eg God, infinity, causation) and/or innate knowledge (eg geometrical, mathematical, logical or ethical truths). They might explain that at least some of this innate knowledge can be argued to be synthetic a priori knowledge (a possibility that empiricists deny).
- They have not been asked to explain why people take the position but some may, and this should not be counted as redundancy (though of course too much time spent on this first (and lesser) part of the question may prevent them having time to do a good job of the second part).
- Students may also distinguish the view that the innate is fully formed from the view of the innate as potential.

...and then explain one of Locke's arguments against this position.
- In general, as an empiricist, Locke argues against the existence of innate concepts and knowledge (ie against innatism) and so claims that, at birth, the mind is a tabula rasa (a blank slate).
- Students may discuss any of the following arguments which oppose innatism (though this is not exhaustive):
- Lack of universal agreement:
  - P1: If a concept or item of knowledge was innate, then it would be universal (every person's mind would contain it from birth).
  - P2: If so, there would be universal assent/agreement regarding it.
  - P3: There are no such concepts or truths.

- - - C: Therefore, there are no concepts or items of knowledge that are innate.
      - In support of P3, Locke discusses 'children and idiots' (by the latter, he means those with severe learning disabilities) who lack supposedly innate knowledge such as 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'.
      - He also discusses the different concepts of God that exist in different cultures, along with the absence of any concept of God in some.
      - Locke also responds to a particular objection to P2 which claims that these items of knowledge/concepts could be present universally but yet still not assented to, if it is possible that they are present in the mind without people (yet) being aware of them. He claims that if a person's mind contained an innate concept or item of knowledge from birth, that person would have to be aware of this from birth. It is, he says, "near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not" (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter II).
- Alternative explanations: Locke argues that any suggested examples of innate concepts and items of knowledge can be adequately explained in some other way: as being based on experience, or as being acquired through reason without being innate, or as not existing at all (for example, he denies that we have a 'positive idea of infinity').
- Universal agreement does not guarantee innateness: He argues (therefore) that even if there were universal agreement on certain concepts or items of knowledge, this would not mean that they were innate (presuming the agreement can be explained in other ways – see point above).
- Problems distinguishing innate from non-innate: Locke argues in general that if 'possession of innate knowledge' means 'capacity to discover it at some point', then this does not adequately distinguish it from other items of knowledge. Specifically, he argues that if certain truths were present in the mind from birth but not universally assented to until the development of reason, then this would not adequately distinguish innate from non-innate knowledge. Examples:
  - Since it is through reason that all the maxims (axioms) and theorems (derived truths) of mathematics are discovered, it would mean that they are all innate.
  - ⬛ Any proposition of the form 'X is not Y' will pass the test; but this will mean that there are 'legions' of innate propositions.
- No innate concepts so no innate knowledge: He argues that there could be no innate knowledge unless there were innate concepts, so any argument against the existence or possibility of innate concepts is ipso facto an argument against innate knowledge. For example, 'yellow is not red' will be universally assented to; but 'there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience' than to claim that the concepts <yellow> and <red> are innate.

5: How convincing is Indirect Realism? [25 marks]

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme
21–25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained. The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.
16–20	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained. The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it. Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended. There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.
11–15	A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated. A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole. Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.
6–10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently. The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated. Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear. Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.
1–5	There is little evidence of an argument. There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided. There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion. There is some basic use of philosophical language.
0	Nothing written worthy of credit.

Indicative content

- Students will likely begin by explaining indirect realism (IR), which can be most clearly split up into the following claims (especially for the purposes of evaluation):
  1. REALISM claim: Mind-independent objects and their properties (objects which exist whether or not they are perceived or conceived of) do exist.
  2. SENSE-DATA claim: We immediately perceive mind-dependent sense-data and their properties rather than these mind-independent objects and their properties
  3. REPRESENTATION claim: Our non-physical sense-data (normally/can) represent these physical mind-independent objects and their properties (at least to some extent) (meaning that we indirectly perceive them). Students may explain this in terms of the primary/secondary quality distinction, although there is no requirement for them to do so.
  4. CAUSATION claim: Our non-physical sense-data are (in the end) caused by these physical mind-dependent objects and their properties (ie by their effects on our physical bodies/brains).
- Conclusions may be drawn by arguing for and against some of the following positions and content discussed may be drawn from the supporting content bullet-pointed underneath (though this list is not exhaustive):
  - **UNCONVINCING**: the immediate objects of perception are (or are likely to be) mind-independent:
    - Broadly metaphysical/ontological objections to IR:
      - IR faces problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) represent mind-independent objects (there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of representation - this may be linked to questions about intentionality/representative content and/or Berkeley's "likeness" principle).
      - IR faces problems arising from the view that mind-dependent objects (particularly non-physical sense-data) are caused by mind-independent objects (there is not enough in common between these different types of objects to sustain this relationship of causation – this may be linked to questions about mind-body causation and so put as an anti-dualist and pro-materialist argument).
      - Other problems associated with sense-data: location issues (where are they?), and the issue of indeterminacy (the speckled hen problem).
    - Broadly epistemological objections to IR:
      - IR faces issues of scepticism about the existence and nature of the external world (the 'veil of perception').
      - In addition, it appears introspectively (a phenomenological point) that we are aware of mind-independent objects (the "transparency" of experience); statements about external mind-independent objects are irreducible to statements about 'mere' experiences.
        - Indirect realists can respond that good inductive support can be given for the existence of the external world:
          - Locke's argument from the involuntary nature of our experience
          - the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Locke and Catharine Trotter Cockburn (attrib)
          - Bertrand Russell's response that the external world is the 'best hypothesis'.
  - **CONVINCING**: the immediate objects of perception are never mind-independent (although mind-independent objects (probably/definitely) do exist) (ie arguing for indirect realism).
    - The argument from illusion.

- The argument from hallucination (the possibility of experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception).
- The argument from perceptual variation (Russell's table example)
- The time-lag argument.
- The argument from science (differences between the ordinary or folk conception of objects and the scientific conception).
    - Students may then discuss responses to these arguments from alternative theories of perception (most likely direct realism) which show how we can avoid the indirect realist conclusion (eg by discussing "relational" properties of objects and/or challenging the phenomenal principle).
- o **UNCONVINCING**: IR is false because mind-independent objects and properties do not exist (ie arguing for either idealism or some form of phenomenalism).
    - Berkeley's 'Master' argument (and other arguments he gives) can be interpreted as demonstrating that we cannot have a meaningful or coherent concept of anything mind-independent (and it may therefore follow that such objects are impossible).
    - Berkeley's attack on the Primary/Secondary Quality distinction: his argument that all properties are mind-dependent. (Of course, this only applies to versions of IR that embrace this distinction, eg Locke).
- o **CONVINCING FOR SOME CASES**: the immediate objects of perception are sometimes but not always mind-dependent
    - ie arguing for a (metaphysical) disjunctivism in which illusions and/or hallucinations do have sense-data as immediate objects of perception but veridical perception does not
    - Doing so by attacking the 'common factor principle' in arguments from illusion and hallucination, ie denying that subjectively indistinguishable