**LACTOR 1, *The Athenian Empire* (ISBN-13 978-0903625172)**

* Andokides 3.29 (No. 61)
* Aristophanes, *Akharnians* 61–71 (No. 58); 524–539 (No. 99)
* Aristophanes, *Peace* 619–622 (No. 110); 639–648 (No. 202)
* Aristotle *Politics* 1284a38 (No. 84)
* Diodorus 11.46-47 (No. 19); 11.50 (No. 28); 12.2.1–2 (No. 52); 12.4.4–6; (No. 53); 12.38.2 (No. 113)
* Harpokration s.v. *Attikois grammasin* (No. 54)
* Plutarch, *Aristeides* 23 (No. 10); 24.1–5 (No. 20)
* Plutarch, *Cimon* 11–12.4 (No. 33); 13.4–5 (No. 51)
* Plutarch, *Pericles* 23.1–2 (No. 71); 28.1–3 (No. 89)

**Andokides, 3.29 (No. 61)**

We are the people who first made a treaty with the Great King – I must remind you of past events in order to give you the best advice – and agreed to friendship for all time, a treaty which Epilykos son of Tisander, my mother’s brother, was responsible for as ambassador, and then, persuaded by the King’s banished subject Amorges, we cast off the King’s power, as if it was worth nothing, and took up the friendship of Amorges, considering him to be stronger.

**Aristophanes, *Akharnians* 61–71 (No. 58); 524–539 (No. 99)**

The long absence of Athenian ambassadors to Persia ridiculed

HERALD. The ambassadors from the King!

DIKAIOPOLIS. What sort of a king? I’m fed up with ambassadors and peacocks and flattery.

HERALD. Silence

DIKAIOPOLIS. Bless me! The shape of Ekbatana!

AMBASSADOR. You sent us to the Great King, paid at 2 drachmas a day, in the archonship of Euthymenes (437/6)

DIKAIOPOLIS. Aaaagh! The cost!

AMBASSADOR. We were worn out with wandering through the plain of the Kayster, lying on soft cushions in our carriages, done for.

Aristophanes *Akharnians* (425) 61-71

DIKAIOPOLIS. Some drunken young men from a party went off to Megara and kidnapped a prostitute named Simaitha. Then the Megarians, their anger fuelled with garlic, came and kidnapped two prostitutes belonging to Aspasia in return. It was a result of that that war broke out for the whole of Greece – over three prostitutes. It was that that caused angry Olympian Perikles to thunder and lighten and stir Greece up: he made laws that were written like drinking songs and said that the Megarians should be banned from earth, from the Agora, from the sea and from heaven. It was this that made the Megarians, who were dying by inches, ask the Spartans to get the decree repealed – the decree over the prostitutes. But we were not willing, even when they often begged us. And it was that that brought about this din of shields.

Aristophanes *Akharnians*524-39

**Aristophanes, *Peace* 619–622 (No. 110); 639–648 (No. 202)**

HERMES. Then, when the cities that you ruled realised that you [the people of Athens] were at each other’s throats and showing your teeth as you grinned, they plotted against you in every way that they could because of their fear of the tribute, and they used bribes to persuade the most powerful men in Sparta.

Aristophanes *Peace* (421) 619-22

Allies afraid of Athenian accusations against them

HERMES. [The speakers in the Assembly] used to shake down the wealthy and prosperous among the allies, laying accusations that they were Brasidean sympathisers. And then you tore at them like hounds – the city, sitting there pale and frightened, gobbled up with pleasure whatever slanders anyone told it. The foreigners, seeing the blows that were being struck, bunged up the mouths of those who made these accusations with gold, making them rich, while you were never going to notice that Greece was on its way to desolation. And the man who did this was the tanner [i.e. Kleon].

Aristophanes *Peace* (421) 639-48

**Aristotle *Politics* 1284a38 (No. 84)**

Those in positions of power do the same [i.e. weaken their rivals] with regard to cities and nations, as for example the Athenians with regard to Samos, Khios and Lesbos: for as soon as they had a firm hold over their empire, they humbled these islands contrary to agreements.

