

**1: What is substance? [3 Marks]**

AO1 = 3

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme   |
|-------|--|
| 3     | A full and correct answer, given precisely, with little or no redundancy.                                |
| 2     | The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or minor imprecision. |
| 1     | Relevant, but fragmented, points.  |
| 0     | Nothing written worthy of credit.  |

**Indicative content:**

**Substances are typified as:**

- i. That which depends upon nothing else for its existence (Aristotle)
- ii. being ontologically basic—substances are the things from which everything else is made or by which it is metaphysically sustained;
- iii. being, at least compared to other things, relatively independent and durable, and, perhaps, absolutely so;

**2: Explain the two features of mental states. [5 Marks]**

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme  |
|-------|---|
| 5     | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.                   |
| 4     | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.   |
| 3     | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2     | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.   |
| 1     | Fragmented points, with no logical structure.   |
| 0     | Nothing written worthy of credit.   |

**Indicative content:**

- Features of mental states:
  - All or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties
    - Some, but not all, philosophers use the term 'qualia' to refer to these properties, where 'qualia' are defined as 'intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible'
  - All or at least some mental states have intentional properties (ie intentionality).
    - Intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs outside of the mind.
    - To say of an individual's mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents.

### 3: Outline the conceivability argument for substance dualism. [5 marks]

AO1 = 5

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme  |
|-------|---|
| 5     | A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.                   |
| 4     | A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy.   |
| 3     | The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise. |
| 2     | One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.   |
| 1     | Fragmented points, with no logical structure.   |
| 0     | Nothing written worthy of credit.   |

#### Indicative content:

This is an argument for substance dualism: the view that there are non-physical/mental substances in addition to physical substances (that minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies).

- The argument might be stated as:
  - P1: I can conceive of my mind/myself existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) existing.
  - P2: Anything that I can ('clearly and distinctly') conceive of is (metaphysically) possible (Descartes puts this as: "God could make it so")
  - P3: Therefore, my mind/myself existing without my extended physical body (and indeed the whole physical world) is (metaphysically) possible.
  - P4: If it is (metaphysically) possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y.
  - P5: Therefore, my mind/myself is not identical with my extended physical body (nor is it identical with any part of the physical world).
- Students might present the argument in terms of clear and distinct ideas (ie I have a clear and distinct idea of mind and body as having distinct essences and thereby as being distinct substances, and, therefore, they are distinct substances).
- P1 is linked to the *cogito* and the fact that Descartes can doubt the existence of physical reality, but not the existence of his mind.
- It is a deductive and (arguably) a priori argument.
- Students may phrase the argument in terms of what God can do or not (see P2).

**4: Outline the indivisibility argument for substance dualism and explain the response that not everything thought of as physical is divisible. [12 marks]**

AO1= 12

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme   |
|-------|--|
| 10–12 | The answer is set out in a precise, fully-integrated and logical form. The content is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. Points are made clearly and precisely. Relevance is sustained, with very little or no redundancy. Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.  |
| 7–9   | The answer is set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. The content of the answer is correct and demonstrates detailed understanding. The content is clearly relevant and points are made clearly and precisely. Any lack of clarity with respect to particular points is not sufficient to detract from the answer. Relevance is largely sustained. There may be some redundancy, though not sufficient to detract from the answer. Philosophical language is used correctly throughout. |
| 4–6   | The answer is clear and set out in a coherent form, with logical/causal links identified. The content of the answer is largely correct and most points are made clearly. Relevance is not always sustained and there is some redundancy. Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the response.   |
| 1–3   | There are some relevant points made, but no integration. Some points are clear, but there is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. Philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately.   |
| 0     | Nothing written worthy of credit.  |

**Indicative content**

Outline the indivisibility argument for substance dualism

- Descartes' indivisibility argument supports substance dualism, namely...
  - the view that minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies;
  - the view that there is a non-physical realm (the realm of mental substance/s – *res cogitans*) distinct from the physical realm (the realm of physical substance – *res extensa*);
  - the view that non-physical minds exist as separate things which persist through property changes.
- Some students may explain that this is a deductive argument for dualism.
- Here is the indivisibility argument in standard form, though students may of course present it differently:
  - P1: All physical objects are (essentially) divisible [since extended in space].
  - P2: All minds/mental states/objects are (essentially) not divisible [since unextended in space].
  - [P3:  $x = y$  (x and y are numerically identical - ie are the exact same thing) if and only if they have the exact same properties].
  - C: Therefore minds/mental states/objects are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.
- In support of P1 and P2, Descartes claims: "As for the faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and so on, these are not parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, understands and perceives. They are (I repeat) not parts of the mind, because they are properties or powers of it. By contrast, any corporeal thing can easily be divided into parts in my thought; and this shows me that it is really divisible" (*Meditations*).
- P3 may or may not be included – this is part of 'Leibniz's law': Leibniz's Law of Identity: two things are the same if, and only if, they have all of the same properties at the same time.