Aristotle *Politics* 1284a38

Diodorus 11.46-47 (No. 19); 11.50 (No. 28); 12.2.1–2 (No. 52); 12.4.4–6; (No. 53); 12.38.2 (No. 113)

**Diodorus 11.46-47 (No. 19)**

Aristeides’ conduct as General was compared [to the notorious behaviour of Pausanias] among the allies, and because of the way he got on with his subordinates and his other virtues, he made them all incline, as it were with one accord, towards the Athenians. So they no longer took any notice of leaders sent from Sparta, but as a result of their admiration for Aristeides they enthusiastically submitted to him in every matter, and so enabled him to take over the supreme command by sea without having to face any danger. Immediately, therefore, Aristeides advised all the allies, who were holding a general meeting, to choose Delos as their common Treasury, to deposit there all the money they collected, and to impose a levy on all the cities according to their means for the war which they suspected would come from Persia. The total collected as a result was 506 talents. Aristeides was put in charge of the tribute assessment, and he shared out the amount so precisely and fairly that all the cities were well pleased. Since he seemed to have accomplished something impossible, Aristeides got the greatest reputation for justice, and because he was so excessively just he was known as ‘Aristeides the Just’.

**Diodorus 11.50 (No. 28)**

(Further evidence of hostility between Athens and Sparta)

IN this year [475], the Spartans showed their resentment that they had lost command of the sea for no good reason. They were ill-disposed towards the Greeks who had revolted from them and threatened to impose an appropriate punishment upon them. When Gerousia [Council of Elders] met, the Spartans debated whether to go to war with the Athenians over the command by sea. Similarly when the popular Assembly met, the younger men, and many of the others, were ambitious to get the command back, in the belief that, if they got it, they would enjoy much revenue, would make Sparta in every respect greater and more powerful, and the households of individuals would be made prosperous. They reminded themselves of the old oracle in which the god had ordered them to beware the lame leadership, and they interpreted the oracle as having a bearing on the present situation. For they said that their rule would indeed be lame if when there were two commanders [on land and at sea], they were to lose on of them.

Practically all the citizens supported this interpretation, and when the Gerousia met to discuss these matters, no one expected that anyone would dare to give contrary advice. But one of the members of the Gerousia, whose name was Hetoimaridas, who traced his ancestry back to Herakles, and who enjoyed favour among the citizens for his excellence, made an attempt at advising that the Athenians be allowed to keep command. He said that Sparta should not dispute command at sea, supplied a wealth of fitting arguments to this unlikely claim, and contrary to expectation succeeded in persuading the Gerousia and the people. In the end the Spartans judged that Hetoimaridas gave the right advice and they turned away from their intention of making war on the Athenians. The Athenians at first expected to face a major war against the Spartans over the command at sea, and because of this built more triremes and accumulated a large amount of money. But when they learned what the Spartans had decided, they were relieved of their anxiety about war and lost no time seeing to increasing the power of their city.

**Diodorus 12.2.1–2 (No. 52)**

The Athenians were renowned throughout practically the whole inhabited world as remarkable for bravery and glory. For they had increased their hegemony to such an extent that on their own, without the Spartans and the Peloponnesians, they had defeated the great Persian forces in contests both by land and by sea, and they so humbled the famous Persian hegemony as to compel them to make an agreement to free all the cities of Asia. But of these things we have given a quite precise and detailed account in two books, this and the proceeding…

**Diodorus 12.4.4–6; (No. 53)**

When Artaxerxes the Persian King learnt about the defeats around Cyprus, he took counsel with his friends about the war, and decided that it was in his interests to make peace with the Greeks. In consequence, he wrote to the generals in Cyprus and to the satraps [provincial governors] laying down the conditions on which they could end the quarrel with the Greeks. So those with Artabazos and Megabyzos sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a settlement. The Athenians heard what they proposed favourably and sent ambassadors with full powers under Kallias son of Hipponikos. An agreement was made between the Athenians and their allies and the Persians about peace, whose central clauses were: that all the Greek cities in Asia be autonomous, that the Persian satraps should not come closer than three days’ journey to the coast and no long ship sail inside [west of] Phaselis and the Kyanean Rocks; that if the King and his generals observe these terms, the Athenians should not invade the land that the King ruled. Once the treaty had been concluded, the Athenians withdrew their forces from Cyprus after having achieved a brilliant victory and a most famous peace. It happened that Kimon died of illness while on Cyprus.

**Diodorus 12.38.2 (No. 113)**

The Athenians, keeping tight hold on their naval hegemony, transferred to Athens the moneys collected on Delos for common use, some 8,000 talents, and handed it over to Perikles to look after. Perikles was outstanding among the citizens for nobility, reputation, and skill in speaking. But after a time he had privately spent no small part of these moneys, and when asked to render an account he fell ill, unable to give an account of the money entrusted to him.

**Harpokration s.v. *Attikois grammasin* (No. 54)**

Doubts about the authenticity of the ‘Peace of Kallias’

Theopompos [a fourth-century historian] in book 25 of his *History of Philip* says that the treaty with the Persians is a fake, being written up not in the Attic but in the Ionic alphabet.

**Plutarch, *Aristeides* 23 (No. 10)**

When Aristeides was sent out along with Kimon as general for the war, he saw Pausanias and the other Spartiate [=Spartan citizen] commanders proving harsh and tiresome for the allies. He himself mingled with them in a kindly and considerate way and made sure Kimon was accommodating and even-handed to all the contingents. In this way he took over the leadership without the Spartans noticing, not by force of infantry, navy or cavalry but by kindness and diplomacy.

Pausanias’ greed and harshness were particularly important in making the Athenians desirable, the Athenians being agreeable to the Greeks because Aristeides was fair and Kimon noble. Pausanias always met the allied commanders with a short temper and rough treatment, and he punished the troops with beatings and making them stand holding an iron anchor all day.

No one was allowed to fetch bedding or fodder or approach a spring to get water before the Spartans did, servants with whips driving away anyone who tried. When Aristeides once tried to make known the complaints on their behalf, Pausanias scowled, said he had no time, and did not hear him out.

As a result of this the various Greek naval and military commanders, and particularly he Khians, Samians and Lesbians, went along to Aristeides and tried to persuade him to accept the leadership and to take command of the allies who had long wanted to be rid of the Spartiates and to transfer their allegiance to the Athenians.

Aristeides replied that he saw that their arguments were compelling and fair, but that he needed a pledge in the form of an action which, once taken, would not allow the troops to transfer their allegiance back again. AS a result, the friends of Ouliades the Samian and Antagoras the Khian, who had hatched the plot at Byzantion, launched an attack on Pausanias’ trireme when it was sailing out in the middle of the fleet.

When Pausanias saw this, he rose up and angrily threatened that in a short time he would show that they had not attacked his ship but their own homelands. They told him to go away and think himself lucky to have had a share of their glory at Plataia; for they thought that it was because the Greeks still felt embarrassed over that they had never exacted proper justice form him. Finally they revolted and went over to the Athenians.

It was here that Sparta’s wisdom revealed itself as remarkable. For when they became conscious that their commanders were being corrupted by the amount of power they were exercising, they willingly gave up the leadership and stopped sending generals to the war; they chose to have citizens who were self-controlled and continued to behave according to traditional values rather than to rule the whole of Greece.

**Plutarch, *Aristeides* 24.1–5 (No. 20)**

Even while the Spartans were leading them, the Greeks made contributions towards the war. Wanting the burden on each city to be moderate, they asked the Athenians for Aristeides’ help, and instructed him to consider the land and income of each city and to fix the contributions according to the resources of each. When he acquired such powers and Greece had, in a way, put all her affairs in his sole charge, he went out to the job poor and returned poorer, and he assessed the contributions not only justly but in a way that was kind and fitting for everyone. As the men of old praised the age of Kronos [as the Golden Age], so the allies of the Athenians sang the praises of Aristeides’ assessment as a stroke of good fortune for Greece, and particularly when not long afterwards tribute was doubled and then tripled. To explain, Aristeides’ assessment was 460 talents; Perikles added practically a third to this, for Thucydides says that at the beginning of the [Peloponnesian] war 600 talents were coming into the Athenians from their allies; after Perikles’ death, the demagogues [popular political leaders] increased it little by little until they had brought the total to 1,300 talents. They did this not so much because of the length and fortunes of war, but because they enticed the people into distributions of money, payments for public shows [*theorika*] and constructing cult statues and temples.