**NB:** Students may score marks for explanations of substance dualism and the form the argument takes (eg 'deductive', 'presupposing Leibniz's law'), but those progressing to Level 3 and beyond will address the substance of the argument, which concerns the indivisibility of mind over against the divisibility of matter (whether in conception or as a matter of fact / metaphysical truth).

and explain the response that not everything thought of as physical is divisible

- It seems that it could be possible to conceive of a physical object that cannot be divided any further.
- There could be a limiting point where when dividing a physical object is impossible
- Elementary particles studied by Physicists may not have smaller constituent parts – in any case Descartes is not in a position to know whether or not particles can be divided ad infinitum
- If it is possible for a body to be indivisible then it is possible that a physical body is made of the same sort of stuff as the indivisible mind.
- Therefore it is not necessarily true that minds are indivisible and bodies divisible.

**5: Is substance dualism convincing? [25 marks]**

AO1 = 5, AO2 = 20

| Marks | Levels of response mark scheme  |
|-------|---|
| 21–25 | <p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is sustained.</p> <p>The student demonstrates detailed and precise understanding throughout.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of it stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument. Crucial arguments are clearly identified against less crucial ones.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used precisely throughout.</p>  |
| 16–20 | <p>The student argues with clear intent throughout and the logic of the argument is largely sustained.</p> <p>The content is correct and detailed – though not always consistently.</p> <p>The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments supporting it.</p> <p>Arguments are generally stated in their strongest forms. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. Arguments and counter-arguments are stated clearly, integrated coherently and defended.</p> <p>There may be trivial mistakes, as long as they do not detract from the argument.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly throughout.</p>   |
| 11–15 | <p>A clear response to the question, in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent.</p> <p>The content is detailed and correct and most of it is integrated.</p> <p>A conclusion and reasons are given and those reasons clearly support the conclusion. There might be a lack of clarity/precision about the logic of the argument as a whole.</p> <p>Arguments and counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Not all arguments are stated in their strongest forms. Stronger and weaker arguments are noted and there are attempts to identify the weight to be given to different arguments, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used correctly, with any minor errors not detracting from the argument.</p> |
| 6–10  | <p>The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but not fully coherently.</p> <p>The content is largely correct, though there are some gaps and a lack of detail. Relevant points are recognised/identified, but not integrated.</p> <p>Alternative positions are identified, but not precisely. Counter-arguments might be stated in weak forms or even slightly misrepresented. Arguments and counter-arguments are juxtaposed, so similarities and contrasts identified, rather than their impact being clear.</p> <p>Philosophical language is used throughout, though not always fully correctly and/or consistently.</p>   |
| 1–5   | <p>There is little evidence of an argument.</p> <p>There may be missing content, substantial gaps in the content or the content may be one-sided.</p> <p>There may be a conclusion and several reasonable points may be made. There may be some connections between the points, but there is no clear relationship between the points and the conclusion.</p> <p>There is some basic use of philosophical language.</p>   |
| 0     | <p>Nothing written worthy of credit.</p>  |

**Indicative content:**

Candidates are likely to begin with a definition of CSD, i.e. that persons are to be identified with an incorporeal soul. Soul is a logical substance possessing none of the attributes of physical substance, such as divisibility and extension in space. Whereas physical substance can change and decay, soul substance cannot, so remains incorruptible and immortal. The soul is a thinking thing, since 'I' am not my body: 'I' am a thing that thinks. Descartes has a number of arguments, so candidates might refer, for example, to the argument from doubt, the argument from clear and distinct perception, and the argument from divisibility. CSD is generally unpopular because of its lack of explanatory power. CSD has no coherent explanation of the undoubted existence of consciousness in animals; the brain seems redundant, since all mental functions are the province of the soul; and Descartes could offer no coherent explanation of the interaction between the physical brain and the non-physical soul. Some might mention the problem of counting souls, the homunculus fallacy, and so on.