**Plutarch, *Cimon* 11–12.4 (No. 33);**

The Allies continued paying tribute but failed to provide men and ships according to their assessment, and were already refusing to go on campaign and did not man ships or send men, on the grounds that there was no need for warfare and that they wanted to live quietly and farm, since the barbarians had been removed and were not causing trouble. The other Athenian generals applied compulsion to make them do this, put those who failed on trial and by their punishments made Athenian rule grievous and hard to bear. But when Kimon was general he went in the opposite direction, and did not apply force to any Greek; he accepted money from those who were not willing to campaign, and empty ships, and he let them be enticed by leisure and spend their time on their own affairs, turning themselves from warriors into money-makers and farmers not fit for war through luxury and folly. He put many Athenians on the ships in turn and made them labour on the campaigns, and in short time used the money and pay from the allies to make the Athenians masters of those who paid. As a result of their own shyness of warfare, the allies became accustomed to fearing and flattering the men who were maintained and trained, and were always sailing and handling arms; they failed to realise that they were turning themselves into subjects and slaves.

No one did more to humble the great King and abase his pride than Kimon. He did not let him go when he departed from Greece, but following hard on the Persians’ heels and not letting them pause for breath, as it were, he ravaged and destroyed some of their territories and made others revolt and come over to the Greeks, so that he completely cleared Asia of Persian arms from Ionia to Pamphylia. When he learned that the King’s generals were lying in wait in Pamphylia with a large army and many ships, he set out from Knidos and the Triopion peninsula with 300 ships, with the intention of inducing such fear as to make the sea this side of the Khelidonian islands an area they would not sail into or trespass upon. These ships had been made by Themistokles to be very swift and manoeuvrable, and on that occasion Kimon made them broader, and gave them a gangway on the decks so that they would carry large numbers of hoplites and so be more effective at fighting the enemy. He sailed to the city of Phaselis, whose inhabitants were Greek, but they did not receive the fleet or wish to revolt from the King, and so he began to ravage their territory and attack their walls. The Khians, who were part of his fleet, had long enjoyed friendly relations with Phaselis, induced Kimon to be more gentle and shot pamphlets attached to arrows over the walls with messages for the people of Phaselis. In the end this brought reconciliation on condition that Phaselis pay ten talents, join the League, and take part in the campaign against Persia.

**Plutarch, *Cimon* 13.4–5 (No. 51)**

Conditions imposed on Persians by Kallias

This deed [Kimon’s victory at Eurymedon] so humbled the King’s pride that he made that famous peace, in which he promised that he would always keep a horse’s journey from the Greek Sea and not sail inside [west of] the Kyanean and Khelidonian islands with a long and bronze-beaked ship [i.e. a warship]. Yet Kallisthenes [late fourth-century historian] denies that the Persians made a treaty on these conditions, but says that because of the fear inspired by the defeat they acted is if such a peace was in force and kept so far away from Greece that Perikles with fifty ships and Ephialtes with just thirty could sail beyond the Khelidonians without any barbarian fleet meeting them. But Krateros in his collection of decrees [made in the early third century] includes a copy of the treaty as one that was made. And they say that the Athenians put up an altar of peace because of this treaty, and gave special honour to the ambassador Kallias.

**Plutarch, *Pericles* 23.1–2 (No. 71)**

When Perikles included an entry of 10 talents ‘as we needed’ in his account of expenditures from his generalship [in 446/5] the people did not quibble with this or look further into the secret. But some, including the philosopher Theophrastos, have stated that Perikles had ten talents sent annually to Sparta, and that by looking after the authorities in Sparta in this way he deferred the war, not purchasing peace but time during which he could make preparations quietly and ensure that the Athenians fought better.

**Plutarch, *Pericles* 28.1–3 (No. 89)**

In the ninth month the Samians surrendered and Perikles pulled down the walls, took away the ships and inflicted a large fine, part of which the Samians paid immediately, part they were assessed to pay at a stated time, giving hostages as security. Douris of Samos writes about this in tragic terms, accusing the Athenians and Perikles of much cruelty not recorded by Thucydides, Ephoros, or Aristotle. But it seems unlikely to be true that Perikles brought the Samian trierarchs (i.e. trireme captains) and marines to the marketplace in Miletos, tied them to boards for ten days and when they were already in a bad way ordered the Milesians to execute them by bludgeoning their heads and then to throw out the bodies without burial. Even when he has no personal links, Douris does not usually control his narrative by reference to truth, and he is very likely here to magnify the misfortunes of his own homeland to slander the Athenains.